BS HISTORY

AFGHANISTAN: HISTORY & POLITICS

Code: 9197 **Units: 1-9**



Department of History
Allama Iqbal Open University, Islamabad

Study Guide

AFGHANISTAN: HISTORY AND POLITICS

(BS History)

Unit 1-9 **Code No. 9197**

Department of History
Faculty of Social Sciences & Humanities
Allama Iqbal Open University, Islamabad

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Dr. Sadia Aziz

STRUCTURE OF THE COURSE

The course "Afghanistan: History and Politics" has been structured to make it as easy as possible for you to do the required work. Being a credit hours course, it consists of nine units, one unit comprises the study work of two weeks, and thus the total study period will be eighteen weeks. We have organized this course to enable you to acquire the skill of self-learning. For each unit, an introduction is given to help you develop an objective analysis of the major and sub-themes discussed in the prescribed reading material. Besides this, the objectives of each unit are very specifically laid down to facilitate in development of a clear, logical, and rational approach. Prescribed reading material (Compulsory and Additional Readings) has also been classified. After listing "Required Reading", we have given you a few Self-Assessment Questions. These questions are not only meant to facilitate your in understanding of the required readings.

This also provides you with an opportunity to assess yourself and how much you have learned. Since the coursework of one unit will include studying the prescribed reading material and carrying out the various self-assessment questions and assignments, you are required to spend two weeks on each unit.

How to Use Reading Material?

As this is a distance education course, we have organized the required coursework.

in the following manner to help you evolve a self-learning process in the absence

of formal classroom teaching.

i) A detailed Course Introduction
ii) Introduction to each Unit
iii) After listing 'Required Readings', we have given you a few Self-Assessment

Questions on each topic or theme. These questions are not only meant to facilitate your understanding of the required readings but also to provide you with an opportunity to assess yourself as to how far you have learned.

iv) To help you in answering the Self-Assessment Questions (SAQs), key ideas and formulas are given. These points will not only lead you to a better understanding but will also suggest a direction in which we expect you to think and analyse. You can, of course, think of many more points.

v) Although you choose your way of studying the required reading material, you are advised to follow the steps that are shown in the study chart.

INTRODUCTION

Afghanistan: History and Politics is a survey course that offers a comprehensive examination of the country's complex and tumultuous history, spanning over two and a half centuries. Through a reading-intensive approach, students will engage with pivotal events, issues, and themes that have shaped Afghanistan's political trajectory. The course is organized into nine thematic units, each comprising multiple sub-headings that facilitate a deep understanding of Afghanistan's transformation from a monarchy to a democratic state. Key topics include the introductory history of Afghanistan, the 'Great Game', state-building and modernization efforts, the Cold War era, and the ensuing decades of violent conflict, civil war, and religious extremism.

Afghanistan's unique history has earned it the distinction of being the "graveyard of empires," having successfully maintained its sovereignty and autonomy despite numerous invasions and conflicts since its emergence as a distinct political entity in 1747. Throughout its complex history, Afghanistan has demonstrated remarkable resilience in preserving its independence. Moreover, the country has played a pivotal role in shaping global events, from the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, which marked the beginning of a new era for Muslim Central Asian states and contributed to the end of the Cold War, to the US-led invasion in 2001, which sparked the global War on Terror.[1]

Upon completing the Study Guide, you will have gained insight into Afghanistan's complex history, marked by a persistent struggle between radical interpretations of various political ideologies. These ideologies have ranged from traditional tribal value systems to Marxism-Leninism and religious fundamentalism. Notably, Afghanistan is the only country to have experienced military invasions by three major world powers: Great Britain (twice in the 19th century), the Soviet Union (1979), and the United States (2001).[2]

Afghanistan's recent political history is aptly described as chaotic. Since 1973, the country has witnessed a succession of leader removals, including the overthrow of King Zahir Shah (1973), the executions of Sardar Daud (1978), Nur Muhammad Taraki (1979), and Hafizullah Amin (1979), and the removals of Babrak Karmal (1987), Najibullah (1992), Burhanuddin Rabbani (1996), and the

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1 Larry P. Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise of the Taliban* (Vancouver: University of Washington Press, 2012), 167.

2 Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 1.

Taliban regime (2001). This pattern of instability has been punctuated by periods of relative stability, resulting in a seemingly chaotic cycle of turmoil and calm.

As Mountstuart Elphinstone astutely observed in his book, Afghanistan's political landscape has long presented a daunting challenge to observers, marked by “fluctuation and instability” that defy easy comprehension. This assessment remains pertinent today, as contemporary analysts strive to provide rational explanations for the country's recent fragmentation.

This course provides a comprehensive overview of Afghanistan's history from 1747 to 2006. The period covered in this course concludes with the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 and the subsequent establishment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. However, it is essential to note that in 2021, the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan, and Haibatullah Akhundzada became the leader of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, this new government has not been recognized by the international community, and its legitimacy remains a topic of debate. As this course only covers events up to 2006, it does not address the recent developments in Afghanistan's politics. Nonetheless, understanding the historical context provided in this course is crucial for grasping the complexities of Afghanistan's current situation.

This course is organized into 9 units, each further divided into multiple sub-headings to facilitate in-depth exploration of Afghanistan's complex history.

Unit 1: The Land and the People provides an introduction to Afghanistan's geography, culture, and people, setting the foundation for understanding the country's complex history.

Unit 2: The Ahmad Shah and Durrani Empire (1747-1826) explores the emergence of modern Afghanistan under Ahmad Shah Durrani, the founder of the Durrani Empire, and the country's early development.

Unit 3: Afghanistan During the 'Great Game' (1826-1919) sheds light on Afghanistan’s strategic position during the 'Great Game' between the British and Russian empires, and the country's struggles to maintain independence.

Unit 4: The Period of the Independent Afghan Monarchy (1919-1973) examines Afghanistan's period of independence under the monarchy, including its modernization efforts and internal power struggles.

Unit 5: Revolution and Resistance: Republic of Afghanistan (1973-1978) discusses the overthrow of the monarchy, the establishment of the Republic of Afghanistan, and the country's brief experiment with democracy.

Unit 6: The Soviet Invasion & Afghan Response (1979-1989) analyzes the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Afghan resistance, and the impact of the conflict on the country and the region.

Unit 7: Afghanistan After the Cold War (1989-1996) explores the power vacuum following the Soviet withdrawal, the rise of warlords, and the country's descent into civil war.

Unit 8: Rise and Fall of Taliban (1996-2006) examines the Taliban's rise to power, their imposition of strict Islamic law, and their eventual overthrow by the US-led coalition.

Unit 9: Post-Taliban Afghanistan evaluates Afghanistan's post-Taliban era, including the country's efforts to rebuild, the ongoing insurgency, and the challenges facing the Afghan government.

COURSE OBJECTIVES

Upon completing this course, you will have acquired a comprehensive understanding of Afghanistan's complex history and politics, enabling you to:

1. Analyze the historical significance, geography, and demographics of Afghanistan.
2. Identify and explain the patterns of continuity and change throughout Afghanistan's history.
3. Assess the impact of the emergence of the first Afghan Kingdom on the region.
4. Examine the period of the independent Afghan monarchy and the consequences of the Great Game on Afghanistan during the 19th century.
5. Evaluate the effects of international and regional events on Afghanistan's internal situation during the 20th century.
6. Understand the historical context of the disputes and issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
7. Analyze the internal situation of Afghanistan following the Soviet occupation.
8. Discuss the emergence of the Taliban movement and its consequences.
9. Consider the implications of recent political changes and events in Afghanistan within the current global context.

LEARNING OUTCOMES

Upon completing this course, students will be expected to demonstrate the following skills and competencies: Inquire, investigate, read, write, reason, and speak as historians.

1. Employ historical inquiry and critical thinking skills to investigate, analyze, and interpret historical events.
2. Exhibit cultural sensitivity, tolerance, and appreciation for diversity.
3. Develop discernment in distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant historical information.

4. Analyze the major events, themes, and cultural developments that have shaped Afghanistan's history from ancient times to the present.
5. Utilize primary sources.
6. Understand the significance of literary sources in reconstructing Afghanistan's rich cultural and historical heritage.
7. Demonstrate proficiency in conveying knowledge through diverse media, encompassing:
   - Delivering effective lectures
   - Engaging in scholarly debates
   - Creating narrative commentaries for film documentaries
   - Writing scholarly articles
   - Providing contextual commentary for museum artifacts

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Unit 01

THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE

Written By: Dr. Sadia Aziz
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INTRODUCTION

Afghanistan enjoys a pivotal geographical location. It is lying at the crossroads of great Asian civilizations, which has had a profound influence on the course of this country's complex history.[1] The presence of a wide diversity of races and languages in modern Afghanistan is an indication of the fact that this country has always been a melting pot of different cultures.[2] Moreover, its crucial position as the gateway to India has greatly influenced Afghanistan's political evolution.

Throughout its history, Afghanistan has been subjected to invasion by external powers.[3] These forces used the infertile Afghan lands as a buffer zone and military encampment without directly occupying them. Forces operating outside its geographical boundaries have always influenced its politics, social structures, which eventually determined its place in the International world.[4] For the South Asian rulers, the Afghan borderland has always been a vulnerable region, as almost all successful invasions from the earliest time in South Asia took place from the Afghan inland routes.[5] The emergence of modern Afghanistan came under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Abdali in the mid-eighteenth century.[6]

However, Afghanistan managed to maintain mostly its sovereignty and autonomy throughout the three Anglo-Afghan wars, and World War II, in which it remained neutral partly due to difficult geographical conditions and the independent nature of the population. Thus, the country has never been occupied or subjugated to colonial rule, although it lost territories to both British India and Russia; these two powers thus drew Afghanistan's boundaries. On the contrary, the Afghanis, who are ethnically and linguistically divided, have become over time nationalistic and independence-minded. To put it in another way: there is a strong anti-colonial tradition in Afghanistan.

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1 Thomas Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010), 1.

2 Sadia Aziz, "Zia's Afghan Policy and Its Impact on Pakistan," (M.Phil diss., Quaid-i-Azam University, 2007), 83.

3 Wolfgang Peter Zingel and Stephanie Zingel Ave Lallement, eds., *Pakistan in the 80s: Ideology, Regionalism, Economy, Foreign Policy* (Lahore: Vanguard Books LTD, 1985), 13.

4 Kamal Matinuddin, *The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994-997* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 1.

5 Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of Taliban* (New York: DA CAPU press, 2002), 1.

6 Musa Khan Jalalzia, *The Taliban and the Great Game in Afghanistan* (Lahore: Vanguard Books LTD, 1999), 43; And Matinuddin, *The Taliban Phenomenon*, 1.

OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you will be able to;

- Know about the geographical location of Afghanistan.
- Explain the political structure, ethnic groups, and economy of Afghanistan.
- Enumerate the tribal structure of Afghanistan.

1. BRIEF INTRODUCTION OF AFGHANISTAN

Given below is a brief introduction of Afghanistan.

1.1 Flag of Afghanistan



Black stands for the time period of fighting three wars of independence against the British Empire.
Red signifies blood, sacrifice, and prolonged efforts of the people of Afghanistan to get through poverty and hardship.
Green symbolizes Islam and peace.
The writing on the flag emphasizes the importance of Islam by stating: 'there is no God but Allah and Mohammad (SAW) is his prophet,' and 'Allah is great'.

1.2 Political Structure

a) Executive:

1. The President is the head of both state and government
2. Provincial governors for each of Afghanistan's 34 provinces are appointed by the President.[7]

b) Legislature:

1. Lower: Wolesi Jirga (the House of the People). Responsibility for making and ratifying laws and approving the actions of the President.
2. Upper: Meshrano Jirga (the House of Elders). Advisory role with veto power.[8]

c) Judicial System:

1. All Justices (nine, including the Chief Justice) appointed by the President and approved by the Wolesi Jirga.

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[7] Afghanistan Profile (2006/April), (Cambridge: World of Information, 2006), 4.
[8] Ibid.

2. Subordinated by high courts and appeal courts.[9]

1.3 Comparative Area

2. 652,230 sq.km

1.4 Statistics

a) Social

1. Population: 28.396 Million (2009 est.)
2. Total Fertility Rate: 6.53
3. Under-5 Mortality: (m/f) 232/237 per 1000.

b) Life Expectancy at Birth:

1. Total population:44.64 yrs
2. Male: 44.47 years
3. Female: 44.81 years (2009 est.)

c) Literacy

1. Only 28.1% aged 15 and over can read and write.
2. Male: 43.1%
3. Female: 12.6% (2000 est.)
4. Unemployment Rate: 40%

1.5 Economy

2. Extremely poor, landlocked, and very dependent on foreign aid.
3. Shortage of housing, clean water, electricity, medical care, and jobs.
4. Other challenges: corruption, criminality, huge opium trade.

1.6 Ethnic Groups

a) Pashtun

1. Largest single Afghan ethnicity
2. Pashtu primary language
3. Adherence to "Pashtunwali"
4. *Pashtunwali* is a term coined by anthropologists. While the term itself is unfamiliar to them, it is an accurate description of an unwritten code or set of values important to their way of life.
5. Independent, fierce.
6. View themselves as the rightful leaders of Afghanistan.
7. The Ghilzai Pashtun tribe formed the backbone of the Taliban.
8. Pashtun proverb: "I against my brother, my brother and I against my cousin: I, my brother and my cousin against the stranger".

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[9] Ibid.

b) Tajik

1. Second largest ethnic group (25-30% of population).
2. Refer to themselves as "Farsiwan" speakers of Farsi/Dari.
3. Tajiks formed the backbone of the Northern Alliance against the Taliban.
4. Social organization by geography, not tribe.
5. Tied together by the perceived threat of Pashtuns.
6. Mostly Sunni Muslim, with few Shi'a.

c) Hazara

1. Mongolian descent.
2. Distinct ethnic and religious group.
3. The vast majority consists of Shi'a Muslims.
4. Historical target of discrimination.
5. Often anti-government, anti-Pashtun.
6. There are two main groups: Hazarajat (Hindu Kush in Central Afghanistan) and those outside Hazarajat (Central and North Afghanistan)
7. Opposed to Taliban.
8. Occasional feuds with nomadic Kuchi.

d) Uzbek

1. Turkic-Mongol mix.
2. Located in northern Afghanistan and Uzbekistan.
3. Uzbek and Dari speakers.
4. Mostly Sunni Muslims.
5. Introduced Buzkashi, Afghanistan's national sport.

e) Nurestani

1. Located primarily in North East Afghanistan.
2. Claim lineage to Alexander the Great and pro Quraysh tribe of Arabia.
3. Previously named "Kafirs", infidels.
4. Converted to Islam in the late 19th century.
5. Consists of 15 tribes with numerous sub-groups.
6. Speaks 5 languages with several dialects.

f) Turkmen

1. Turkic-speaking group.
2. Turkic-Mongol origins
3. Tribe structure based on patrilineal genealogies.
4. Farmers-herdsmen.
5. Jewellery and carpet makers.

g) Kuchi

1. Nomadic herdsmen.

2. Most often Pashtuns (a few non-Pashtun, such as Baluch).
3. Cross boundaries with ease.
4. High illiteracy rate.
5. Strong supporters of the Taliban.
6. Feuds with Hazara.
7. Number around 3 million.
8. Suffered from landmines emplaced during and after the Soviet-Afghan war.

h) Other Ethnic Groups

1. Pashai
2. Kabuli
3. Qizilbash
4. Gujjar, Hindus, Sikhs, Baluch, and Aimak

2. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF AFGHANISTAN: A ROUNDABOUT OF THE ANCIENT WORLD

2.1 Location and Bordering Countries

Afghanistan is a landlocked country located in the heart of Asia. Over the centuries, waves of migrating peoples passed through the region described by Arnold Toynbee as the "roundabout of the ancient world," leaving behind a mosaic of ethnic and linguistic groups. [10] Afghanistan's history, internal political development, and foreign relations, and very existence as an independent state have largely been determined by its geographic location at the crossroads of Central, West, and South Asia.

The geography of Afghanistan encompassing 245, 000 square miles, features a wide variety of terrain. The ecology of this country, dominated by mountains and deserts, a few fast-flowing rivers, and narrow mountain valleys, requires extensive labour to support human existence. The Hindu Kush chains of mountains, which divide the country into a northern third and a southern two-thirds, are the dominant geographical feature of the land, which extends out of the Pamir range clustered to the North West. The Pamir range, often called the roof of the world because of the many mountain ranges that converge near it, lies at the intersection of four countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, and Tajikistan.[11]

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[10] Abdul Sabahuddin, *History of Afghanistan* (New Delhi: Global Vision Publishing House, 2008), 1.

[11] Before the reign of Amir Abdul Rahman the boundaries of Afghanistan had never been clearly defined and their vagueness was always a source of misunderstanding with contiguous Powers. The demarcation of the boundaries of Afghanistan is an abiding and eloquent witness to the wisdom and foresight of that monarch's policy. He took full advantage of his alliance with the British Government, and through them he arranged Boundary Commission with Russia and

Afghanistan is bordered in the northeast by China via the Wakhan corridor, a region given to Afghanistan during the border demarcation to ensure a buffer zone existed between Tsarist Russia and Imperialist Britain.[12] On its west lies Fars or Iran. Baluchistan in South separates it to the Indian Ocean; On the East, it is divided from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa by the river Sind (Indus).[13] Afghanistan shares; 2,430km border with Pakistan, a 1,206km border with Tajikistan, a 137km border with Uzbekistan, a 744km border with Turkmenistan, a 936km border with Iran, and; 76km border with mainland China.[14]

2.2 Geographic Zones

Afghanistan may be divided into eight geographical zones distinguished by population clusters as well as terrain and climate. All of these zones, with the exception of the central one, extend outside Afghan political boundaries.
Beginning from east to west, the eight regions are;

1. The high altitude Wakhan
2. The mountains and valleys to its south, beginning with Badakhshan, southward to the Panjshir and Nuristan
3. The semitropical lowlands of Kunar, Logar, Jalalabad, and Laghman
4. The southeast mountain regions, including greater Paktia
5. The plains and foothills of the Kandahar region
6. The central mountains of Greater Hazarajat
7. The northern plains known as Afghan Turkestan
8. The western regions around Herat[15]

3. TRIBAL STRUCTURE OF AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan has existed as a recognisable political unit since the middle of the eighteenth century. Before this, the country did not have any national cohesion or a political identity as Afghanistan. Afghanistan is composed of many ethnicities, and the term Afghans refers to Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras, Turkmen, and many other ethnicities living in Afghanistan. But the term Afghan has historically

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Persia, and settled and marked all the limits of his dominions except a part of the Perso-Afghan boundary. For detail see; Abdul Ghani, *A Brief Political History of Afghanistan* (Lahore: Najaf Publishers, 1989).

12 Luis Durrani and Quis Durrani, *Afghanistan: It's No Nebraska: How to Deal with a Tribal State* (North Carolina: Lolo Enterprises, 2009), 17.

13 See for detail; Mohammad Hayat Khan, *Afghanistan and its Inhabitants*, trans. Henry Priestley (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1981).

14 Ahmad Shayeq Qassem, *Afghanistan's Political Stability* (London: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2009), 16.

15 For detail see; Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby, *Mullah, Marx and Mujahid,* with a foreword by Dar Rather (New York: West view Press, 1998), 5-7.

been used to refer to the Pashtuns. This is portrayed by Khushal Khan Khattak's poem, "pull out your sword and lay anyone, which says Pashtun and Afghan are not one! Arabs know this and so do Romans: Afghans are Pashtuns, Pashtuns are Afghans!"[16] The very names 'Afghan' and 'Afghanistan' were first chronicled as late as the tenth century AD by Hudud-al-Alam.[17]

Pashtun tribes and clans traditionally enjoyed a great deal of autonomy. The major tribes are Durrani, Ghilzai, Momand, Afridi, and Yusufzai. All of them follow a strict code of honour called Pashtunwali, whose main principles are hospitality and asylum to all guests seeking help, justice, and revenge for misdeeds or insults, fierce defence of *Zan, Zar, Zameen* (women, wealth, and property); defence of homeland, personal independence. Local government is regulated by village tribal elders who hold *Jirgas* (councils) to discuss tribal affairs and resolve problems. Rivalries between tribes carry on from generation to generation. The majority of Pashto speakers are sedentary farmers, though a large minority live as nomadic herders.[18] The Tajik, Uzbek, and Turkmen each share a language, culture, and history. All three groups traditionally follow a less tribal political organization than the Pashtun and usually accept the rule of various regional Khans.[19]

16 Luis Durrani, Afghanistan: It's No Nebraska, 31.
17 Ibid.
18 Shaista Wahab and Barry Youngernan, *A Brief History of Afghanistan* (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2007), 15.
19 Ibid.

Compulsory Reading

Ewan, Martin. *Afghanistan: A New History*. London: Curzon Press, 2001.

Suggested Readings

Afghanistan Profile (2006/April). Cambridge: World of Information, 2006.

Barfield, Thomas. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010.
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Wahab, Shaista and Barry Youngernan. *A Brief History of Afghanistan*. New York: Infobase Publishing, 2007.
Zingel, Wolfgang Peter, and Stephanie Zingel Ave Lallement, eds., *Pakistan in the 80s: Ideology, Regionalism, Economy, Foreign Policy.* Lahore: Vanguard Books LTD, 1985.

Self-Assessment Questions

1. Why Afghanistan has been described by Arnold Toynbee as a ‘roundabout of the ancient world’. Explain with an example.
2. Briefly explain the socio-political structure and composition of the Afghan society.
3. Discuss and enumerate how the geographical position of Afghanistan as the gateway to India has greatly affected Afghanistan’s present political evolution.

Please select an appropriate answer.

1. Why has Afghanistan been described as the "roundabout of the ancient world"?
a) Its unique cultural heritage
b) Its central location at the crossroads of Asia
c) Its natural resources
d) Its strategic military importance

2. What does the red color on the flag of Afghanistan signify?
a) Islam and peace
b) The blood and sacrifice of the people
c) Prosperity and growth
d) Sovereignty and independence

3. Who is the head of state and government in Afghanistan’s political structure?
a) The Prime Minister
b) The Chief Justice
c) The President
d) The Speaker of Parliament

4. Which ethnic group is the largest in Afghanistan?
a) Tajik
b) Hazara
c) Uzbek
d) Pashtun

5. What is Pashtunwali?
a) A tribal council
b) A code of conduct followed by Pashtuns
c) A religious scripture
d) A historical event

Answer Keys

1. Answer: b)
2. Answer: b)
3. Answer: c)
4. Answer: d)
5. Answer: b)

UNIT 02

THE SADOZAI DURRANI EMPIRE (1747- 1826): THE EMERGENCE OF THE AFGHAN KINGDOM

Written by: Dr. Sadia Aziz
Reviewed by: Dr Razia Sultana

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INTRODUCTION

Ahmed Khan, known as Ahmed Shah Abdali, was a young Afghan warrior who belongs to the Sadozai clan of the Abdali tribes of Afghanistan. He served in the army of the Persian King Nadir Shah and, after his death, won command in Qandahar of the confederation of the leading Pashtun Tribes in 1747 and styled himself as Dur-e-Dorran (the Pearl of the Pearls) and thereafter his followers and descendants became known as the Durranis. To this event can be traced the emergence of Afghanistan as an autonomous and recognizable political entity. Ahmed Khan went on to found a dynastic empire, the borders of which by the time of his death in 1772, extended from Central Asia and Kashmir to the Arabian Sea, and from Eastern Persia (Khorasan) to the eastern Punjab. It was the largest Asian Empire of its time after that of the Ottoman Turks.[1] This imperial enterprise was made possible by the waning power of the Persian Safavid Dynasty to the west and the Indian Mughal Empire in the east. It met a rapid decline after the death of Ahmed Shah as his successor lacked military power and was involved in dynastic warfare.

OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you will be able to;

- Understand the circumstances that paved the way for the establishment of the Durrani Empire.
- Identify the local communities that emerged during this period.
- Grasp how different rulers of neighboring countries interfere in the affairs of the Durrani rulers.
- Comprehend the nature of different rulers of the Later Durrani Dynasty.

[1] Angelo Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan: A Modern History. Monarchy, Despotism or Democracy? The Problem of Governance in the Muslim Traditions* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005), 11.

1. RISE OF AFGHANS AND CONSOLIDATION OF AFGHANISTAN UNDER AHMAD SHAH ABDALI (1747-1772)

Ahmad Shah Abdali Durrani was the King of Afghanistan from 1747-1772 and considered to be the founder of the Sadozai Dynasty of the Pashtun Abdali Durrani tribe centered in Qandahar.[2] He was born in Multan in today's Pakistan in 1722 A.D. He was a notable warrior and organizer, as he distinguished himself in the service of the Persian King, Nadir Shah Afshar. His Abdali tribal confederation, under the chieftainship of his father Zaman Khan, had ruled Herat before the conquest of the city by Nadir Afshar in the early part of the eighteenth century. In 1747, following Nadir Shah's assassination, Ahmad Shah came to Qandahar and successfully assembled the rival Abdali and Ghilzai chieftains, almost within the boundaries of present Afghanistan in a *Jirga* (traditional tribal assembly), which accepted him to be their dominant chief, and formed a grand Afghan ethno-tribal confederation, with Qandahar as its capital.[3]

Even though Ahmad Shah's authority was not at once recognized throughout Afghanistan and he had to depend on both conquest and diplomacy to achieve it. This event, however, was vital as it bestowed Ahmad Shah as the first monarch of the Afghan people in modern history. He established sway over the whole of today's Afghanistan, Pakistan, and northern India, including Delhi. Ahmad Shah's invasions of Mughal India brought him significant bounties and kept his tribal warriors busy in foreign wars rather than among themselves, both essential for the stability of his seat of power in Qandahar.[4] The Durrani Empire received over 75.5 percent of its tax revenues from its Indian provinces (excluding Peshawar).[5] Beginning in 1748, he embarked on a series of military campaigns in India.

2. EARLY VICTORIES

Ahmed Shah Abdali set up his headquarters at Qandahar, and after establishing his control over the erstwhile Persian territories of Qandahar and Herat, he also conquered the eastern provinces of Kabul and Ghazni and laid the foundation of the kingdom of Afghanistan. During the 25 years of his rule, he not only rapidly managed to free divided Afghan tribes from Persian and Mughal domination but also consolidated the Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Baluchis, and Khorasanis into an identifiable independent political unit within an expanded territory of present-day Afghanistan.[6]

3. THIRD BATTLE OF PANIPAT (January 14th, 1761)

Ahmed Shah Abdali led as many as eight invasions of India from 1748 to 1767. Like Mahmood of Ghazna, the main objective of his invasions was, of course,

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2 Frank Clements, *Conflict in Afghanistan: An Encyclopedia* (California: ABC CLIO, 2003), 79.
3 Amin Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 19.
4 George Grassmuck and Ludwig W. Adamec (ed), *Afghanistan: Some New Approaches* (Michigan: Center for Near Eastern and African Studies, 1969), 17-19.
5 Ahmad Shayeq Qassem, *Afghanistan's Political Stability* (London: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2009). 22.
6 Amin Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival*, 29.

to not only establish his hegemony over Indian but also to exploit its resources to provide a sufficient base for a strong national government in Afghanistan. Ahmad Shah's campaigns weakened the Muslim rulers of India against their Hindu Maratha rivals.

However, the rise of Sikhs in Punjab and the appearance of Marathas in Northern India brought him into head-on collision with them. The Marathas became so strong that they wrested control of Punjab from the Durrani Empire and threatened the Mughal dynasty in Delhi, which had accepted Ahmad Shah's authority. Shah Wali Ullah appealed for help from the Durrani ruler. Declaring *Jihad* on the Marathas, Ahmad Shah marched to recapture Punjab and help his Muslim brothers in Mughal India. He dealt a lasting blow to the power of Marathas in 1761 in the third battle of Panipat, securing for himself the prestigious title of Ghazi among the Muslims. Towards the end of Ahmad Shah's reign, the rise of Sikh power in Punjab had been destabilizing for the Durrani rule in the east of the country. In the aftermath of Ahmad Shah's campaigns against Mughal India and the Marathas, the Sikhs found it opportune to fill the power vacuum left by them. In 1781, the Sikhs revolted and took control of Multan, only to be shortly defeated by the Durrani ruler. Influential landlords and provincial chieftains of Sind and Kashmir refused to pay their land taxes to Kabul. However, the Durrani ruler had subdued them all by 1787.

4. THE LATER SADOZAI RULERS (1773-1826)

Ahmad Shah was succeeded by his son, Timur Shah, who ruled the country from 1773 to 1793. During this period, despite an increased tendency by the centrifugal forces of tribal leaders and some provincial governors to break away from the central government, the Durrani empire remained intact and much the same as he had inherited it from his father.[7] The country's capital was shifted from Kandahar to Kabul, with Peshawar becoming the winter capital of the empire.

The Durrani Empire started to crumble during the reign of Zaman Shah (1793-1800), Timur Shah's fifth son and successor. It begins to disintegrate due to the interplay of intra-dynastic rivalries over royal succession, the dispute with Persia over the province of Khurasan, and the active manipulation of these issues by the East India Company, which had firmly entrenched itself as the strongest force in India by then. Zaman Shah was keen to invade India in the tradition of his grandfather. The Mughal ruler, Shah Alam II, and other Indian Muslim leaders also urged him to invade India to crush the growing power of the Hindus and the British.

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[7] The confederation established by the Ahmed khan was very weak in its structure. Its core was made up of four major Abdali or Durrani tribes: Popalzai (to which Ahmad Shah's own Sadozai clan belonged), Barakzai (which produced the Mohammadzai clan that assumed the reins of power from the Sadozai from 1826), Alikozai and Achakzai. On the periphery of the confederation was the Abdali's rival tribe, the Ghilzai, with which Ahmad Shah succeeded in forging an alliance that did not last for very long after his death, although this initial alliance proved instrumental in depriving the Ghilzais of any access to paramount leadership in the long run. In the past, the Durrani clans had been engaged in intense rivalry and blood feuds, not only with the Ghilzais, but also among themselves. The central bond that held them together was Ahmad Shah's charisma and sensible policies in regulating and controlling tribal relationships within his confederation.

Zaman Shah went to Peshawar and Punjab and made war preparations several times, only to be drawn back to Herat, Qandahar, and Kabul due to instabilities born out of internal rivalries, the Iranian threat against the province of Khurasan, and the skill ful British diplomacy, which effectively combined these internal and external dangers against his authority.[8]

Like all its predecessors during the Islamic era, the Durrani Empire also faced challenges to its stability from Central Asia. The challenge came mainly from the Khanate/Emirate of Bukhara, which supported the people of the Lesser Turkistan (Northern provinces of today's Afghanistan) in their many revolts against the Durrani rule. In 1767-68, the people of Badakhshan and Balkh revolted against the Durranis. Ahmad Shah sent a *Lashkar* from Qandahar to suppress the revolt. This prompted the Emir of Bukhara, Abdul Aziz Khan, to create his own *Lashkar* in support of the rebels. In response, Ahmad Shah led another *Lashkar* from Qandahar to meet the Bukharan challenge. A major war between the two armies was averted, however, when, out of Islamic feeling, Ahmad Shah proposed peace to the Bukharan Emir. The peace did not last long; however, the rebellion by the Northern provinces became a recurring theme of contention between the two countries.[9]

The new Bukharan Emir, Mir Masoum Shah Murad (1785-1800), and the Durrani rulers, Timur Shah and Zaman Shah, fought many battles over the northern provinces of Balkh, Badakhshan, Qonduz, Aqcha, Merv, and the rest of the Lesser Turkistan. Despite the entire instabilities manifest in popular revolts, violence, and suppression of dissent in Northern provinces by the Durrani rulers, and the Bukharan support to the rebels in the north, the final blow to the Durrani Empire did not come from Central Asia. Unlike its predecessors, the Durrani Empire tumbled down under the pressure of external forces from South Asia and Iran in collusion with its internal tensions. In April 1809, the East India Company signed the treaty of Amritsar with Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1780-1789), Zaman Shah's handpicked governor of Punjab, in which the Sikh ruler undertook not to expand his domain southeast of the Sutlej River in return for British support to expand his territory to the northwest.

As the Durrani rulers were busy in their internal conflicts in Kabul, Herat, Qandahar and Peshawar, Ranjit Singh became so powerful that he annexed large parts of the Durrani domains in northern India in the span of little over than a decade, Attock Fort (1812), Multan (1818), Kashmir (1819) Dera Ghazi Khan and Dera Ismail Khan (1821) and Peshawar (1823).

Meanwhile, in Kabul, Zaman Shah was overthrown by his brother Shah Mahmud, who ruled from 1801 to 1803. Shah Mahmud was overthrown by his stepbrother, Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, who ruled from 1803 to 1809. Shah Mahmud returned to depose Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk and rule again from 1809 to 1818. Parallel to the conflict among Timur Shah's sons, another conflict arose between the royal clan, the Saduzais, and the Mohammdzais, which was the second most influential

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8 Ibid.

9 J.L. Lee, *The 'Ancient Supremacy': Bukhara, Afghanistan and the Battle for Balkh, 1731– 1901* (New York: E.J. Brill, 1996), 92-99.

clan in the Durrani rule. Another conflict erupted between the two main Pushtun confederates in Afghanistan, the Durranis and the Ghilzais. After much bloodshed and further disintegration of Afghanistan, the conflicts finally resulted in the demise of the Sadozais' rule and the ascendancy of the Mohammadzai clan under Amir Dost Mohammad in 1826.[10] The East India Company and Ranjit Singh were involved in most of these conflicts on the side of one or the other of the various Afghan protagonists. It was natural, therefore, that the main Sadozais claimant to the throne, Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, would seek refuge in India under the protection of the East India Company and its ally, Ranjit Singh.

[10] Stephan Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History form Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban* (New York: Da Capo Press, 2002), 124-26.

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Self-Assessment Questions

1. Why were the Afghan rulers, while facing evident dangers at home, so eager to invade India?
2. Briefly discuss the circumstances and causes that led to the war of succession between the sons of Ahmed Shah Abdali.
3. Write a critical note on the role of the Ahmed Shah Abdali in the Persian court.
4. What were the reasons that prompted the British to establish their political control at Kabul?
5. Critically examine the circumstances and reasons that led to the establishment of the Afghan rule in India.

a) Please select the appropriate answer.

1. Who was the founder of the Sadozai Durrani Empire?
   a) Timur Shah
   b) Ahmad Shah Abdali
   c) Ranjit Singh
   d) Babur

2. Ahmad Shah Abdali belonged to which tribe?
   a) Ghilzai
   b) Barakzai
   c) Abdali
   d) Yusufzai

3. The Durrani Empire was established in:
   a) 1600
   b) 1747
   c) 1826
   d) 1857

4. What was the capital of Ahmad Shah Abdali's empire?
   a) Kabul
   b) Qandahar
   c) Lahore
   d) Herat

5. The Third Battle of Panipat was fought in:
   a) 1757
   b) 1761
   c) 1773
   d) 1800

Answer Key

1. **(b)** Ahmad Shah Abdali
2. **(c)** Abdali
3. **(b)** 1747
4. **(b)** Qandahar
5. **(b)** 1761

UNIT 03

THE MUHAMMADZAI DYNASTY & 'THE GREAT GAME' (1826-1919)

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Reviewed by: Dr. Razia Sultana

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INTRODUCTION

As discussed in the previous unit, you now have come to know that the emergence of modern Afghanistan came under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Abdali in the mid-eighteenth century.[1] This was the era when the entire Asian and African continents were facing Western colonization. Nevertheless, due to geopolitical complexities of the region, none of the colonial powers was able to colonize Afghanistan. The rivalry between the British in India and Russians in Central Asia started to manifest itself in the soil of Afghanistan was the focus of both the superpowers for their defence against each other. The British policy towards Afghanistan alternated between the *Close Border Policy* and *Forward Policy* depending on the perceptions of the British decision-makers regarding Russian designs over India.[2] *The Close Border Policy* meant direct British rule only in the settled area of the frontier region and leaving the tribes to administer their own affairs. It also meant non-interference in Afghan affairs.

The British believed that stability in Afghanistan would obstruct Russian expansion. Therefore, during the 1890s, the *Closed Border Policy* was replaced by the *Forward Policy*. Under the new policy, the British took the responsibility of administering certain areas and sent a strong military force into the other parts of the region.[3] When the British reached the Pashtun areas in the north-west, they had to stop at the *scientific frontiers* following the line that ran between the cities of Kabul and Kandahar. Such a frontier would have brought the entire Pashtun population under British control, but the Pashtuns were not in favour of such a solution to British expansionism.[4] However, the Russian intervention in Central Asia and its progress towards Afghanistan made the British worried, who looked upon the Russian threat as a real danger. Therefore, the defence of India had to be planned, and this could be achieved by the occupation of the *scientific frontier* based on the Kabul-Ghazni-Qandahar Line.[5] The British, for their part, continually charged various Afghan ruling dynasties as Tsarist supporters, and held them accountable for not doing enough to stop Russian penetration into Afghanistan.

Therefore, they initiated various military campaigns known as the Anglo-Afghan wars against the Afghan rulers, especially during the reigns of Dost

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1 Musa Khan Jalalzia, *The Taliban and the* Great Game *in Afghanistan* (Lahore: Vanguard Books LTD, 1999), 43; And Matinuddin, *The Taliban Phenomenon*, 1.

2 Tahir Amin, *Afghanistan Crises: Implications and Options for Muslim World, Iran and Pakistan* (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1982), 26.

3 Kalim Bahadur, *"Pakistan Policy towards Afghanistan,"* in K. P. Misra, ed., Afghanistan in Crises (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1981), 84.

4 Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan: The Continuing Search for Nationhood* (Oxford: West view Press1991), 196.

5 Lal Baha, *N.W.F.P Administration Under British Rule: 1901:1919* (Islamabad.: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1978), 6.

Muhammad (1839-1842), Sher Ali Khan (1878-1880), and Amanullah Khan (1919).[6] The British failed to conquer or even subdue the Afghans in the first two Anglo-Afghan wars. All of these internal and external uncertainties produced a power vacuum in and around Afghanistan. This new volatile political atmosphere gave vent to other powers to step into the vacuum.

OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you will be able to;

1. Distinguished between 'The Forward Policy' and 'The Close Border Policy' that determines the strategies of the British towards Afghanistan.
1. Examine the British-Afghan relations in the context of G great Game from 1826-1919.
2. Comprehend the factors that paved the way for the rise of the Afghans under Amir Abdur Rehman.
3. Assess the causes and consequences of the first and second Anglo-Afghan wars.
4. Discuss the relations of the British India with the other European powers during nineteenth century.

[6] Donald N. Wilber, *"Afghanistan"* in Encyclopedia Americana, 5th ed.

1. THE Rise OF DOST MUHAMMAD

On the eve of the nineteenth century, Afghanistan was an ethnically divided and dominated by the Pashtun tribes belonging to the southern and eastern part of the country. Durrani ruled Afghanistan, which also included diverse non-Pashtun ethnic groups. Uzbeks and Tajiks inhabited the northern regions. In central Afghanistan, the Shiit Hazaras of Mongol origin were dominant. A mixture of Persian-speaking population belong the Tajik, Farsiwan, Turkmen, and Pashtun groups, inhabited the area of western Afghanistan centred on Herat. Territorially, the Pashtun tribes could be divided into three broad categories:

1. The Pashtun tribes of eastern Afghanistan. The prominent groups amongst them were the Afridi, Khattak, Orakzai, Bangash, Wazir, Mahsud, Mangal, and the Shiite Turi.
2. The tribes inhabiting south-western Afghanistan were mainly of Durrani (Abdali) and Ghilzai extraction.
3. The main Yusufzai inhabitants of the Peshawar plains and the valleys in Herat.

In the previous unit, you learnt about the rulers of the Sadozai Dynasty. The Sadozai dynasty was deposed by another influential Durrani subdivision, the Muhammadzai of the Barakzai tribe. This transition of power was accompanied by a prolonged period of civil war, which not only weakened the state supporting the Durrani elite but also left the new ruler of Kabul, Dost Muhammad Khan, with considerably fewer resources than his Sadozai predecessors.[7] In his endeavour to consolidate his authority, the Amir alternately resorted to strategies of conciliation and confrontation. The Muhammadzai clan dominated the politics of Afghanistan until 1973, except a brief period between 1839 and 1842.

2. THE GREAT GAME AND ITS IMPACT ON AFGHANISTAN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The Great Game was a nineteenth-century forerunner of the Cold War, a battle involving secret agents and diplomats, in which not a shot was fired between British and Russian forces for dominance in Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Iran. This rivalry had already begun in the late eighteenth century with the British schemes for bringing Iran into their fold against French-backed Afghanistan. Geographically, Afghanistan was closest to British India and considered to be within its reach. Lord Curzon saw imperialist fervour in European powers as a great opportunity to acquire new territories. According to Curzon, 'Turkistan,

[7] Christine Noelle, *State and Tribe in Nineteenth Century Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Dost Muhammad (1826-1863)* (New York: Routledge, 1997),

Afghanistan and Persia are pieces on chessboard upon which is being played out a game for dominance of the world'.[8]

Russian interests in Afghanistan were undoubtedly due to its pursuit of the warm water outlets on the Indian Ocean, and in the nineteenth century, this ambition brought it into conflict with British presence in India and Persia.[9] Although Afghanistan itself was landlocked, its links to India made it necessary for Russia to occupy this southern land to reach the Indian Ocean or the Dardanelles in Persia.[10] As early as the Seventeenth century, Tsarist regimes in Russia looked for the warm water ports to the south of their borders. Peter the Great (1628-1725) was the first to reflect this desire in his policy.[11] Thus, the Russians perceived it as a national duty and their historic mission to find ways to move forward southwards. However, obstacles to the fulfilment of this national goal were many. Primarily, this objective was hindered by the presence of Persia and Afghanistan, which were geographically positioned as a barrier for the southward expansion of Russia.

In these circumstances, it was clear to Tsarist Russia to bring Afghanistan into its sphere of influence, or merge Afghan territories within the Russian empire. Nevertheless, these expansionist designs were an immediate challenge to the interests of the British, who had strongly defended the rich Indian colony under their control. Russian or British expansion or contraction in Asia had direct implications for their strength and standing in Europe. Afghanistan, therefore, held the key to the prospect of triumphs or collapse of two powerful empires in Asia and Europe.[12] Since both powers were conscious of Afghanistan's geo-strategic importance, thus, none dared to engage in a direct military conflict, which could have led to unwanted consequences. Alternatively, the Russians and the British attempted to test their ability indirectly. It was certainly a competition between the British and the Russians in Afghanistan. Both powers suspected each other of making moves to destabilize each other.[13] The desire to expand led Russia to absorb Kirghiz and reduce Khiva and Bukhara to the status of mere vassal states, while the British Empire in India, contended for the time being with the annexation of the Punjab, Sind, and established its supremacy in Kashmir, Chitral, and Kalat. It also manifested its desire to control the approaches to India located in Afghanistan.[14]

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8 A. L .Akram, "*Our Western Frontier: Of Peace and Pacts*," Pakistan Times, 26 March 1982.

9 Leon B. Polluada, *"Pashtunistan: Afghan Domestic Politics and Relations with Pakistan,"* in Ainslie T. Embree, ed., *Pakistan's Western Borderlands*: *The Transformation of a Political Order* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1977), 130.

10 Ibid.

11 Tariq Majeed, *The Global Game for a New World Order* (Lahore: Tayyab Iqbal Printers, 1995), 138.

12 Mushtaq Ahmed, *Pakistan at the Crossroads* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1985), 353.

13 Ijaz Hussain, *Issues in Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An International Law Perspective* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988),49-50.

14 Ibid.,

Thus, Afghanistan became a battleground for testing war skills of the two great powers. The cat and mouse game between imperial Russia and British India was termed the Great Game by the English poet and novelist Rudyard Kipling in his novel 'Kim'.[15] Throughout the Great Game, both Russia and British India invaded Afghanistan for strategic reasons and could not sustain due to fierce local retaliation. This imperial game of chess was played out in Afghanistan throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Due to Afghanistan's impenetrable geography, the colonial powers were unable to directly occupy the country. The Great Game, however, sternly hampered the country's political development, tumoring its future into darkness and turning Afghanistan into a nation ever vulnerable to outsiders.

The earliest signs of the Great Game came about in the wake of a Franco-British rivalry, where Russia and Iran were also against Britain. In 1801, Napoleon Bonaparte and Tsar Paul I (1796-1801) of Russia agreed to a Franco-Russian military expedition that would converge at Astrakhan and move to Iran (with the consent of the Shah of Iran), Herat, Qandahar, and Bolan Pass in Afghanistan to occupy the Indus valley at present-day Pakistan.[16] Due to the Tsar's assassination in the same year, the expedition never materialized. However, Britain continued to view the French as a threat to their colonial possessions in India and initiated policies to neutralize it. British Governor General Lord Wellesley sent two missions to Tehran under Mehdi Ali Khan in 1798 and a second under John Malcolm in 1801 to conclude a defence treaty with the Shah of Iran. Russian advances in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the incorporation of Georgia (a territory over which Iran exercised nominal suzerainty) in 1800 compelled Iran to seek British help over this issue.[17] London refused to help and insisted that the Anglo-Iranian Treaty was targeted only against a French threat. This affront made Iran seek France's help in its war with Russia. In 1807, a treaty was signed by the two states. However, the Treaty of Tilsit between France and Russia, also concluded in 1807, diminished the importance of the Franco-Persian alliance significantly.[18] To maintain the pressure on Russia, Iran again signed a definitive treaty with Britain in 1814, in which British undertook to help the Qajar Government financially and militarily against any hostile European power. However, Iran's devastating conflict with Russia and acceptance of humiliation treaties with St. Petersburg assured Tehran of the British lack of commitment in safeguarding the territorial integrity and independence of Iran in accordance with its treaty obligations.

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15 Surila, *The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India's Partitio*, 18.

16 Rizwan Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2005), 23.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

By the late 1820's the British perceived that after the repeated defeat of Iran at the hands of the Russians that it could not serve as a suitable ally for the defence of British India. As an alternative to Iran, Lord Minto, the Governor General of British India, sent the first British diplomatic representative, Mountstuart Elphinstone to the court of the Durrani King, Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, in June 1809, while he was in his winter capital, Peshawar. The two sides signed an agreement in which the Afghan ruler agreed to deny passage to the purported Franco-Iranian alliance through the Afghan territory.[19] The Durrani ruler, direct successor to Ahmad Shah through Timor Shah and Zaman Shah, laid the foundations for gaining the assistance of the British and in return for his agreement to surrender the right to conduct independent foreign policy.

3. SHAH SHUJAH AND FIRST ANGLO-AFGHAN WAR (1838-1842)

Politically, Afghanistan entered the nineteenth century as a fragmented, tribal-feudal entity riven with political, ethnic, and religious fissures. Zaman Shah's reign (1793-1801) signified a visible change in the relationship between British India and Afghanistan. The sovereignty of Afghanistan established by Ahmad Shah had been shattered, and the outer provinces had become independent. In the north, Durrani influence at Balkh had almost ended; independent local rulers ruled Baluchistan and Sind, and in the Punjab, the Sikhs were in the process of forming an independent Kingdom.[20] Towards the decline of the Durrani Empire, family rivalries were leading towards the disintegration of the Pashtun regions, including the Abdali heartland. Instead of combating with his brothers, Mahmud at Herat and Shuja-ul-Mulk at Peshwar, Zaman Shah's Indian conquests against the Sikhs and Marathas brought Afghanistan into collision with the British, who by this time had established themselves as the supreme power in northern India.[21]

In 1800, Zaman Shah was blinded and deposed by his half-brother, Mahmud Mirza. This resulted in repeated wars of succession among the members of the royal family which weakened Afghanistan. Mahmud was forced to flee from Kabul by Zaman's full brother, Shuja-ul-Mulk.[22] However, he again regained Kabul in 1807and Shuja-ul-Mulk was compelled to leave for Peshawar. In 1818, a leading member of the Mumammadzai clan took advantage of family feuds and

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19 Kevin Baker, *War in Afghanistan: A Short History of 80 Wars and Conflicts in Afghanistan and the Northwest Frontier 1839-2011* (NSW: Rosenberg Publishing, 2011), 28.

20 Mountstaurt Elphinstone, *An account of the Kingdom of Cabul and its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary and India* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1972), 199.

21 Muhammad Khalid, 'Russian Influence Over Afghanistan", *Pakistan Horizon*, vol, 33, no. 1/2 (1980): 50. (49-56)

22 Ibid.

successfully overthrew Mahmud, who fled Kabul to Herat, where his family ruled up until 1842.

In 1826, Dost Muhammad, a prominent Muhammadzai sardar, was finally able to defeat his rival brothers for the possession of Kabul and assumed control of that city.

However, Dost Muhammad was not entirely free from difficulties. In 1834, Dost Muhammad defeated an invasion by the former ruler Shah Shujah, in an attempt to regain his throne with British and Sikh backing. Ranjit Sing's forces occupied Peshawar, moving from there into territory ruled directly by Kabul. In 1836, Dost Muhammad forces under the command of his son Muhammad Akbar Khan defeated the Sikhs at Jamrud, a post fifteen kilometres west of Peshawar. In western Afghanistan, Iran renewed its efforts in 1836-37 to establish itself at Herat with Russia's help. In the Cis-Indus region, Ranjit Sing was expanding his influence southwards and desired to conquer the city of Shikarpur, ruled by the Shiite Talpur Amirs of Sind. At this time, Lord Auckland became the Governor General of India, who was keen to agree with Dost Muhammad to keep Afghanistan away from Russian influence. This alliance had enabled the British and Afghans to prevent the extension of Persian domination. In May 1836, Dost Muhammad sought the help of the British to recover Peshawar from the Sikhs. Still, Auckland refused, and after being disappointed from the behaviour of the British, Dost Muhammad and the Russians tried to forge an alliance between them, which alarmed the British. British Indian administration brought into action a scheme to overthrow Dost Muhammad and replace him with the pro-British Sadozai prince Shuja-ul-Mulk, and thus the stage was set for the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842) and one of Britain's greatest military humiliations.

In November 1838, after concluding a tripartite treaty, a combined contingent of British, Sikhs, and Afghans under Shuja-ul-Mulk tried to restore the Sadozai rule in Kabul. Earlier, Shuja-ul-Mulk had signed a treaty that bound him to deal with any foreign power only with the consent of the British. In August 1839, the British were able to install Shuja-ul-Mulk on the throne of Kabul. However, it became apparent to the Afghans that Shah Shujah was a British puppet, and the real ruler of Kabul was William Hay McNaughton (political agent appointed by Governor General Auckland with the title of Baronet). In 1841, the revolt started in Kabul, and it seemed that the entire Afghan nation had decided to drive the English out of Afghanistan. Alexander Burnes, his brother Lt. Burnes, and Broadfoot were killed by an unruly mob on 2 November 1841. The British initially failed to understand the nature of the revolt and took no immediate and stern measures to suppress it. The revolt, therefore, spread far and wide, and its command was taken over by Akbar Khan, son of Dost Muhammad. Akbar Khan besieged

Kabul, and McNaughton was forced to accept a treaty with the Afghnis on 11th December 1841. It was agreed that;

a. The English would leave Afghanistan as early as possible.
b. The English would leave all Afghan prisoners, including Dost Muhammad.
c. Shah Shujah would be granted a pension. He could live in Afghanistan or go to India with the English.
d. Four English officers would be surrendered to the Afghans as hostages.[23]

However, the treaty remained useless as McNaughton attempted to divide the Afghans and was subsequently murdered on 23 December 1841. On 1st January 1842, a new treaty was concluded between General Elphinstone and the Afghans. By this treaty, the English agreed not only to the terms of the previous treaty but also a few more terms, which were as follows;

a. The English would surrender all their cannons and gunpowder to the Afghans.
b. The entire treasury would be handed over to the Afghans.
c. The English would pay rupees fourteen lacs to the Afghans.[24]

After signing this treaty, the English army was permitted to leave Kabul for Jalalabad. Elphinstone, Lawrence, and Pottinger were left as hostages, thus losing all the prestige, arms, and money; sixteen thousand people left Kabul. The English were assured a safe passage; however, at several places attacked by the Afghans on the way.

4. RETURN OF DOST MUHAMMAD AND SECOND ANGLO-AFGHAN WAR (1843-1880)

Auckland was deeply disturbed after hearing the news of this disaster. He immediately sent reinforcement under Colonel Pollock. But before Pollock reached Jalalabad, Auckland was recalled and Lord Ellenborough was sent to India as the Governor General of India. The first Afghan war brought no advantage to the British. Their primary objective was to secure a friendly Amir on the throne of Afghanistan failed. Shah Shujah was murdered, and Dost Muhammad again victoriously assumed the charge as Amir of Afghanistan and ruled there till 1863. Thus, the same person ruled in Afghanistan after the war who had ruled it before the war. Dost Muhammad kept himself free from the British orbit of influence. Thus, it is clear that the British drew no advantage whatsoever from the war following the forward policy in which they lost nearly twenty thousand soldiers and rupees one and a half crore.

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23 L.P. Sharma and V.D. Mahajan, *History of British Rule in India* (New Delhi: Carrier Publishers, 1993), 153.
24 Ibid.

Lord Lawrence, the Governor General of India, initiated the close border policy during 1864-69. He believed that English should not interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and there was no necessity to keep an English representative at the court. Pursuing this policy, he retrained the British from interfering in the wars of succession which ensued between the sixteen sons of Dost Muhammad after he died in 1863. Different princes succeeded in capturing the throne at different times, and Lawrence accepted each of them as Amirs. He recognized Sher Ali in 1868, Afzal Khan in 1866, Azim Khan in 1867, and again Sher Ali in 1868 as the Amir who finally ascended the throne of Afghanistan after defeating all his brothers. Lawrence presented Amir Sher Ali with arms worth three thousand five hundred and £ 60,000. He, however, did not attempt to conclude a treaty with him. When the Russians captured Tashkent in 1865 and Bokhara in 1868, he carried out the close border policy. Lord Mayo (1869-72), who succeeded Lord Lawrence, also pursued the same policy. When Lord Northbrook (1872-76) was the Governor General of India, Russia extended its frontier much closer to Afghanistan. Feeling insecure in such situation, Amir Sher Ali sought complete British protection, but Northbrook refused to give any such assurance. Sher Ali was completely disappointed and, thereafter, attempted to gain the goodwill of Russia. He accepted a Russian representative in Kabul. At the same time, the conservative party leader, Disraeli, became the Prime Minister of Britain, who believed in an aggressive imperial policy and directed Northbrook to ask the Amir to accept a British resident at Kabul. After Northbrook, Lord Lytton took charge as Governor General of India and pursued the Forward Policy, which resulted in the second Afghan war.

The British were solely responsible for the Second Afghan War. Amir Sher Ali had repeatedly requested the English for a treaty that was refused during the Governorship of Lord Lawrence, Mayo, and Northbrook. It was only much later that he showed his favour to Russia. Yet, he had signed no treaty with Russia. The Amir refused to accept the permanent English ambassador at his court as he considered himself free to befriend either Russians or British as an independent ruler of Afghanistan. Lord Lytton attempted to compel the Amir to sign a treaty because he felt that the Afghans were militarily weak and could be coerced to gain certain advantages. After the declaration of war, the English attacked Afghanistan from three sides. One army under Sir Samuel Browne moved forward through the Khyber Pass, the other under Major General Roberts proceeded through the Kurram valley, and the third one under General Steward through the Bolan Pass.

5. TREATY OF GANDAMAK (MAY 1879)

The Afghans were easily defeated in Second Anglo-Afghan War. Sher Ali fled to Russian Turkestan, and his son Yakub Khan agreed to peace. The Treaty of Gandamak was, therefore, signed on 26th May 1879. Its terms were as follows;

a. The English accepted Yakub Khan as the Amir of Afghanistan.
b. He surrendered to the English the passes of Khyber and Misni and the districts of Kurram, Pishin, and Sibi.
c. He agreed to manage his foreign policy with the advice of the English.
d. He agreed to keep an English ambassador at Kabul.
e. The English agreed to pay an annual subsidy of rupees six lacs to the Amir and to protect him from foreign aggression.[25]

The Amir accepted Mr. Cavagnari as the English ambassador at Kabul, and peace remained in Afghanistan for some time. But the Afghans were not reconciled to the situation. After murdering Cavagnari, they revolted on 3rd September 1879 at Kabul. The English took immediate steps to suppress the revolt successfully and captured Kabul and Kandahar. The Afghans declared Muhammad Jaan, son of Yakub Khan, the ruler of Afghanistan, but failed to gain control of Afghanistan. Yakub Khan, however, surrendered all his claims over the throne of Afghanistan and was sent to India under the English protection.

6. AMIR ABDUR REHMAN KHAN, THE 'IRON AMIR' (1880-1901)

Thus, there was a change in the British policy as they were forced to sponsor an Afghan ruler to serve as a buffer between an ambitious Tsarist Russia and British India. This ruler was to be strong enough to uphold Afghanistan against Russia. Abdur Rahman Khan,[26] A nephew of Amir Sher Ali, who lived in exile in Tashkent, was chosen for the task in 1880. Abdur Rahman took charge of Afghanistan with the support of the British, who considered him the best for this task.[27] He got the title 'the iron Amir' because he appeared not to hesitate to kill, exile, terrorize, and otherwise subdue all his opponents.[28]

7. CONSOLIDATION OF AFGHANISTAN

The exposure of Afghanistan to the colonial powers during the *Great Game* was ultimately responsible for the emergence of the modern Afghan state. Nevertheless,

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25 Ibid., 161.

26 Amir Abdur- Rahman was a son of Afzal Khan, the rival brother of Amir Sher Ali. He had spent the last fifteen years in exile in Russian Turkistan after the defeat of his father by Sher Ali. Abdul Rahman openly called for a Jihad against the British invaders, while secretly initiating correspondence with the senior British officials at Kabul, Lepel Griffin, for securing the throne of Afghanistan. The British realized that Abdul Rahman could offer a solution to the dilemma they confronted over the appointment of an Afghan Amir acceptable to the Afghan people and also friendly towards British. See for details, J.L.Lee, *The Ancient Supremacy: Bukhara, Afghanistan and the Battle for Balkh 1731-1901* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 397.

27 Ibid.

28 Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby. *Mullah, Marx and Mujahid.* With a Foreword by Dar Rather (New York: West View Press, 1998), 36.

this modernization came with a price. These powers damaged Afghan internal politics and the right to conduct foreign affairs with absolute freedom. The Anglo-Russian revolts in Central Asia led to the demarcation of Afghanistan's ethnically sensitive borders. This development facilitated a process that concluded in the creation of a state structure in the modern sense of the term. Afghan political culture, which was already very unstable, became worse due to the Anglo-Russian intervention.

Yet, this *Great Game* had some positive fallout as well. Afghanistan was a breeding ground for political intrigues of the ruling class. Antagonism between small local tribes, Khanates, and various ethnic groups was considered to be a regular phenomenon. It was due to both formal and informal accords between the two imperial powers, Britain and Russia.[29] Abdur Rahman Khan got a chance to spend his resources and inspirations on strengthening his homeland. Thus, the British rule in Afghanistan was an indirect one, which made it the only Muslim country that was able to retain its sovereignty against the colonial powers. In this grand scheme of the imperial chessboard, the status of Afghanistan was a no-go area.[30]

8. PANJDEH CRISES OF 1885

In 1884, the Russian army occupied the Merv oasis, just north of Afghanistan's strategic but ill-defined north-western corner. Britain had no solid basis for complaint against the Russian action, since no English statesman had ever declared Merv a part of Afghanistan. On 30th March 1885, Russain troops occupied Penjdeh itself and drove out the Afghan forces with a loss of 500 Afghans. At the time the Penjdeh incident occurred, Amir Abdur Rehman was conferring with Viceroy Lord Dufferin in Rawalpindi.[31] The Amir was fearful of further Russian advances on his domains and was just as eager as the British to stabilize the situation in the northwestern corner of his territory. At the same time, he had no desire to be caught in a war between the two great powers and to see a return of British troops to his country. He apparently suggested to Lord Dufferin that the Russians be allowed to retain Penjdeh, if the Zulfikar Pass, a strategic key to the highlands of central Afghanistan, remained in Afghan hands. This suggestion of Amir was accepted by St. Petersburg, and war was averted.[32]

9. DURAND LINE AGREEMENT OF 1893

Afghanistan's status as a buffer state was further strengthened under the rule of Abdur Rahman Khan. This is the era when the issue of the Durand Line started.

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30 Ibid.
31 James W. Spain, *The Pathan Borderland* (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1985), 137.
32 Ibid.

In 1893, Amir Abdur Rahman submitted to the British demands for demarcation of the country's eastern boundaries. A boundary agreement between the British and the Afghans was signed on November 12, 1893.[33] The line on which the settlement was finalized by the Amir and Sir Mortimer Durand has sustained as the international border till today.

It is named after the British negotiator, Sir Mortimer Durand, as the Durand Line. The notion of Afghanistan as a buffer zone between the British and Russian empires was now acknowledged both in Calcutta and London. It had been half-hearted and slowly approved by St. Petersburg. A series of protocols was signed between Russia and Britain at London in 185l, at Khamiab in 1886, at St. Petersburg in 1887, and at Chehel Dukhtaran in 1893 that fixed Afghanistan's northern borders. Throughout these negotiations and subsequent agreements that followed, Afghan representatives were not present. The Amir was simply informed of the decisions taken by the imperial powers.[34] The acceptance of the authenticity of the Durand line has remained a matter of controversy among the successive Afghan governments. Initially, it was recognized by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan and his successors, Habibullah (1905), Amanullah (1921), and Nadir Shah (1930).[35] This was confirmed with the unrelenting validity of the treaty that was reaffirmed by an exchange of letters between the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Afghan Minister in 1948-1949.[36]

10. WAKHAN CORRIDOR AGREEMENT OF 1895

The final boundary dispute with Russia was settled by the Pamir Agreement of 1895: Afghanistan got control over the Wakhan Corridor in the Pamir Mountains, which formed a political buffer between Russian Turkestan, British India, and China.[37] The last of Afghanistan's borders was defined, and the main struggle in Central Asia between the two empires ended. Abdur Rehman Khan was successful in his central preoccupation to consolidate his internal rule. He died in bed of natural causes while still the ruler of Afghanistan. He even managed to pass his throne to his son and chosen successor, Habibullah.

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33 Shahid Javed Barki, "A difficult Neighbor," *Dawn*, 9 January 2007.

34 D. P. Singhal, *India and Afghanistan 1876-1901: A Study in Diplomatic Relations (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House,1963)*,124

35 Charles Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads. Afghanistan* (Calcutta, 1933), vol. XIII, no. XXI (L/PS/20/G3/14, National Documentation Center, Acc. No. 4480), 256-257. See also, Caroe, *The Pathans*, 464.

36 Caroe, *The Pathans,* 464.

37 James Waynbrandt, A Brief History of Pakistan (New York: Info Base Publishing, 2009), 133.

11. AMIR HABIBULLAH (1901-1919)

Either the reign of Habibullah's father, Abdur Rehman, the originator of a strong central government and unified state, or that of Habibullah's son, Amanullah, who moved boldly to adopt full-scale modernization and national independence for the state as his goal, is usually considered to be the beginning of modern Afghanistan. In fact, the most crucial decisions on the road to modernization in Afghanistan were taken in Amir Habibullah's reign, such as modern education in both civilian and military subjects and employment of foreign teachers.

Habibullah's second contribution to modernization was a liberalization of the political system that allowed for the return of key Afghan exiles, which in turn encouraged other reforms. Other modernization efforts undertaken by the government included the construction of the first modern hospital and the first hydroelectric plant. Factories and roads were improved, and trade with both Russian Central Asia and British India increased, encouraged.

12. MAHMUD BEG TARZI: FATHER OF AFGHAN JOURNALISM

One of the return exiles, Mahmud Beg Tarzi, was the son of the exiled Durrani sardar and poet who had adopted the pen name 'Tarzi' (the stylist). Mahmud had been educated in the Ottoman Empire, where his father had died in 1900 and had even served as an official in the Ottoman administration of Damascus. On his return home, Tarzi became head of the translation bureau and founder and editor of a modernist and nationalist newspaper (anti-British and pro-German), *Siraj ul-Akhbar-i-Afghanistan* (The Lamp of the News of Afghanistan), which was published from 1911-1918.[38] The Afghan press dates from this period. In this newspaper, Tarzi advocated modern education and political views that remained influential as the basis for subsequent debate among Afghanistan's modern intellectuals and that were influential as well among the awakening reformers of Central Asia. Tarzai's editorials, despite being a government newspaper, were highly critical of Western imperialism and particularly of the British.

He rejoiced in the Japanese victory over the Russians in 1905, because it represented an Asian triumph over Europeans, and in the Chinese republican revolution of Sun Yat Sen that overthrew the Qing dynasty. During World War I, his anti-British and pro-Ottoman policies drew protests from the British, particularly at the Amir's neutrality policies.[39] Eventually, Amir Habibullah paid with his life for his policies. The liberalization, education, and modernization of even a tiny elite spawned an opposition movement. These 'Young Afghans,' who demanded an end to royal absolutism and the establishment of a constitution, reflected a trend reaching from Turkey to China. Tarzi exercised a great influence

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38 Lal Baha, "Struggle of Journalism in the Frontier Province (1900-1939)," *Islamic Studies*, vol. 17, no. 3 (Autumn 1978): 221.

39 ***Nancy Dupree, "Perspective on Socialist Realism in the Literature of Afghanistan,"*** **Journal of South Asian Literature*, vol. 27, no. 2 (Summer, Fall 1992): 91-92 (85-114)***

over King Amanullah, whose modernization reforms aroused the conservatives to revolt and consequently the king's downfall. Tarzi followed the king's family into exile in 1929.[40]

13. CONVENTION OF ST. PETERSBURG

The result of the emergence of Japan as a power in Asia was the headlong clash of two imperialisms, which led up to the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. Japan, after easily defeating China, was now initiating its program of expansion on the mainland of Asia. As the Russians started to drive toward the open sea through Manchuria, the British, following the policy of immediate expediency allied herself with Japan.[41] Russia was further isolated when France, hitherto the Tsar's only great power ally in Europe, entered the Entente Cordiale with Britain in 1904. The War of 1904-5 with Japan weakened Russia's prestige further. Eventually, on 31st August 1907, the Convention relating to Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet was signed in St. Petersburg, and a second doing the same between Japan and Russia in Manchuria and later in Mongolia.[42] The convention conceded to Russia the right to settle local boundary questions directly with Afghan frontier officials.[43]

14. FIRST WORLD WAR

Anglo-Russian rivalry came to a temporary end, and the motivational whim of this coming together of the former rivals was the rise of Germany, which from Baghdad to Kiaochow equally endangered the interests of both powers. In 1907 Bosnian crisis broke followed by the Young Turk Revolution, the Tripoli war, and the two Balkan wars.[44] This process opened up a power vacuum in the Ottoman Empire, which was to act as the catalyst for the outbreak of the First World War. Afghanistan remained neutral during the war; however situation became even worse after the war, as the entire Muslim world was anguished by the Western allies' harsh treatment of the Ottoman Empire, which also led to the abolishment of the caliphate. At the same time Bolshevik Revolution had resulted in chaos in Central Asia, apparently creating an opportunity for Afghanistan to extend its influence to the peoples who had thrown off Russian imperialism. In February 1919, an assassination attempt against Amir Habibullah was successful. The reign of Habibullah set the pattern of Afghan politics until the end of the Afghan monarchy.

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40 Ibid.

41 A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, 'Anglo-Russian Relations through the Centuries,' vol. 7, no. 2 (Spring, 1948): 49.

42 Spain, *The Pathan Borderland*, 140.

43 Ibid.

44 Christopher M. Wyatt, *Afghanistan and the Defence of Empire: Diplomacy and Strategy during the Great Game* (London: IB Tauris, 2011), 180.

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Self-Assessment Questions

1. 'The first Afghan War was politically unwise and morally unsound.' Discuss.
2. How would you distinguish between 'The Forward Policy' and 'The Close Border Policy' determine the policies of British towards Afghanistan?
3. Trace the circumstances leading to the second Afghan war. How far was Lord Lytton responsible for it?
4. The first Anglo-Afghan war resulted in the political unrest in Afghanistan. Comment.
5. How far the Amir Abdur Rehman Khan was successful in laying down the foundation of modern Afghanistan during the 'Great Game?

a) Please select the appropriate answer.

1. The Muhammadzai Dynasty was founded by:
   a) Sher Ali Khan
   b) Dost Muhammad Khan
   c) Habibullah Khan
   d) Timur Shah

2. The Great Game refers to:
   a) A military battle between Afghans and Persians
   b) The geopolitical struggle between Britain and Russia over Central Asia
   c) Afghan tribal conflicts
   d) Economic trade agreements

3. The First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842) resulted in:
   a) British control over Afghanistan
   b) Afghan victory
   c) Partition of Afghanistan
   d) Sikh rule in Kabul

4. Who was reinstalled as ruler of Afghanistan by the British in 1839?
   a) Dost Muhammad Khan
   b) Sher Ali Khan
   c) Zaman Shah
   d) Shah Shujah

5. The Treaty of Gandamak (1879) was signed between:
   a) Afghanistan and Russia
   b) Afghanistan and Britain
   c) Afghanistan and Persia

d) Afghanistan and the Ottoman Empire

Answer Key

(b) Dost Muhammad Khan
(b) The geopolitical struggle between Britain and Russia over Central Asia
(b) Afghan victory
(d) Shah Shujah
(b) Afghanistan and Britain

Unit 04

THE PERIOD OF THE INDEPENDENT AFGHAN MONARCHY (1919-1973)

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Reviewed By: Dr. Razia Sultana

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INTRODUCTION

Afghanistan was ruled by the independent constitutional monarchies that functioned under different constitutions (1923, 1931, and 1964) from 1919 to 1973. This period of independence coincides with the beginning of the decolonization period throughout the world, especially in the Muslim world.

OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you will be able to:

1. Comprehend the circumstances that led to the state of the independent Afghan monarchy in the twentieth century.
2. Assess the causes and consequences of the third Anglo-Afghan War.
3. Examine the causes of the failure of the reforms introduced by Amanullah Khan.
4. Grasp the involvement of European powers in the local politics of Afghanistan.
5. Understand the historical context of the *Pashtunistan* issue.
6. Understand the causes and the course of rivalry between the USSR and the USA during the Cold War.

1. AMANULLAH AND THE DRIVE FOR MODERNIZATION (1919-1929)

Amir Amanullah had ascended the throne in February 1919 after defeating his uncle, the conservative Nasrullah, in his attempt to seize the throne. He was an ardent nationalist, reformer, and was said to have been a 'war party' at the Afghan court, which favoured an attack on India during the First World War. However, Afghanistan remained neutral, and Amir Habibullah expected a generous financial reward and British recognition of Afghanistan's complete independence.

2. THIRD ANGLO-AFGHAN WAR & ITS IMPACT

Amanullah proclaimed a jihad against the British in May 1919, which led to the third Anglo-Afghan War. He took advantage of widespread anger in India over an incident known as the Amritsar Massacre (Jallianwala Bagh).[1] In Russia, the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 had ushered in the collapse of the Czarist monarchy and replaced it with a fervently anti-imperialist Marxist regime in Moscow led by Lenin.[2] The Third Anglo–Afghan War came upon the British unexpectedly, and in contrast to the first two wars in which the British were the aggressors, this war started with aggressive actions from the Afghans under the commander Nadir Shah.[3] At this point, as the British readily admitted, 'The Curzon system,' like so many older and majestic institutions, broke under the mighty pressure. [4] The third Anglo-Afghan War was the shortest of the conflicts between Britain and Afghanistan, lasting from 4th May 1919 until a ceasefire was agreed on 3rd June 1919 led to the Treaty of Rawalpindi in August 1919, largely dictated by the British, which left Afghanistan free to conduct its own foreign affairs.[5] But the Third Afghan war, even though it was fought in the midst of political upheavals in the Frontier and Punjab, did not produce any explosion. However, it did give Afghanistan its independence.[6]

3. TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN RUSSIA AND AFGHANISTAN (1921)

However, afraid of the British, Amanullah sent a mission to the newly established Bolshevik Moscow in October 1919. This visit was in fact preceded

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1 Kevin Baker, *War in Afghanistan: A Short History of 80 Wars and Conflicts in Afghanistan and the Northwest Frontier, 1839-2011* (NSW: Rosenberg Publishing, 2011), 131.

2 Rizwan Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2005), 38.

3 Baker, *War in Afghanistan*, 130.

4 Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India (1899-1905) return to the 'Close Border Policy'. His objective was to allow and even encourage the tribal area to go its own way as much as possible. For more detail see; James W. Spain, *The Pathan Borderland* (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1985), 149-150.

5 Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby, *Mullah, Marx and Mujahid,* with a foreword by Dar Rather *(*New York: West view Press, 1998), 41.

6 Riffat Ayesha, "Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations 1947-71." *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, vol. VII. No. 1 (Jan-Jun 1986): 55-72.

by a Bolshevik mission to Kabul in the previous month to negotiate the status of the still-disputed Panjdeh area in Turkestan, annexed by the Tsar in 1886, and to get Afghan support for Bolsheviks in Muslim Central Asia in return for assistance against the British.[7]

4. REFORMS INTRODUCED BY AMIR AMANULLAH

The domestic polices of Amanullah were largely concerned with the transformation of an anarchic society into a modern and secular nation, which cost him his throne. In 1919, he had established a council of ministers, appointing Tarzi as the first foreign minister in Afghan history. One aspect of the reform program was the drawing up of the 1923 Constitution, which established the basis for the formal structure of government and set the role of the constitutional monarch. The Amir himself assumed the title of *Padshah* (King).

This Constitution attempted to regulate relations between Islam and the State. Amanullah also established schools using English, German, and French as the main languages of education. King Amanullah moved to end his country's traditional isolation by establishing diplomatic relations in Europe and Asia. In 1927, he embarked on a world tour during which Amanullah observed the modernization and secularization introduced by Ataturk. Amanullah returned to Afghanistan with a new determination to make his country as fast as possible into the modern age. Therefore, on the social scene, he encouraged the government employees to wear Western dresses and abolished the traditional Muslim veil for women. At the next Loya Jirga, Amanullah insisted that the tribal leaders shave their beards and further aggravated the people of Afghanistan by announcing a plan of compulsory education for women.

5. CIVIL WAR AND TAJIK RULE (JANUARY 1929 TO OCTOBER 1929)

These initiatives, which followed a tour of European capitals in 1928 and were partly manifested in the Queen and other female members of the royal family appearing unveiled on a public platform, were seen by religious and tribal leaders as being aimed at the imposition of Western value systems onto an Islamic society[8] Faced with overwhelmingly armed opposition, Amanullah was forced to abdicate in January 1929 after Kabul besieged by a prominent Tajik known as.[9] The royal family owed its safe exit from Afghanistan to an airplane provided by the British. The return of his body after his death in Rome in 1960 for an Afghan burial did not meet with opposition.[10]

After the reign of less than a year, Bacha-i-Saqao was deposed by Nadir Shah, belonging to the Mahammadzai Durrani clan but of the Musahiban family. Nadir

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7 Ralph H. Magnus, *Mullah, Marx and Mujahid*, 41.
8 Peter Marsden, *Afghanistan: Aid, Armies and Empires* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 27.
9 Abdul Sabahuddin, *History of Afghanistan* (New Delhi: Global Vision Publishing House, 2009), 6.
10 Ralph H. Magnus, *Mullah, Marx and Mujahid*, 42.

Shah ascended the throne as King Nadir on October 16, 1929, and thus began a dynasty that lasted until 1978.[11] Nadir Shah shared to some extent the ideal of modernising Afghanistan, but tribal society was still strong and the state was weak enough to exercise its sovereign authority. He signed a nonaggression treaty with the Soviet Union in 1931 (at the tenth anniversary of the 1921 treaty).[12] Nadir Shah was assassinated in 1933 by Abdul Khaliq, a teenage student who was determined to avenge the political murder of his guardian and mentor, Ghulam Nabi Charkhi.[13]

6. KING ZAHIR SHAH AND CONSTITUTIONALISM (1929-1973)

Mohammad Zahir Shah, Nadir Shah's 19-year-old son, succeeded to the throne and reigned from 1933 to 1973. Initially, Zahir Shah was ruled with the assistance of his uncle, Sardar Hashim Khan, who held the post of Prime Minister and followed the footsteps of Nadir Shah till 1946. In 1946, another uncle of Zahir Shah, Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan, became Prime Minister, who granted political relaxation domestically and wanted to have relations with the United States of America. Shah Mahmud Khan was encouraged by young modernising Afghans in the government to liberalize the political system.[14] Soon, a student union emerged at Kabul University. Students produced satirical plays against the misconduct of the royal family and the misuse of Islam to sustain injustice.[15] In 1953, he was replaced as Prime Minister. Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan belonged to the king's own generation and was not only a first cousin but a brother-in-law as well.

7. TREATY OF SAADABAD (1937)

Like many nations in the 1930s, Afghanistan sought a degree of security through membership in International organizations. Afghanistan entered the League of Nations in 1934, shortly after the Soviet Union joined. On July 7th, 1937, representatives of Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey signed the Saadabad Pact. A treaty of nonaggression and friendship, it remains the only alliance Afghanistan ever entered.[16] The Saadabad Pact provided for general consultation on regional disputes and stipulated similar discussion in the event of aggression by the non-members. The Pact prohibited interference in the internal affairs of member states and promoted cooperation in dealing with subversives. The Saadabad Pact met with the Soviet as well as the British proposals.[17]

The Saadabad Pact proved to be favourable for Zahir Shah's government as the pan-Islamic overtones of the pact calmed down the conservative opposition at

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11 Chris Johnson, *Afghanistan* (London: Oxfam, 2004), 16.
12 Larry P. Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War, State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise of the Taliban* (WA: University of Washington Press, 2012), 47.
13 Ahmad Shayeq Qassem, *Afghanistan's Political* Stability (London: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2009), 39.
14 For detail see; Mohammad Halim Tanvir, *Afghanistan, History, Diplomacy and Journalism* (London: Xlibrish Publishing, 2012), 164-244.
15 Ralph H. Magnus, *Mullah, Marx and Mujahid*, 46.
16 Jeffery T. Roberts, *The Origin of Conflict in Afghanistan* (CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003), 68.
17 Ibid.

home and membership lessened the chance of the return of Amanullah to the throne of Afghanistan. It also increased cultural and economic contacts and led to the temporary settlement of a border dispute with Iran.

8. WORLD WAR II AND AFGHAN NEUTRALITY

Afghanistan remained neutral during World the II despite its ties to both Allied and Axis powers. World War II also altered the balance of power in Central Asia; however, the USSR was able to step up its program for acquiring influence in Afghanistan.[18] Meanwhile the Great Britain and the other European powers were economically and militarily feeble enough to contend for international leadership. Two new superpowers emerged after WWII to fill this vacuum: the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Europe was divided into blocks, and two superpowers quickly became rivals, and by the 1940s, the Cold War was well underway. By the 1950s it appeared that the Great Game might finally be over.

9. RELATIONS WITH USSR

As discussed earlier that Afghanistan signed two major treaties with the USSR before World the II, both preceded by the latter's violation of the former's territory. However, the Soviet economic penetration of Afghanistan developed in earnest in the 1950s. During this period USSR overwhelmed a half-hearted US effort to compete for Afghanistan's friendship with a combination of diplomatic initiatives, economic and technical aid, as well as military assistance. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Afghanistan made repeated advances toward the USA for economic and military aid. Before the Cold War, [19] the *Pashtunistan* issue was a matter of little significance for Western countries.[20] Nevertheless, preceding the Korean Crisis,[21] the USA offered a conference of British and American officials along with the Pakistani and Afghan representatives on this border dispute.[22] Pakistan hailed this gesture with ambivalent feelings that at least somebody had shown an interest in bringing Afghanistan and Pakistan together, and fear that the meeting could possibly upshot in giving the *Pashtunistan* issue an added and even more negative connotation. Thus, Pakistan was only ready to discuss economic, cultural, and other issues. It did not recognize the Afghan claims on its sovereign territory.[23] However, it became clear that the US interest in South Asia was limited only to the containment of Communism and thus American attitude rolled the

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18 Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War, State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise of the Taliban*, 49.

19 The Soviet Union's Globe-girdling political, diplomatic and economic conflicts with US were known as Cold War.

20 Fazal-ur-Rehman Marwat, *The Evolution and Growth of Communism in Afghanistan 1917-79: An Appraisal* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1997), 282.

21 The American had been relatively unconcerned about South East Asia following the end of the WWII, but the invasion of South Korea of North Korea in June 1950, changed the situation dramatically. US realized to its horror that the communist menace was not confined to Korea but was spreading to Vietnam. See for detail; Farooq Naseem Bajwa, *Pakistan and the West: The First Decade 1947-1957* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 196.

22 When the Afghan Prime Minister Shah Mahmud Khan asked Philip C. Joseph visiting US ambassador that the United States should intervene in the *Pashtunistan* issue. Joseph said that no purpose would be served by jeopardizing the peace on the Pak-Afghan border, the matter should be settled by mutual negotiation and declined to take sides in favor of one or the other party. Agha G.Raza, "Options for Pakistan in regard to Afghanistan," *Pakistan Times*, 10 May 1985.

23 Ibid.,

Kabul ball 'into the Indo-Soviet Lobby.'[24]

Most scholars argued that the Soviet efforts in Afghanistan have always been intentional elements of an overall plan rather than ad hoc or unintentional responses to poorly understood situations.[25] Finally, in 1956, Afghanistan accepted military aid from the USSR. This opening, along with trade and transit disruptions by Pakistan during the *Pashtunistan* trouble, made it possible for the USSR to re-establish its economic relationship with Afghanistan.[26]

10. THE *PAKISTAN* ISSUE

During the first half of the 20th century, when the question of a separate state for the Muslims of South Asia gained impetus, the Afghan Muhammadzai ruling elite visualized that Britain's withdrawal of the North West Frontier might give Afghanistan a chance to re-establish its traditional links with these former Afghan territories.[27] The Afghan government also knew the geo-strategic importance of an NWFP aligned with Afghanistan. In 1944, when the British departure from India became visible, the Afghan Government notified the British Indian government that in the wake of British withdrawal, the fate of Pashtuns living in the East and South of the boundary would be affected. Nonetheless, the British responded categorically that 'Durand Line was an international boundary, which meant no change would take place to it'.[28] Thereafter, the Afghan Government stopped pushing its demand. However, the Afghan questioned the Durand Line when the Partition Plan of India was announced on June 3, 1947. The Afghan Government claimed the entire area of the Subcontinent inhabitant by the Pashtuns.[29]

On 21st June 1947, the Afghan Prime Minister, Mohammad Hashim Khan stated that the 'Frontier Province should join Afghanistan so that the latter can get an outlet to the sea'.[30] Though the Afghan premier adopted a pragmatic approach to reveal his ambition, however, it was not materialized. The Afghan rulers disregard the three treaties, the Anglo-Afghan Pact of 1905, the Treaty of Rawalpindi of 1919, and the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921, which contained clauses in which Afghanistan appears to ratify or at least accept the 1893 Durand Line Agreement. The Afghan government did not pay heed to the fact that, under international law, the treaties of an extinct state concerning boundary lines remained valid and all the rights and duties arising from such treaties had to be maintained by the successor state. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law

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24 Fazal-ur-Rehman Marwat, *The Evolution and Growth of Communism in Afghanistan 1917-79: An Appraisal*, 288-289.

25 Leon B. Poullada, "The Road to Crisis, 1919-1980;' in Rosanne Klass, ed,. *Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited* (London: Freedom House, 1987), 40; M. Siddieq Noorzoy, "Long-Term Soviet Economic Interests and Policies in Afghanistan;' in Rosanne Klass, ed,. *Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited* (London: Freedom House, 1987), 74-75.

26 M.Khalid, *Welfare State: A Case Study of Pakistan* (Karachi: Royal Book Co, 1968), 187.

27 Nicholas Mansergh, ed., *The Transfer of Power 1942-47: Constitutional Relations between Britain and India*. Vol. VII: (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1977), 34.

28 Abdul Samad Ghaus, *The Fall of Taliban: An insider Account* (Washington: Pergamon-Brasseys, 1988), 66. See also; Ishtiaqe Azhar, "*Durand Line Ki Tarikhi Hasiat Aur Aalmi Ahmiat,"* Jang, 5 February1980.

29 Zarina Salamat, *Pakistan 1947-58: An Historical Review* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1992), 190.

30 Syed Mujtaba Rizvi, *The Frontier of Pakistan: A Study of Problems in Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (Rawalpindi: Army Education Press, 1971), 145.

of Treaties, international agreements once concluded cannot be questioned, annulled or altered except through a bilateral agreement or *force majeure*.

In July 1947, King Zahir Shah's government notified the British that the tribesmen in the "free tribal area" across the Durand line aimed to disassociate themselves from India.[31] This meant that Pakistan would come into existence the next month, had to face serious disturbances on its Afghan border. However, the Government of British India held a referendum in the NWFP in July 1947 to ascertain the preference of the province's population as to whether they would join India or Pakistan. The referendum was boycotted by the Congress and the Khudai Khidmatgars as it did not include the option for a Pashtun state or *Pashtunistan* along with those for India and Pakistan.[32]

The result was an expected one. Out of the total electorate of 572,798 voters, about 50% participated, and as many as 289,244 had voted for the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. Only 2,874 voted against it.[33] Likewise, the Jirgas of tribesmen avowed their allegiance to Pakistan.[34] About the result of the referendum, the Quaid-i-Azam said, "The results of the referendum in the North-West Frontier Province have shown that an absolute majority of the Pathans is desirous of joining the Pakistan domination".[35] As anticipated from the unsmooth start, Afghanistan proved to be a difficult neighbor for Pakistan in the days to come. Afghanistan was the only country to oppose Pakistan's membership in the United Nations.[36] The country conditioned its recognition of Pakistan to provision of the right of self-determination to the people of the NWFP.

This Afghan demand was always perceived as an anti-Pakistan gesture. The *Pashtunistan* issue, sponsored by Afghanistan, gave ethnic-color to the North Western Frontier's politics.[37] Later, the Afghan government sponsored a *Pashtunistan* government in exile led by Haji Mirza Ali Khan (Faqir of Ipi) near Tirah on the Pak-Afghan border.[38] The Pak-Afghan relations continued to heat, and the ultimate outcome of it was the disconnection of diplomatic relations between the two countries. A military clash was just warded off by between the two countries.[39] The issue that mainly disconcerted Afghanistan was Pakistan's adherence to Western-sponsored alliances SEATO and CENTO.[40] However, with

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31 Ghayoor Ahmad, "Truth about the Durand Line," *Dawn*, Thursday, January 18, 2007.

32 Khalid B. Saeed, *Politics in Pakistan* (New York: Pager Publishers, 1980), 24.

33 Kalim Bahadur, *"Pakistan's Policy towards Afghanistan,"* in K. P. Misra, ed., Afghanistan in Crises (New York: Advent Books Inc, 1981), 92-3.

34 Syed Abdul Quddus, *The Pathans* (Lahore: Ferozsons LTD, 1987), 225.

35 Mehrunissa Ali, ed., *Pak-Afghan Discord: A Historical Perspective Documents (1853-1979)* (Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre, 1990), 113.

36 Rafi Raza, *Pakistan in Perspective* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 116.

37 Polluada, *"Pashtunistan: Afghan Domestic Politics and Relations with Pakistan,"* 126.

38 Syed Mujtaba Rizvi, "Pak-Afghan Relations since 1947: An Analysis*," Pakistan Horizon* 32 (Sep-Dec 1979):38.

39 Rizvi, *The Frontier of Pakistan,* 144.

40 When Ayub Khan visited the US in July 1961 and made a demand for modern weapons, the Afghan Ambassador Hashim Malakandwal, expressed his country's concern over the large-scale US military aid to Pakistan which he feared would be used against freedom loving Pashtun and Baluchis. But the American leaders assured him that they would advice Pakistanis leaders to use these weapons with a sense of responsibility, see The Hindustan Times, 24 July 1961.

the resignation of Sardar Daud, one of the main exponents of *Pashtunistan*, in March 1963 and his subsequent replacement by Dr. Mohammad Yusuf, who was a commoner,[41] the Pak-Afghan relations demonstrated signs of improvement. It was through the Shah of Iran's mediation, that diplomatic relations between the two countries were reinstated in May 1963.[42] During the Pak-Indo war of 1965, the Afghan government had decided to remain neutral.[43] Zahir Shah visited Pakistan in 1968, and his visit was reciprocated by Finance Minister Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash in 1970. The aim was to survey the potential of escalating trade and economic cooperation.[44]

In July 1973, Sardar Daud put an end to Zahir Shah's regime, who went into exile in Rome and nominated himself as the president of Afghanistan.[45] Since this coup was leftist and evidently sponsored by the USSR, it became the first country to recognize the coup.[46] At this point, Soviet/Communist elements had deeply penetrated the Afghan army, media, and educational institutions, and so on. Around 800 hardcore officers in the Afghan army were trained by the Soviets.[47]

11. PROMULGATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 1964

In 1964, King Zahir Shah promulgated a liberal constitution providing for a bicameral legislature to which the king appointed one third of the deputies. The people elected another third, and the remaining were elected indirectly by provincial assemblies. Although Zahir's experience with democracy produced few lasting reforms as it permitted the growth of unofficial extremist parties on both the left and the right. These included the Communist, People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which had close ideological ties with the USSR. In 1967, the PDPA split into major rival factions: the Khalaq (masses) headed by Nur Mohammad Tarakai and Hafizullah Amin. This faction of PDPA was supported by the elements within the military. The second faction of PDPA was the Parcham (banner) led by Babrak Karmal.[48] This split reflected ethnic, class, and ideological divisions within Afghan society.

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41 Dr. Mohammad Yosuf, a Tajik and first non-royal Prime Minister in Afghan history chosen by King to head th e constitutional drafting process (1963-1964) and secured its passage in Loya Jirga. Supervised elections to first Parliament under the constitution of 1964 and was confirmed as confirmed as Prime Minister despite organize riots by People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan at session. See for details; Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby, *Mullah, Marx and Mujahid,* with a foreword by Dar Rather *(*New York: West view Press, 1998), 202.

42 Government of Pakistan*, Background information and Analysis: Pak-Afghan Relations (A General Survey 1947-73* (Islamabad: Bureau of National Research and Reference, n.d.), 4. The Shah had previously tried to meditate in the Pakistan-Afghanistan dispute and had been suggested a confederation between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. See Rizvi, *The Frontier of Pakistan,* 163.

43 Ibid,.

44 The New Times, 17 May 1970.

45 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Soviet Policy towards Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan: The Dynamics of Influence* (New York: Prager Publishers, 1982), 139.

46 Ibid,.

47 Edgar O' Ballance, *Afghan Wars* (London: Creative Prints and, Design Wales, 2003), 79-80.

48 Abdul Sabahuddin, *History of Afghanistan* (New Delhi: Global Vision Publishing House, 2009), 7.

Compulsory Reading:

1.Ewan, Martin. *Afghanistan: A New History*. London: Curzon Press, 2001.

Suggested Readings:

Ali, Mehrunissa, ed., *Pak-Afghan Discord: A Historical Perspective, Documents 1853-1979.* Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre, 1990.

Bajwa, Farooq Naseem. *Pakistan and the West: The First Decade 1947-1957.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

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Sabahuddin, Abdul. *History of Afghanistan*. New Delhi: Global Vision Publishing House, 2009.
Saeed, Khalid B. *Politics in Pakistan* . New York: Pager Publishers, 1980.
Salamat, Zarina. *Pakistan 1947-58: An Historical Review.* Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1992.
Spain, James W. *The Pathan Borderland*. Karachi: Indus Publications, 1985.
Tanvir, Mohammad Halim. *Afghanistan, History, Diplomacy and Journalism*. London: Xlibrish Publishing, 2012.

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Rizvi, Syed Mujtaba. "Pak-Afghan Relations since 1947: An Analysis." *Pakistan Horizon* (Sep-Dec 1979): 34-50.
Ayesha, Riffat. "Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations 1947-71." *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture* vol. VII. No. 1 (Jan-Jun 1986): 55-72.

Self-Assessment Questions:

1. Entail the circumstances that led to the establishment of an independent Afghan monarchy in the twentieth century.
2. Briefly discuss the causes that led to the third Anglo-Afghan War.
3. Examine the causes of the failure of the reforms introduced by Amanullah Khan.
4. What were the reasons that prompted the USSR to establish its political control over Afghanistan?
5. Do you agree that the Pak-American military act of 1954, instead of improving the situation in the region, pushed Afghanistan into the arms of the Soviet Union?
6. The *Pashtunistan* issue was one of the major reasons for the rivalry between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Comment.
7. Trace the causes and the course of rivalry between the two superpowers, USSR and the USA, during the Cold War.

a) Please select an appropriate answer.

1. Who was the ruler of Afghanistan who declared independence in 1919?
   a) King Zahir Shah
   b) Amir Amanullah Khan
   c) Sardar Daud
   d) King Nadir Shah

2. The Third Anglo-Afghan War took place in which year?
   a) 1917
   b) 1918
   c) 1919
   d) 1920

3. What was the main outcome of the Treaty of Rawalpindi (1919)?
   a) Afghanistan became a British colony
   b) Afghanistan gained full control over its foreign affairs
   c) Afghanistan became a protectorate of Russia
   d) The British retained control over Afghanistan's army

4. Which European country was the first to sign a friendship treaty with Afghanistan in 1921?
   a) Britain
   b) France
   c) Russia
   d) Germany

5. Which Afghan king was forced to abdicate in 1929 due to civil unrest?
   a) King Nadir Shah
   b) Amir Amanullah Khan
   c) King Zahir Shah
   d) Habibullah Kalakani

Answer Key

1. a) Amir Amanullah Khan
2. c) 1919
3. b) Afghanistan gained full control over its foreign affairs
4. c) Russia
5. b) Amir Amanullah Khan

UNIT 05

SARDAR DAUD'S REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN (1973-1978)

Written by: Dr. Sadia Aziz
Reviewer: Dr Razia Sultana

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INTRODUCTION

Sardar Mohammad Daud was the son of Sardar Mohammad Aziz. He embarked on a military career and was Governor and General Officer Commanding the Eastern Province (1934), Qandahar (1935), and the Central Forces stationed at Kabul (1939-1947) as well as the Minister of Defence in 1946. As Minister of Interior (1949-50) and Prime Minister (1953-63), he encouraged social reforms and, in 1959, allowed women to cast away the veil, thus endorsing their emancipation and participation in the economic life of Afghanistan.[1] He was the main protagonist of *Pashtunistan* and demanded its independence from Pakistan, which led to continuous crises with the neighbouring country and ended with his resignation in 1963. Ten years later, in a bloodless coup, Sardar Daud ousted King Zahir Shah from power and in July 1973 proclaimed Afghanistan a republic as President of the Republic of Afghanistan.[2] In 1977, he introduced a new constitution that called for socio-economic reforms and intended to stave off the exploitation of the ordinary Afghan citizen. A program of land reforms was also promised, along with an assurance to nationalize key industries.[3]

Towards the end of his rule, he attempted to eliminate his leftist supporters from power and wanted to lessen the Russian influence in the internal politics of Afghanistan. He managed to improve his relations with the West, Iran, Pakistan, and the Arab Gulf States which would enable him to pay back the Russian loan.[4] However, he and his family members were assassinated on 27 April 1978 as a result of the Saur Revolution that brought Marxist parties to rule Afghanistan.

OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you will be able to;

- Discuss the reforms introduced by Sardar Daud and their impact on the internal situation of Afghanistan.
- Figure out the importance and impact of the *Pashtunistan* issue.
- Explain the internal and external circumstances that paved the way for the Saur Revolution.
- Critically evaluate the reforms introduced by the PDPA regime.
- Highlight the impact and outcomes of international and regional events on the internal situation of Afghanistan.

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1 Ludwig. W. Adamec , *Dictionary of Afghan Wars, Relations and Insurgencies* (London: The Scarecrow Press, 1996), 292.

2 Hasan Abbas , *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America's War on Terror* (CT*: Yale University Press, 2002), 80*

3 Frank Clements, *Conflict in Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopaedia* (California: ABC, CLIO, Inc, 2003), 68.

4 Adamec , *Dictionary of Afghan Wars, Relations and Insurgencies, 292.*

1. END OF MONARCHY

Sardar Daud took full advantage of malevolent propaganda and disinformation campaigns regarding political sedition and corruption charges against the royal family. These factors, including the severe drought of 1971-72, paved the way for Sardar Daud to depose King Zahir Shah and become the president of DRA (Democratic Republic of Afghanistan).[5]

2. REFORMS INTRODUCED BY DAUD

Here, it would be relevant to discuss the internal and external policies of Daud's regime in order to understand the circumstances that led to the Socialist coup.

- Daud had adopted an authoritarian political model for maintaining his rule. He aimed to create a strong centralized state based upon an all-powerful Presidency. Thus, he had virtually taken for granted all the earlier assurances of social reform and democratic governance.
- By 1977, he had dispensed with the pro-Soviet Parcham faction of the PDPA that had been crucial in his rise to power.
- His 1977 constitution replaced the former bicameral parliament with a unicameral legislature. This new legislature was structured on one-party system and was controlled by Daud's *Hezb-e-Inqelab-e-Melli* (the National Revolution Party). The President was not answerable to the legislature as well. Only the *Loya Jirga* (the Grand National tribal assembly), the highest body in the structure of the Afghan state, could inspect certain Presidential acts. Nevertheless, the *Loya Jirga* could only be summoned in national emergencies, in situations of extreme national importance, such as the beginning or termination of war.
- There was a shift in Daud's policy towards the Soviet Union after 1977, as a result relations were gradually becoming cold. Moreover, the growing Iran-Afghanistan friendship and Iranian influence in Afghan internal issues seriously troubled the Kremlin (USSR).
- To improve ties with conservative Muslim states, Daud visited Saudi Arabia and Egypt. These were the two most anti-Soviet states in the Islamic world. The Saudis pledged Daud US$500 million in financial assistance. Daud's tilt towards the West and the traditional Muslim states had amplified Soviet apprehensions regarding the future of Soviet-Afghan ties.[6] In spite of it, Moscow remained Afghanistan's largest aid supporter during the Daud era. In spite of the changes in Afghan foreign policy that went contrary to Soviet sensitivities.[7]

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5 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Soviet Policy towards Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan: The Dynamics of Influence* (New York: Prager Publishers, 1982), 139.

6 Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan: A New History* (London: Curzon Press, 2001), 132-134.

7 By 1978, the Soviet Union and, its Eastern allies had given Kabul aid to the value of US$1.5 billion,

3. REVIVAL OF THE *PASHTUNISTAN* ISSUE AND RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN

The *Pashtunistan* issue once again came to the limelight. In August 1973, the Afghan government announced *Pashtunistan* Day in Kabul with a vociferous exhibition of support for Pashtun and Baloch brothers.[8] In November 1973, Kabul asserted that, 'Kabul does not recognize the Durand Line as an international border between the two countries since it separates almost 2.5 million Pashtuns from Afghanistan'. [9] Waheed Abdullah, the Deputy Foreign Secretary of Afghanistan, also expressed the same feelings by saying, 'Afghanistan could not remain a silent spectator to the Pakistan government's use of force and arms against the Pashtun and Baluchs'.[10]

In disregard to Daud's strong support for Pashtuns and Baluchs, Bhutto took strong measures against the Baluch nationalists. In Baluchistan, he launched a campaign against anti-government elements with the assistance of the army and air force.[11] At this point, both countries started intervening in each other's internal affairs by sponsoring anti-state elements within the other country. Daud aided the nationalist insurgency in Baluchistan. On the other hand, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto used Rabbani and Hikmatyar to subvert Daud's regime.[12]

In July 1973, Bhutto founded an 'Afghan Cell' in the Foreign Office to respond to propaganda from Kabul. The basic aim was to counter the claim of the Greater *Pashtunistan,* which had become a challenge to Pakistan's national integrity. Bhutto's advisor, Major General (Rtd.) Nasirullah Babar was in charge of the Afghan affairs. The Afghan cell was working regularly for the next four years, under the Prime Minister Bhutto and streamlined policy guidelines.[13] Bhutto responded with an innovative set of border policies that led to the organization of a secret anti-government Afghan guerrilla force. This force was recruited mainly from Afghanistan's growing Islamic fundamentalist movement. Thus, Pakistan began to conduct an insurgency inside Afghanistan. According to Bhutto, 'two can play at the same game. We know where their weak points are, just as they know ours. The non-Pashtuns hate Pashtun domination. So we have our ways of persuading Daud not to aggravate our problem.[14] Kabul charged Pakistan with its involvement in the insurgency against Daud and his government. On November 27, 1974, Daud informed the UN Secretary General of

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excluding large -scale military assistance. Bruce J. Amstutz, *Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation (*Washington DC: Department of State, 1986), 22.

8 Anthony Arnold, *Afghanistan's Two Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq* (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1983), 45.

9 Hafizullah Etemadi, *State, Revolution and Superpower in Afghanistan* (New York: Praeger, 1990), 72.

10 Azmat Hayat Khan, *The Durand Line: Its Geostrategic Importance* (University of Peshawar: Area Study Center, 2000), 192

11 S, Selig Harrison, *Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptation* (Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981), 80.

12 Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghan, Communism and Soviet Intervention* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 14.

13. Bradsher, Afghan, Communism and Soviet Intervention, 17-18.

14 Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of Soviet Withdrawal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 61.

Pakistan's 'interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan'. He cited various documents then in the hands of the Afghan government, which showed Pakistan's interference in Afghanistan. Those documents were not disclosed, so Pakistan denied the accusation.[15] In March 1975, Gulbaddin Hakmatyar tried an unsuccessful attempt to organize an unsuccessful uprising in four provinces of Afghanistan with Bhutto's support.[16] On July 21, 1975, the Hizb made another attempt in Panjsher to raise an armed insurrection against the government of Daud with the help of Pakistan.[17] The Panjsher uprising started in the southeast of Afghanistan in the summer of 1975. The insurgents targeted the police posts in the provinces of Paktia, Laghman, Nanghar, and Badakhshan. They began a large-scale offensive in Paktia. The objective was to destabilize Daud's government. But an anticipated general uprising did not take place in spite of these speedy strikes during the night and early morning of July 21-22, 1975. Daud had to make extraordinary efforts to crush the revolt. Government forces, with the assistance of helicopters, were sent to suppress the insurgency.[18] In this way, the Hizb failed in mobilizing the general public against Daud. The survivor came to Peshawar, where ISI continued its support to them.[19]

These elements later emerged as very important and successful liberation fighters or mujahedin against Soviet forces. Bhutto's prudent policies were successful in pressuring the Afghan government. Abdul Samad Ghaus (Deputy Foreign Minister of Afghanistan under Daud) also indicated that, 'before coming to a compromise position, Kabul's involvement in the Baluch and Pashtun areas of Pakistan was flagrant as was alleged by the Islamabad government'.[20] He further wrote that tribal leaders and representatives were continuous visitors to Kabul to request aid, supervision, and material assistance. The Afghan government also offered complete support to these elements as it aimed at dismemberment of the tribal regions.[21] Nevertheless, the government of Afghanistan could not gain the support of the Muslim countries on the *Pashtunistan* issue. This was basically due to the world's polarization into the American and Soviet blocs. Those Muslim countries that were pro-America could not heed Afghanistan's pro-Soviet policy and so they remained friendly towards Pakistan.[22]

There was a change in Daud's policy towards Pakistan when he realized that his antagonistic policies towards Pakistan were becoming harmful to his country's own integrity. Consequently, an exchange of visits between Bhutto and Daud took place, thus of dialogue between high officials. Daud agreed to recognize the

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15 Nilofer Qasim Mehdi, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971-1981:The Search for Security* (Rawalpindi: Ferozsons Pvt Ltd, 1999).135.

16 Sadhan Mukherjee, *Afghanistan: From Tragedy to Triumph* (Karachi: Gazzaz Press, 1984), 79.

17 Abdul Rashid, *"The Afghan Resistance: Its Background, Its Nature, and the Problem of Unity,"* in Rosanne Klass, ed,. *Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited* (London: Freedom House, 1987), 209.

18 Institute of Regional Studies, Afghanistan, Past, Present and Future (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies), 217.

19 Bradsher, *Afghan, Communism and Soviet Intervention,* 18.

20 Abdul Samad Ghaus, *The Fall of Taliban: An insider Account* (Washington: Pergamon-Brasseys, 1988), 110-134.

21 Ibid,.

22 Sadia Aziz, "A Study of Pak-Afghan Relations During 1947-1979," *Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences* 28 (December 2010), 132.

Durand Line as the frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan.[23] In return, Bhutto agreed to release the National Awami Party leaders, including Wali Khan, who were accused of supporting the *Pashtunistan* demand.[24] The concord had yet to be signed, since Bhutto was driven out in the July 1977 coup of Zia-ul Haq, and the matter remained inconclusive.[25]

4. DAUD'S TIES WITH THE USSR

Since this coup was leftist and evidently was sponsored by the USSR, it became the first country to recognize the coup.[26] At this point, Soviet/Communist elements had deeply penetrated the Afghan army, media, and educational institutions, and so on. Around 800 hardcore officers in the Afghan army were also trained by the Soviets.[27]

5. THE GREAT SAUR REVOLUTION AND DRA (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN)

Daud's authoritarian course alienated not only the pro-Soviet Parcham and Khalq factions of the PDPA but also the orthodox religious factions, as increasing secularization raised their deepest concern. Daud's anti-leftist policies led the Khalq and Parcham factions of the PDPA to unite in 1977.[28] The PDPA unity was aimed at deterring the Daud regime from eliminating the Afghan left.[29] In this regard, the Communist Party of India acted as an intermediary.[30]

In 1978, there was a visible decline in Daud's popularity due to his authoritarianism and a waning economy. As a result, a pro-Soviet PDPA coup occurred against the Daud regime on 27 April 1978.[31] The Parcham-Khalq alliance gained increased power with the aid of Soviet-trained officials of the Afghan army and air force ,who, even in 1973, had also been instrumental in installing Daud once again became the main instrument of the coup, albeit against Daud.[32] The coup claimed the life of Daud and several members of his family. Although the military played a key role in this coup but the Afghan armed forces handed over power to

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23 Hafiz Malik, *Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post Soviet Dynamics* (London: Macmillan, 1994), 258-9.

24 Ghaus, *The Fall of Taliban: An insider Account* , 130.

25 Omar Noman, *"Pakistan and General Zia: Era and Legacy,"* Third World Quarterly 2 (January 1989): 30.see also, Singh, Jasjit. "Nothing Uniform about them." *Times of India* (New Delhi, 1999), 17.

26 Ibid,.

27 Edgar O' Ballance, *Afghan Wars* (London: Creative Prints and, Design Wales, 2003), 79-80.

28 Ibid,. 82.

29 Several smaller leftist groups other than the Khalq and, Parcham factions had emerged in Afghanistan during the late 1960s. A prominent leftist group Shola-e-Jawaid (eternal name) was int1uenced by Maoist ideas and, had gained some support amongst lower middle class Hazaras, Tajiks and, some Pashtuns. Another ultra-leftist group Sitam-e-Melli (the oppressed nation) led by the Tajik leader, Tahir Badakshi, surfaced in Afghan Badakshan in the early 1970s. These groups could not muster much support and, remained on the periphery of the Afghan left. As Sardar Abdul Wali observed that: 'if the mullahs were unleashed all leftists in the country would be dead'. Frontier Post, 27 February 1988.

30 Anthony, *Afghanistan's Two Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq*, 53-54.

31 Edgar O' Ballance, *Afghan Wars*, 82.

32 Ewans, *Afghanistan*, 135-37.

the civilian leadership of the PDPA.[33] The leader of the Khalq faction, Nur Muhammad Taraki, who headed the PDPA regime, became the President and the Prime Minister of the newly proclaimed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). Hafizullah Amin, the chief organizer of the coup and also belonging to Khalq, was appointed as one of the deputy prime ministers along with Parcham's Babrak Karmal. Taraki and Amin were Ghilzai Pashtuns, whereas Babrak Karmal came from a mixed Pashtun-Tajik ancestry.[34] General Zia, who had established personal relations with Daud, was worried when he received news of political turmoil in Afghanistan. General Zia was willing to help Daud when he requested assistance. Zia told General Arif, 'I will not hesitate to provide help to Daud, but I have to await his reply'.[35]

6. REFORMS INTRODUCED BY PDPA

The PDPA's announcement of a number of radical social and economic reforms in the months of May-June 1978 sparked considerable opposition within Afghanistan from the traditional elements and conservative Islamist groups. The regime's measures included land reforms, improvement in the status of women, attempts at alleviating the country's over 90 per cent illiteracy rate, granting of rights to national minorities, and the cancellation of debts owed by peasants to rich landlords, an act legitimized by Islamic Sharia.[36]

The intention behind the reforms tended to be reasonable, but taking into account Afghanistan's tribal social structure, their implementation required patience, tact, and educated bureaucratic attributes that the PDPA lacked. The Afghan armed forces, the only relatively organized institution in the country, although considerably strengthened by Soviet assistance, were not strong enough to assist the PDPA in its ambitious reform schemes. Even Soviet specialists regarded the PDPA's reform program as over-ambitious and ill-planned. According to a leading Soviet scholar on Afghanistan, the PDPA tried to 'do in two or three years what twenty or thirty years would not be sufficient to accomplish'.[37] Most certainly, PDPA regimes of Nur Muhammad Taraki (May 1978-September 1979) and Hafizullah Amin (September 1979-December 1979) were highly authoritarian and brutal. Thus, thousands of people were imprisoned and executed during their brief tenure in office.[38]

The government's alienation from its people was also the outcome of its immature measures like changing the Afghan flag, renaming the country as the

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33 Musa Khan Jalalzai, *Taliban and the Great Game in Afghanistan* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1999), 60.
34 Tabassum Naz, "Pakistan's Afghan Policy Under Jonejo," (M.Phil diss., Quaid-i-Azam University, 2001), 83.
35 Khalid Mahmud Arif, *Working with Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics 1977* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 304.
36 Institute of Regional Studies, *Afghanistan: Past, Present and Future* (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, 1997), 158-164.
37 Mian Asad Hayaud din, "Pakistan's Afghan Policy 1974-1991" (M.Phil diss., Quaid-i-Azam University,1991), 206.
38 Ballance, *Afghan Wars,* 85-86.

Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), invocation of the names of Marx and Lenin by government officials and other such measures provided the Islamic groups and anti-PDPA clergy an opportunity to denounce the government as 'atheistic' and a puppet of the Soviet Union.[39] PDPA never had more than a meagre basis of support and that concentrated mainly in Kabul, possibly numbering no more than a few thousand people in a country that had a population of I5 million in 1978. However, on the 16th of September 1979, President Taraki was executed by his Prime Minister, Hafizullah Amin.[40] Amin's autocratic style of leadership, brutality against both the Khalq and Parcham factions of PDPA, and decisiveness resulted in Amin's elimination by Soviet forces and his replacement by Babrak Karmal, the leader of the Parcham faction of PDPA.[41] The installation of Babrak Karmal by Soviet forces in Kabul called his advent to power 'a new stage of the Saur Revolution'.[42] During this period, many Afghans fled to Pakistan, Iran, and gave impetus to organizing a resistance movement against the Communist regime with the help of neighbouring countries.

7. IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL EVENTS ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION OF AFGHANISTAN

Internationally, the geopolitics of Asia was transformed by the Sino-US rapprochement that the US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski openly stated was largely aimed at 'discouraging Soviet expansionism'.[43] Around early 1979, the influence of the Zia regime had increased considerably in Afghanistan. The Sino-Japanese and American entente became one of the central foreign policy concerns of the ageing Soviet leadership in Moscow. A threat was also perceived due to America's pressure on its NATO allies to install cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe did not allow the hard-liners in Moscow to abandon Afghanistan.[44] In Iran, the Shah's regime was confronted with severe opposition from the Islamic movement led by Ayatollah Khomeini that resulted in the overthrow of the monarchy in January-February 1979.[45] In short, the political conditions around Afghanistan favoured the Islamic opposition to fight the faction-ridden government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

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39 N.D, Ahmed, *The Survival of Afghanistan: The Historical Background of Afghan Crisis* (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1990), 308.

40 *Pakistan Times*, 1 January 1980.

41 *Pakistan Times*, 28 December, 1979.

42 Radio Kabul. " President Karmal's Speech" [transcription] Persian- 2030/ Pushto- 2045 Hours Dated: 25.1.80. Press Clipping File no 953. See also; Malik, *Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post Soviet Dynamics, 268.*

43 Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principal: The Memoir of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar Strauss and Giroux, 1983), 199.

44 V.K.Bhasin, *Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan: Its Background and implications* (New Delhi: S.Chand and Company Ltd, n.d), 43.

45 Shahid M. Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 83.

In December 1978, Afghanistan signed a friendship treaty with the USSR. An article of this treaty stated that the 'High Contracting Parties … shall take appropriate measures with a view to maintaining the security, independence and territorial integrity of both countries'.[46] Moreover, the PDPA steadily increased its reliance on Soviet military and civilian advisers.[47] The Soviet-Afghan treaty greatly disturbed the military regime in Islamabad and its key regional ally, the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The right wing of the Chinese Communist Party under Deng Xiaoping had gained dominance by 1978 after ousting the Maoists. The Chinese leadership perceived the Moscow-Kabul alliance as an instrument to project Soviet power in South Asia.[48] China had been urging Pakistan to detach Afghanistan from the Soviets after the April 1978 coup. In this regard, the Chinese-backed pro-Maoist *Shola-e-Javid* had escalated its actions against Kabul and tried to win over marginalized Afghan minorities such as Hazaras.[49] The Soviets claimed that Chinese-made weapons were being seized from alleged 'conspirators' as early as July 1978.[50] In effect, the Zia regime's strategy to counter the political developments in Kabul had implicit Chinese consent months before the large-scale United States involvement.

A major goal of Zia was to induce the United States on its side in pursuance of its policy in Afghanistan. Since the Afghan coup, the Zia regime had been conveying its apprehensions about Afghanistan to the Carter administration. While urging the US for involvement in Afghanistan, the Zia regime kept in constant contact with the People's Republic of China. Zia publicly referred to his concerns about the 'stability of Afghanistan' to the Chinese Vice Premier, Geng Biao, during the latter's visit to Pakistan for the opening of the Karakorum Highway (KKH) linking Chinese Xinjiang to Islamabad.[51] The Chinese official had responded by repeating the standard Beijing mantra about Soviet 'hegemonism' and interference in the region.[52] The Karakorum Highway would later serve as one of the main channels for the supply of Chinese arms and ammunition to the Afghan Islamic groups.[53]

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46 *Pakistan Times*, 1 January 1980.

47 Bradsher, *Afghan, Communism and Soviet Intervention*, 64.

48 Yaakov. Y. I. Vertzberger, *China's Southwestern Strategy: Encirclement and Counter Encirclement* (New York: Preager, 1985), 109-110.

49 The Shola-e-Javid had been operating since 1973 and, had some support in the 'discriminated' Shiite Hazara community. See for detail; Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973),616.

50 Although, the Chinese do not appear to have been the major supplier of arms and resistance. The mujahedeen claims that most of their weapons are obtained from raids on Soviet Stores, Soviet defectors and the Soviet captives, whilst, Egypt, the USA and Pakistan have all supplied more than the Chinese. See for details; John G. Merriams, *"Arms shipments to the Afghan Resistance: The Politics of Survival"* in Grant M. Farr and John G. Merriams, eds., *Afghan Resistance: The Politics of Survival* (Boulder: West view Press, 1987), 70-71.

51 Mehdi, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971-1981: The Search for Security*, 209.

52 Ibid,. 210.

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Self-Assessment Questions

1. Briefly describe the reforms introduced by Sardar Daud and analyze their impact on the internal situation of Afghanistan.
2. How did the revival of the *Pashtunistan* issue affect the relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan?
3. Give details about the internal and external circumstances that paved the way for the Saur Revolution.
4. Critically evaluate the impact of the reforms introduced by the PDPA regime.
5. Do you agree that the international and regional events influenced the internal situation of Afghanistan? Explain with examples.

a) Please select an appropriate answer.

1. Who overthrew King Zahir Shah in 1973?
   a) Hafizullah Amin
   b) Nur Muhammad Taraki
   c) Sardar Daud
   d) Babrak Karmal
2. What type of government did Sardar Daud establish in 1973?
   a) Islamic Republic
   b) Communist State
   c) Monarchy
   d) Republic
3. Sardar Daud's government introduced a new constitution in which year?
   a) 1975
   b) 1977
   c) 1979
   d) 1981
4. What was one of Sardar Daud's key reforms?
   a) Strengthening ties with the Soviet Union
   b) Abolishing the monarchy
   c) Establishing Sharia law
   d) Joining NATO
5. What was the main goal of Daud's foreign policy?
   a) Strengthening relations with Western powers
   b) Seeking independence from Soviet influence
   c) Forming an alliance with India
   d) Rejoining the British Empire

Answer Key

1.c) Sardar Daud

2.d) Republic

3. b) 1977

4.b) Abolishing the monarchy

5. b) Seeking independence from Soviet influence

Unit 06

SOVIET INTERVENTION & AFGHAN RESISTANCE (1979-1989)

Written by: Dr. Sadia Aziz
Reviewer: Dr. Razia Sultana

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INTRODUCTION

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979-1989) was one of the bloodiest of Cold War conflicts. By the time the last Soviet soldier returned to his native soil in February 1989, over 13,000 of his comrades had died, and another 40,000 were mortally wounded. Estimates of Afghan losses vary, but it is believed that anywhere from 800,000 to 1.2 million Afghans died as a result of the fighting.[1] Yet the destruction did not stop there. In the years 1989-1992, the government of the Republic of Afghanistan under Dr. Najibulla, aided and abetted by the Soviets, continued to hold out against *mujahedin* groups backed by Pakistan, the United States, and Saudi Arabia. After the Geneva Accord, the Republic of Afghanistan survived for almost five months, but its collapse commenced a new phase of civil war, which in one form or another continues to the present day.

OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you will be able to;

- Know about the circumstances that led the USSR to invade Afghanistan.
- Realize the situation of Pakistan as a 'security deficit' state within the South Asian Region.
- Highlight the role of Pakistan in fomenting and covert backing of the *Jihadi* groups inside Afghanistan.
- Explain the course of battle between *Jihadi* groups and the former Soviet Union.
- Discuss the United Nations' efforts to solve the Afghan crisis.
- Highlight the importance of the Geneva Accord.

[1] Artemy Kalinovsky, *Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan* (Cumberland: Harvard University Press, 2011), 1.

1. SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN

In December 1979, one thousand Soviet soldiers moved into the military airport of Bagram to the north of Kabul. On 24 December, some elements of the 105th Soviet airborne division took complete control of the airport. On 27 December, three motorized divisions crossed the Amu Darya and advanced towards Mazar-e-Sharif. The following day, two more divisions, with the Soviet air force providing air cover, took Herat before continuing towards Kandahar and Ghazni. Four days after the Soviet contingent had landed, Afghanistan's four largest cities had come under its control.[2]

By 1979, Soviet Military aid for Afghanistan was valued at roughly $1,250 million.[3] The elevated watermark of the Afghan-Soviet companionship and co-operation reached on 5th December 1978, with the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship.[4] The Treaty was later used as the legal basis for the military intervention, on the pretext that external forces had risked the Independence of Afghanistan. It was argued that the internal politics became worse in Afghanistan, and the Soviets took initiatives to make a thrust into Afghanistan, to defend the collapsing communist regime of Hafizullah Amin.[5] The Red Army was now on Pakistan's doorstep step and the Soviet threat to Pakistan's northern border was posed.[6]

2. PAKISTAN'S RESPONSE TO SOVIET INTERVENTION

The Soviet presence in Afghanistan created a serious threat to Pakistan's North Western borders vis-à-vis the enemy to the East-India. For Pakistan, the Soviet Union was an aggressive superpower, potentially willing to threaten Pakistan's security in the NWFP and Baluchistan.[7] Pakistan had never faced such a multidimensional external threat, and it felt incomparably weaker, sandwiched between the hostile Soviet Union and unfriendly India.

Rodney W. Jones described Pakistan as a 'security deficit' state with inherent problems of defending itself militarily, should an outside attack be launched against it.[8] The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan posed a security problem of almost

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2 Edgar O' Ballance, *Afghan Wars* (London: Creative Prints and, Design Wales, 2003), 89.

3 Hafeez Malik, *"Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan and, its impact on Pakistan's Foreign Policy,"* in Hafeez Malik, *Soviet American Relations with Pakistan, Iran and, Afghanistan* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1987), 129-130.

4 *Pakistan Time*, 1 January 1980.

5 Shirin Tahir Kheli, "Soviet Fortunes on the Southern Tier: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan," *The Concept*, 23 June 1982: 17-19.

6 *Pakiatan Times*, 3 January 1980.

7 V.K.Bhasin, *Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan: Its Background and implications* (New Delhi: S.Chand and Company Ltd, n.d), 179-180.

8 Rodney W. Jones, "*The Military and Security in Pakistan,"* in Craig Baxter ed., Zia's *Pakistan: Politics and Stability in a Frontline State* (Boulder: West view Press, 1985), 78.

insuperable proportions for strategic planners in Islamabad. It meant that the country recognized as a buffer between the Soviet state and South Asia for nearly a century, had disappeared. Pakistan was now confronted with the prospect of having to defend a 1400-mile-long frontier against a superpower with superior military capability. There was a possibility of Soviet aggression against Pakistan, and consequent Soviet domination of Pakistan that would have enabled the Soviets to break the 'capitalist encirclement' of its southern flank, give it access to the open ocean, liquidate an ally of both the US and China at one stroke, and complete the link in the chain of pro-Soviet countries surrounding China. From the Pakistani perspective, after the Soviet invasion, Pakistan faced a real threat to its security from its communist neighbour, Afghanistan.

3. THE WAVE OF RELIGIOUS INSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN: FORMATION OF JIHADI GROUPS

Pakistan's direct involvement in the resistance started from the time of the communist coup, when it gave sanctuary to the opponents of the Kabul regime. From then on, Pakistani authorities tried to monitor all aspects of the Afghan presence in Pakistan as well as the conduct of the war with a view to making the military efforts of the Afghan resistance coincide with Pakistan's interests. In order to facilitate Pakistan's covert backing for the Afghan groups opposed to the Kabul administration, Zia had instructed General Fazal-i-Haq to reduce the more than one hundred and fifty groups and parties to a smaller figure in Peshawar.[9] It was argued that the fragmentation of Afghanistan could be ascribed to ethnic and tribal rivalry as well as to the deep-rooted ideological difference. So, scholars like Olivier Roy and Osta Olsen strongly emphasize the difference between 'fundamentalists' and 'traditionalists'.[10]

By 1980, Pakistan recognized seven main groups based in Peshawar, all with a Sunni religious ideology, four of them Islamists and three traditionalists. The difference between the two groups was broadly of the like that the 'radical' in outlook, regarding their struggle for a state and society in accordance with the Islamic principles. However, the 'traditionalists' saw it primarily as a struggle for national liberation.[11] It was under the tutelage of the Pakistani Military that the desperate Afghan groups presented a semblance of unity to get Western support. In this context, seven major Afghan parties gained prominence, especially in the Western world, with the support and assistance of the Zia regime.

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9 Christina Lamb, *Waiting for Allah: Pakistan's Struggle for Democracy* (London: Viking Penguin Book Ltd, 1994), 220.

10 Olivier Roy, *Failure of Political Islam* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1995), 224; See also Osta Olesen, *Islam and Politics in Afghanistan* (New York: Richmond, 1995), 230-235.

11 Martin Ewan, *Afghanistan: A New History* (London: Curzon Press, 2001), 153-154.

The main Sunni and Shia groups were as under:

Table 3.1- Pakistan and Iran-Based Groups

Pakistan-Based Seven Party Alliance		***Geographical Area***		***Iran-Based Four-Party Alliance***		***Geographical Area***	
Name of Party	***Leaders***	***Areas***	**Ethnic Origin**	***Name of Party***	***Leaders***	***Areas***	**Ethnic Origin**
Afghan National Liberation Front	*Sibghatullah Mujaddidi*	*Southern Tribal*	Pashtun	*Hark-I-Islami*	*Sheikh Asaf Mohseni*	Kandahar and Kabul	Hazara
Hezb-i-Islami(G)	*Gulbuddin Hekmatyar*	*North & Southeast*	Pashtun	*Nasr-I-Islami*	*Mehdi Hasemi*	Central Hazarajat	Hazara
Hezb-i-Islami(K)	*Yunis Khalis*	*Kabul & Southeast*	Pashtun	*Shura-e-Islami*	*Syed Ali Behesti*	Central Hazarajat	Hazara
Harkat	*M.Nabi Mohammad*	*Southern Tribal*	Pashtun	*Sipah-e-Pasdaran*	*Shaykh Akbari*	West and Central Area	Qizibash
Islamic Union	*Abdul Rasul Sayyaf*	*Southeast*	Pashtun				
Jamiat-I-Islami	*Burhanuddin Rabbani*	*North – northeast*	Tajik				
National Islamic Front	*Syed Ahmad Galiani*	*Southern Tribal*	Pashtun				

Source: Rasul Bakhsh Rais, *War without Winners: Afghanistan's Uncertain Transition after the Cold War* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 173-195.

The seven Afghan parties based in Peshawar were presented to the world by the Pakistani establishment as the main *Mujahedin* groupings waging the Jihad for the liberation of Afghanistan. The IS1's head of the Afghan Bureau, Brigadier Muhammad Yusuf, rightly observed that the 'leaders were well aware that without Pakistan's, and that meant Zia's, backing, everything was finished'.[12] Yusuf emphasized that it was a principle of Pakistani policy that 'every commander must belong to one of the seven parties; otherwise, he got nothing from us (ISI), no arms, no ammunition, and no training. Without these, he could not exist.[13] On 16th May 1985, the seven major Islamic parties based in Peshawar formed a single alliance of the *Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahedin* (Islami Ittehad-i-Mujahedin-i-Afghanistan) under the pressure of the Zia regime, as well as of Saudi Arabia and the western supporters.[14]

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12 Mohammad Yusuf and Mark Adkin. *The Bear Trap*. Lahore: Jang Publishers Press, 1993.40.

13 Ibid.,

14 Mushahid Hussain, *Pakistan's Politics: The Zia Years* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1990), 90-91. See also; Craig M. Karp, "The War in Afghanistan," Foreign *Affairs* 64 (Summer 1986): 1047.

4. THE CONCLUDING YEARS OF THE COLD WAR AND THE AFGHAN CONFLICT

Almost eight years of civil war and foreign military intervention in Afghanistan resulted in a terrible loss of human life and massive physical destruction, especially in the countryside. The United Nations had been conducting indirect proximity talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan to facilitate the withdrawal of Soviet troops since late 1981. On 11th February 1981, Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim appointed Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, then Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, as his Personal Representative on the situation relating to Afghanistan. Upon his assumption of the post of Secretary-General in January 1982, Mr. Perez de Cuellar designated Mr. Diego Cordovez, who had succeeded him as Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, as his Personal Representative. Beginning in June 1982 and over the next six years, Mr. Cordovez acted as intermediary in a series of indirect negotiations between the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan in Geneva and in this region.[15]

5. GENEVA ACCORD AND SOVIET WITHDRAWAL

Much before the formal negotiations began in June 1982, Pakistan and Afghanistan expressed interest in a political settlement of the crisis, though for different ends. Kabul's motive was to seek an end to what it called intervention from Pakistan. However, Zia wanted the withdrawal of the Soviet forces and the establishment of broad-based government that would enable the millions of refugees on its land to return to their country. The basic elements of such a settlement existed in the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 20th November 1980, which called for;

- The preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and non-aligned character of Afghanistan.
- The right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and to choose their economic, political, and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion, or constraint of any kind whatsoever.
- The immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan.
- The creation of the necessary conditions that would enable the Afghan refugees to return voluntarily to their home in safety and honor.[16]

Based on these essentials and the authorization of the General Assembly to negotiate a political solution to the crisis, Secretary General Diego Cordovez acted

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15 A mode of proximity talks were engineered because of the refusal of Pakistan to conduct face to face negotiation with the Marxist regime, which it refused to recognize.

16 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, *War without Winners: Afghanistan's Uncertain Transition after the Cold War* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 118.

as an intermediary between Islamabad and Kabul. After several months of meetings with the concerned parties, Cordovez succeeded in bringing the representatives of Kabul and Islamabad to Geneva in June 1982. Iran, another regional state affected by the Afghan crisis, refused to participate in the negotiation because of the exclusion of *mujahedin*, which it thought was a legitimate party to any solution. The formal negotiations to secure peace in Afghanistan had started as early as 1981 under US auspices, but were making little progress till Gorbachev came to power. During the indirect talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan mostly four major issues were mostly discussed. These were the withdrawal of foreign forces, mutual non-interference, international guarantees, and the return of the refugees.[17] The momentum towards a political agreement started rolling faster in 1987. The soviets seemed willing to make major compromises to seek an honourable way out from Afghanistan.[18] In May 1986, Gorbachev removed Babrak Karmal, who was seen by Pakistan as one of the obstacles in the way of an agreement, and replaced him with Dr. Najibullah.[19] This acted as a catalyst for the conclusion of the Geneva Accords initiated by Pakistan and Afghanistan on 14 April 1988 and guaranteed by the United States and the Soviet Union.[20] The Accord facilitated the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghan territory by February 1989. Under the Accords, Pakistan and the United States were supposed to cease their assistance to the Afghan resistance by May 15, 1988. The United States, however, had insisted on continuing to provide assistance to 'the *Mujahedin* as long as the Soviet Union continued to support the Kabul regime. This so-called 'positive symmetry' ensured that the war in Afghanistan would continue indefinitely.

The Geneva Accords were essentially designed to be a 'face-saving' device for the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan. General Zia hesitantly agreed to sign the Accords under US pressure. Days after the signing of the Accords, he had explicitly commented that 'the *Mujahedin* should and would continue to fight and topple the Kabul regime.[21] This made a mockery of Article 1 of the Accords that explicitly forbade Pakistan and Afghanistan from interfering in each other's affairs.

However, General Zia-ul-Haq was killed four months after signing the Geneva Accords in a mysterious air crash. The farcical nature of the Geneva Accords was revealed as the Afghan conflict continued. The Soviet Union and the United States persisted in aiding their respective proxies. The primary objective still revolved around creating a pro-Pakistan Pashtun-dominated Islamic government in Kabul after the exit of the Soviet forces.

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17 *Dawn*, "Progress at Geneva," 25 April1983.
18 *The Guardian*, 12 January 1985.
19 *Dawn*, 25 July 1986.
20 Sardar Shukat Ali, "Geneva Accord and Pakistan," *Frontier Post*, 9 May 1988.
21 *The Guardian Weekly*, 24 April, 1988.

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Self-Assessment Questions

1. Critically analyze the circumstances that paved the way for the USSR to invade Afghanistan.
2. How far is it correct to say that 'Russian invasion of Afghanistan posed a serious security threat for Pakistan'? Discuss in detail.
3. Highlight the role of Pakistan in fomenting and covert backing of the *Jihadi* groups inside Afghanistan.
4. Critically discuss the United Nations' efforts to solve the Afghan crisis.
5. How far Geneva Accord successful in serving as a 'face-saving' device for the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan? Comment.

a) Please select an appropriate answer.

1. When did the Soviet Union invade Afghanistan?
   a) 1975
   b) 1979
   c) 1983
   d) 1985
2. Who was the Afghan leader assassinated by the Soviets in 1979?
   a) Nur Muhammad Taraki
   b) Hafizullah Amin
   c) Babrak Karmal
   d) Dr. Najibullah
3. Which country played a major role in supporting the Afghan Mujahideen?
   a) Iran
   b) United States
   c) India
   d) China
4. The Geneva Accords led to the withdrawal of which country's troops from Afghanistan?
   a) United States
   b) Pakistan
   c) Soviet Union
   d) Iran
5. What was Pakistan's primary concern regarding the Soviet invasion?
   a) Economic crisis
   b) Threat to its borders
   c) Strengthening trade with Afghanistan
   d) Political instability in India

Answer Key

1. b) 1979
2.b) Hafizullah Amin
3. b) United States
4. c) Soviet Union
5. b) Threat to its borders

Unit 07

POST SOVIET AFGHANISTAN (1989-1996)

Written by: Dr. Sadia Aziz
Reviewed by: Dr. Raiz Ahmed

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INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the Soviet occupation, strong Afghan factions engaged in a bitter civil war that lasted for seven years. Early on, infighting among the resistance leaders prevented them from mounting a unified assault on the PDPA regime, led since 1986 by Dr. Najibullah. As a result, and contrary to conventional expectations, the PDPA held on in Kabul until 1992. After the *Mujahedin* finally ended fourteen years of Communist rule in Afghanistan by deposing and murdering (by the Taliban) Najibullah, they still could not cooperate sufficiently well to form an effective government. The Afghan civil war continued for another four years, as the various factions fighting one another destroyed much of Kabul in the process.

OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you will be able to;

- Understand the internal situation of Afghanistan after the evacuation of the Soviet forces.
- Critically analyze the tactics and policies initiated by Najibullah to counter the Government's opposition.
- Discuss the reasons for the rise and fall of the Rabbani Government in Afghanistan.
- Comprehend the situation of Afghanistan from Conflict Resolution to State Disintegration.

1. FALL OF NAJIBULLAH

After the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, there was an expectation that the Communist regime led by Dr. Najibullah would not resist longer and collapse. This assumption did not become reality and served to disintegrate the national structure for another three years.[1] The absence of a united political and military organization that could lead the Afghan *Mujahedin* groups toward the establishment of a nationally accepted government was primarily responsible for this crumbling situation in Afghanistan. The Peshawar-based parties, for example, failed to transform themselves from rival armed organizations operating essentially independent of each other to unified leadership capable of creating a new government and a new credible state apparatus.[2] The internal interaction of Afghan armed political forces from the Afghan government and Afghan resistance factions left the UN peace plan without any power or ability to succeed, and a bloody civil war shattered this already war-ruined country and forced the Afghans into larger fragmentation.[3]

At the same time, the Afghan government under Najibullah was not able to provide a workable alternative for a peaceful settlement or gain more power to extend its control. The UN also failed to persuade the development of a positive environment for a peaceful transition of government. The greatest challenge to the PDPA's continued hold over central power was to emerge from internal factionalism within its political and military establishments. Differences between the two wings of the party, the Parcham and the Khalq, had continued to heat up under the Parchamite President. These divisions also assumed the shape of ethnicity as Najibullah's policy of increasing the military and political presence of the non-Pushtun minorities created resentment amongst the predominantly Pushtun Khalq. These internal differences assumed a more threatening shape since the Soviet-US agreement in Geneva on negative symmetry ended the PDPA's only source of military assistance while its opponents continued to be supported by their regional allies. The increased vulnerability of the regime led to an escalation of activity both within the internally divided ruling party and the various segments of the Afghan opposition to capture power at the centre.

Dr. Najibullah took certain measures to retain control of the country by dividing the opposition through local, regional, ethnic, and sectarian competition.

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1 Phillip Corwin, *Doomed in Afghanistan: A UN Officer's Memoir of the Fall of Kabul and Najibullah's Failed Escape* (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 24.

2 Institute of Regional Studies, *Afghanistan, Past, Present and Future* (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, 1997), 52.

3 Neamatollah Nojumi, *Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War,and the Future of the Regime* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 60.

In 1986, Najibullah changed the name of PDPA and merged it into a broad-based party called the *Hezb-e-Watan Afghanistan* (HWA) (the Motherland Party of Afghanistan). HWA was comprised of non-communist and other individuals who were not affiliated with the PDPA. According to the Afghan official publication, HWA's political ideology was not based on Marxism but rather on Afghan national and historical values and Islamic principles.[4]

In 1987, Najibullah changed the name of Afghanistan from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to the Republic State of Afghanistan (RSA).[5] These changes were essential for the former PDPA leaders to survive and were made in anticipation of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Although the government failed to extend its control over most of the territory of the state, the stalemate continued since the forces opposing the PDPA government presented no concrete alternative political structures or leadership that could serve to unify their disparate bases of support. In March 1989, the *Mujahedin* launched large-scale attacks against government forces in the Jalalabad region east of the capital. What happened was a surprise to many. The *Mujahedin* were routed in their attack on Jalalabad and forced to retreat after suffering heavy losses. They were not only defeated by the government aircraft but also squabbling amongst themselves.[6] When the Soviets withdrew, they left behind them a still-functioning Afghan air force that enabled Najibullah's government to retain control of Afghanistan.

Najibullah had succeeded in defeating the first major challenge to his government by Khalaqi defence minister, General Shah Nawaz Tania, with the assistance of his fellow Pushtun, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, in March 1990. The coup failed, but the governing party continued to lose loyal members. Those who left Najibullah's ranks generally joined the forces of Hekmatyar or those of Rabbani.[7] Now the internal weakness of the regime had come into the open, and the nation seemed to plunge into anarchy.

Najibullah wanted to negotiate through the UN aegis on transitional mechanism for a peaceful transfer of power and the creation of broad-based government.

2. THE FIRST PHASE OF THE CIVIL WAR

On 18th March 1992, while addressing the nation, Najibullah announced his resignation, which he said would take effect once the United Nations had an 'interim government,'

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4 Ibid., 75.
5 Ibid.
6 Peter Marsden, *Afghanistan: Aid, Armies and Empires* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 77.
7 Kevin Baker, *War in Afghanistan: A Short History of 80 Wars and Conflicts in Afghanistan and the Northwest Frontier, 1839-2011* (New South Wales: Rosenberg Publishing, 2011), 196.

to which he would transfer all power and executive authority.[8] A strategy was devised by the UN to streamline the establishment of a pre-transitional council comprised of impartial personalities chosen from the list submitted to the United Nations would take over all power and executive authority from the current government. This council then convened a Shura in Kabul to choose an interim government. According to the UN plan, on April 15-16, a UN plane would fly the members of the interim government into Kabul, where Najibullah would transfer power to them at the airport and leave for exile in India on the same plane. However, the UN plan was perceived by Hekmatyar and the commander of the Northern Alliance as an attempt to marginalize them. The Parchamites rebels allied with Massoud seized control of the Kabul Airport, and Najibullah was forced to seek asylum in the office of the United Nations. After the fall of Najibullah, four major armed groups fought for power in Kabul. These groups had different ethnic compositions and different sources of foreign support according to the regions in which they were based. Each group to some extent also enjoyed income from local taxes or customs as well as from the drug trade and other enterprises.[9]

Abdul Rashid Dostum, a former commander of the Afghan army's Jauzjani division, led a largely Uzbek group of former government militia that also included members of other ethnic groups from northern Afghanistan, including former leaders of Parcham. Massoud and Rabbani led mainly Tajiks with members of some other north-eastern ethnic groups. They both aligned with one small but well-organized Shia party that had lost favour with Iran. Hekmatyar led mainly a Pashtun group that consisted of Hizb recruits from the refugee camps and eastern Afghanistan, former Khalqis and former government militia. Finally, Hizb-e-Wahdat, which had a base in the Hazarajat organized the Shias of Kabul who were supported by the Iranians and Parchamistes during Najibullah's fall.[10]

3. THE PESHAWAR ACCORD

In the aftermath of the collapse of the fourteen-year communist regime, the need for a functioning political system was considerable. Yet the search for workable political institutions remained unattainable due to the severe division of Afghan warlords over power sharing. The *Mujahedin* managed to come to some agreement among themselves.[11]

On 24th April 1992 Peshawar Accord provided for the 'structure and process for

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8 Barnett R. Rubin, *The Search For Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State* (London: Yale University Press, 1995), 128.

9 Ibid.

10 For detail see; Shayeq Qassem Ahmad, *Afghanistan's Political Stability* (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2009), 96-98.

11 Baker, *War in Afghanistan: A Short History of 80 Wars and Conflicts in Afghanistan and the Northwest Frontier, 1839-2011*, 196.

the provisional period of the Islamic State of Afghanistan' forged among the Pakistan-based *Mujahedin* leaders with the heavy involvement of the Pakistani government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.[12] The Agreement was orchestrated primarily to provide a framework for an interim government to be implemented in two stages. At the first stage, Sebghatullah Mojaddedi, leader of the National Salvation Islamic Front, as a compromise choice would serve as President for a two-month transitional government to head a *Shura-i Intiqali* to 'take over power from the present rulers of Kabul'. The second was to enable a longer-term interim coalition government, headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani as President and Head of the *Shura-i Qiyadi* (Leadership Council) (strongly supported by Ahmed Shah Massoud), to take over from the transitional government for a period of four months. At the end of the six months, the government would form a *Shura-ye ahl al-hall wal-aqd* (Council of Experts on Solving and Binding) to choose an interim government for 18 months as a prelude to a general election for creating a popular government.[13] The Accord then distributed offices to be held by second-grade members of the party.[14]

4. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE RABBANI GOVERNMENT (1992-1996)

Sebghat ullah Mojaddedi, as the head of the transitional Council, assumed power in Kabul. Hekmatyar was offered the post of Prime Minister, while the defence portfolio was given to Massoud and the Foreign Affairs Ministry to the Gailani Party.[15] The interim government arrived in Kabul from Peshawar on April 28 and proclaimed the establishment of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA).[16] However, Hekmatyar refused to assume the charge of Prime Minister and denounced the ISA as a disguised Communist regime.[17] Four months after Rabbani assumed authority as acting president. On October 28, the leadership Council reluctantly voted to extend his mandate for forty-five days on the grounds that continued fighting and the destruction of Kabul had made it impossible for him to summon the *Shura* in the time designated.[18] However, Rabbani managed to summon *Shura-ye ahl al-hall wal-aqd* (Council of Experts on Solving and Binding) in late 1992 (besides some controversy over the representativeness of its membership), which endorsed the continuation of the Rabbani administration for 18 months.[19]

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12 William Maley, *Afghanistan Wars* (VA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 197.

13 Amin Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 214.

14 Maley, *Afghanistan Wars*, 198

15 Shayeq Qassem Ahmad, *Afghanistan's Political Stability* (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2009), 91.

16 Rubin, *The Search For Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State*, 133.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan's *Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise of the Taliban* (Vancouver: University of Washington Press, 2012), 74.

5. THE ISLAMABAD ACCORD AND THE SECOND PHASE OF CIVIL WAR

After the extension of Rabbani, large-scale fighting erupted all over Kabul and the military and political forces divided along the ethnic groups: Hekmatyar with the ex-Khalqis Pushtons; Massoud supported mostly by the non-Pushtons; Dostam supported by Uzbeks; and Hezb-e-Wahdat supported by Hazaras. Later, all these armed ethnic groups were generally divided into two hostile groups: the government forces dominated by the Shura-e-Nezar (Supervisory Council) led by Massoud and Rabbani; and the Shura-e-Hamahangi (Coordinated Council) comprised of Hekmatyar, Dostam, and Hezb-e-Wahdat. The fighting devastated Kabul, and thousands of people took refuge in Jalalabad and Pakistan. Moreover, more than 5,000 people were killed by the end of 1992.[20]

As casualties rising in Afghanistan, a peace accord was sponsored by Saudi King Fahd on 7th March 1993 between the warring factions in Islamabad. All the participants agreed with a new proposal that appointed Burhanadin Rabbani as President and Gulbadin Hekmatyar as Prime Minister to form a Cabinet in consultation with the President, who remained the supreme commander of the armed forces.[21] Hekmatyar, as Prime Minister, immediately announced that he would dismiss Defence Minister Massoud, while the President announced that Massoud would remain at his post.[22] The political and military shift by the armed political groups in many directions decentralized the social and political structure of the country once again. The cycle of violence and the massive mobilization of the nation in an unclear direction, with no popular leadership, continued to fragment Afghanistan.

The fragmentation deepened in 1994, and so did the frustration of regional power brokers, who simultaneously wanted Afghanistan to be peaceful yet were preoccupied with internal affairs. Afghanistan's continued violence especially frustrated Pakistan because it prevented that country from realizing its aspirations to trade and influence in Central Asia. Pakistani and Saudi Arabian fundamentalists began to support a new movement known as the Taliban (religious students) in the summer of 1994. The Taliban were Afghan refugees and war veterans based in rural Pakistani and Afghan seminaries (Islamic religious schools).[23] Their arrival on the Afghan stage marked the end of the period of intra-mujahedin civil war and the beginning of a new era of violence that continued to haunt Afghanistan.

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20 Nojumi, Rise *of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War and the Future of the Regime*, 113.

21 Maley, *Afghanistan Wars*, 199.

22 Rubin, *The Search For Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State*, 134.

23 Goodson, Afghanistan's *Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise of the Taliban*, 76.

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Self-Assessment Questions

1. Critically examine the internal situation of Afghanistan after the departure of the Soviet forces.
2. How far was Najibullah successful in curtail the power of his internal and external enemies? Comment.
3. Do you agree that the Peshawar accord, instead of resolving issues serves the vested interests of the warlords of Afghanistan?

a) Please select an appropriate answer.

1. What was the name of the party formed by Najibullah in 1986?

a) Hezb-e-Watan Afghanistan (HWA)
b) PDPA
c) Islamic State of Afghanistan
d) National Salvation Islamic Front

2. Who was appointed as President and Head of the Shura-i Qiyadi under the Peshawar Accord?
    a. Sebghatullah Mojaddedi
    b. Burhanuddin Rabbani
    c. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
    d. Ahmed Shah Massoud
3. What was the outcome of the Mujahedin's attack on Jalalabad in March 1989?
    a. They captured the city
    b. They were defeated and forced to retreat
    c. The attack was called off
    d. The outcome is unknown
4. Who sponsored the peace accord in Islamabad on March 7, 1993?
    a. Saudi King Fahd
    b. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
    c. UN Secretary-General
    d. Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani
5. What was the name of the movement supported by Pakistani and Saudi Arabian fundamentalists in 1994?
    a. Taliban
    b. Mujahedeen
    c. Hezb-e-Wahdat
    d. Islamic State of Afghanistan

Answer Key

1. a) Hezb-e-Watan Afghanistan (HWA)
2. b) Burhanuddin Rabbani
3. b) They were defeated and forced to retreat
4. a) Saudi King Fahd
5. a) Taliban

Unit 08

TALIBANIZATION OF AFGHANISTAN (1996-2001)

Writer: Dr. Sadia Aziz
Reviewer: Dr. Razia Sultana

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INTRODUCTION

Though the Taliban had not been able to institutionalize their brand of extremist ideology, and failed to develop it into a viable state in Afghanistan. The establishment of the Taliban regime in 1996 had political implications far beyond Afghanistan. The persistence of this movement and its political and military operations more than ten years after its removal from power reveals the extent to which the Taliban continues to draw on its regional and international support base and maintains it as an outpost of global militancy.[1] The rise of the Taliban had firm roots in the regional and international politics of the 1980s and 1990s. Their demise, too, depended upon crucial shifts in the international context.

OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you will be able to;

1. Explain the different theories about the origin of the Talibans.
2. Critically analyze the Taliban ideology and its implications.
3. Figure out the importance of 9/11, which further paved the way for the US to launch an attack on Afghanistan
4. Highlight the impact of the American attack on Afghanistan and its aftermath.
5. Discuss the reasons for the formation of the Northern Alliance.
6. Analyze the impact of the Bonn Accord.

[1] Neamatomallah Nojumi, "The Rise and Fall of the Taliban" in Robert D. Crews and Tarzi, Amin, ed,. *Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan* (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 90.

1. ORIGIN OF TALIBAN[2]

The Taliban were a product of the chaotic environment of the early 1990s, when Afghans were devastated by the bloody feuds and rapacious behavior of warlords who carved out fiefdoms after a decade of war to drive out Soviet invaders.[3] Mullah Muhammad Omar formed the Taliban from students in religious schools (*madrassas*) over the Pakistan border (refugee camps) to battle the ex-Mujahedin Guerrilla Commanders who were preying on traders on roads in the Southern province of Qandahar.[4] Their ranks grew rapidly, and they proved more united and disciplined than the faction-ridden government and rival groups. In 1995, they swept up the Western flanks of Afghanistan to take Herat, the main transport route to Iran and Turkmenistan. The next year, they captured Kabul.

The capture of Kabul in 1996 by the Northern Alliance prompted them to claim to be considered the National Government.[5] But they also revealed a ruthless streak, hanging the former President Najibullah and his brother Shahpur Amadzai from a Kabul traffic post to display their power. Kabul residents learned that the Taliban would bear no interference in the project to implement their vision of Islamic law. By the end of 1996, Afghanistan's chessboard for power struggle was thoroughly dominated by the Taliban.[6] After gaining control over most of the country (apart from the northern regions, which were controlled by the Northern Alliance), the Taliban changed the official name of the state in October 1997 to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. This was done in order to strengthen the official position of Mullah Omar, who was granted the title Amir al-Mu'minin (Commander of the Faithful), the highest spiritual title in the Islamic caliphate used since 632 A.D.[7]

2. TALIBAN IDEOLOGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

The Taliban banned cinema, television, games, music, and any form of entertainment. They banned girls' schooling, barred women from jobs, and forced them to wear a *burqa* when out of their homes. Men were jailed if they trimmed

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2 For detail see; Ahmad Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2000).

3 Abdulkader Sinno, "Explaining the Taliban's Ability to Mobolize Pashtuns" in Robert D. Crews and Tarzi, Amin, ed,. *Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan* (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 60.

4 Neamatomallah Nojumi, *Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan*, 101.

5 Neamatomallah Nojumi, *Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan*, xi.

6 Razia Sultana and Sadia Aziz, "Pakistan and General Zia's Afghan Policy," *South Asian Journal* (Quarterly Magazine of South Asian Journalists & Scholars 26 (Oct-Dec 2009). 81.

7 Rakhamim Emanuilov, *Terror in the Name of Faith: Religion and Political Violence* (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2011), 184.

their beards.[8] By 1998, they had captured the northern city of Mazar-I-Sharif and in September 2000 launched an offensive attack that isolated the last of their Northern Alliance opponents in the remote northeast of Afghanistan.[9]

On 27th September, 1996, the Taliban militia captured Kabul from the Northern Alliance, executed former President Najibullah, and imposed *Shariah* in Afghanistan. Ahmad Shah Masood, defense minister in the ousted government of President Burhanuddin Rabbani, withdrew to his native Panjshir valley and began a military campaign to overthrow the Taliban. But by far the Taliban's most serious error was welcoming Osama Bin Laden, the Saudi-born militant accused of a series of assaults on US interests culminating in the 11th September, 2001, attacks on Washington D.C. and New York that killed up to 3900 people.[10] Before 9/11, the US embassies in Nairobi (Kenya) and Tanzania (Dar es Salaam) were targeted by the terrorists resulting in 224 people dying and more than 5000 wounded.[11] On 20th August, 1998, the US launched a barrage of Cruise missiles against alleged extremist training in Afghanistan. They aimed to wipe out Osama Bin Laden, a guest of the Taliban. In September 1999, the Taliban gained control of the Hezb-i-Wahadat stronghold Hazarajat. They control more than 80 percent of the country, but were recognized by only Pakistan, the UAE, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.[12]

On 14th November, 1999, the first UN sanctions against the Taliban went into effect, including an air embargo. However, on 3rd November 2000, the Taliban agreed to UN-backed peace talks. On 20th November 2000, a peace plan drawn up by former King Zahir Shah, living in exile in Rome, was rejected by the Taliban. On 20th December 2000, UN sanctions were renewed, and the Taliban walked out of peace talks. Taliban on 14th February, 2001, ordered the closure of UN offices in Kabul.

The Taliban on 1st March, 2001, provoked international outrage by blowing up the giant Buddha statue of Bamiyan.[13]. On 3rd-5th August 2001, eight foreign aid workers and 16 Afghan colleagues were arrested in Kabul and accused of

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8 Hafizullah Emadi, *Repression, Resistance, and Women in Afghanistan* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 126-127. See also; Vanda Felbab-Brown. *Aspiration and Ambivalence: Strategies and Realities of Counterinsurgency and State-Building in Afghanistan* (Washington: Brooking Institution Press, 2012), 42.

9 Neamatomallah Nojumi, *Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan*, xi.

10 For relationship between Taliban and Al-Qaeda see; William Maley, *Afghanistan Wars* (Gordonsville, VA,: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 254-256.

11 Vanda, *Aspiration and Ambivalence: Strategies and Realities of Counterinsurgency and State-Building in Afghanistan*, 43.

12 Michael E O'Hanlon and Hassina Sherjan, *Toughing It Out in Afghanistan* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 17- 22, 2010.

13 Bamiyan is one of the most significant historical heritages of ancient Afghanistan dominated by ethnic Hazarajat.

preaching Christianity.[14] On 9th September, 2001, Northern Alliance military commander Ahmed Shah Masood was fatally wounded in a suicide attack carried out by two Arabs posing as journalists that going was a prelude to the apocalyptic actions against the USA, and occurred two days later.[15]

3. 9/11 AND THE FALL OF THE TALIBAN

Afghanistan reappeared on the world center stage following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States. The suicide attackers who crashed hijacked passenger planes into the World Trade Center in New York[16] and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.,[17] were linked to Osama bin Laden's worldwide terrorist network, al Qaeda, centered in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.[18] However, none of those who committed the dreadful crime was an Afghan national nor was the violence inspired by Afghan politics. The tragic event that cost thousands of innocent lives and enormous material damage marked a new turn in the international war on terrorism and ushered in a new phase in the drawn-out civil strife in Afghanistan.

4. AMERICAN ATTACK ON AFGHANISTAN AND ITS AFTERMATH

September 11 was a tragic day in the history of the United States of America. The symbol of economic prosperity, the World Trade Center, and the symbol of American Security Pentagon, were made targets by unknown terrorists. America ascribed these attacks to Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaida and rushed into war from Afghanistan to chastise the alleged terrorist camps. The fall of the Taliban at the end of 2001 marked the end of a prolonged civil war in Afghanistan and the beginning of a recovery and healing process, opening the way for Afghanistan to free itself from extremism and international isolation. In less than two months, the U.S.-led coalition shattered the Taliban regime, broke up the al Qaeda establishment, and forced its leadership to retreat. The dominance of military

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14 William Maley, *Afghanistan Wars* (VA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 256.

15 Amin Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival* (London, GBR: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 229.

16 At 8.45 a.m. on 11 September, American Airlines Flight 11, which had left Boston's Logan Airport for Los Angeles an hour earlier, slammed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York. At 9.05 a.m., United Airlines Flight 175, which had left Boston for Los Angeles at 7.58 a.m., smashed into the World Trade Center's South Tower.

17 At 9.39 a.m., American Airlines Flight 77, which had left Washington Dulles for Los Angeles at 8.10 a.m., struck the Pentagon Building, headquarters of the US Department of Defense.

18 Ali. A. Jalali, "The Legacy of War and the Challenge of Peace Building" in Robert I. Rotberg, ed,. *Building a New Afghanistan* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 22.

considerations within the U.S.-led coalition affected political developments after the demise of the Taliban. The military operation was primarily aimed at destroying the terrorist network based in Afghanistan and to wipe out the security threats stemming from instability in that Central Asian country.

5. FORMATION OF NORTHERN ALLIANCE AND BONN CONFERENCE

This situation allowed Afghan anti-Taliban forces to join the coalition forces, the Northern Alliance; the only organized anti-Taliban military faction in Afghanistan, took advantage of the sudden fall of the Taliban by the US and moved swiftly to fill the vacuum by seizing control of Kabul. The coalition expected that the formation of a broad-based government would precede the fall of the Taliban in Kabul. But the militia's sudden evacuation of the capital opened the way for the Panjshiri-led Tajik faction (Ahmed Shah Masood) of the Northern Alliance to seize control of the city in defiance of international demands. The victors immediately restored the pre-Taliban bureaucracy dominated by the Shura-i-Nazar Tajiks. This monopolization of power hindered the emergence of an ethnically balanced post-Taliban government. The Pashtun forces that took over most of the southern provinces were too scattered to form a counterbalancing bloc vis-à-vis the Northern Alliance. As military victories outpaced political arrangements, the international community rushed to broker the formation of a broad-based Afghan government that the country's diverse ethnic and political groups would support. However, negotiations on the structure of the new government between four Afghan political-ethnic groups at the UN-sponsored conference in Bonn were strongly influenced by the military situation on the ground. Having control of major cities in Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance showed no flexibility about sharing power equally with other groups, including the exiled Rome faction headed by Zahir Shah, the elderly former king, who had led the political opposition against the Taliban. However, on 5th December 2001, four rival Afghan groups signed in Bonn a historic power-sharing agreement to form a post-Taliban interim government.

From the outset of the post-Taliban era, the future of Afghan armed forces was a high-level concern. The document specifies that the partners request "the assistance of the international community in helping the new Afghan authorities in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces," but also stipulates that the international partners "assist in the reintegration of the mujahedin into the new Afghan security and armed forces". [19] It was decided at the Accord

[19] Terrence, K. Kelly, Nora Bensahel and Olga Oliker, *Security Force Assistance Afghanistan: Identifying Lessons for Future Efforts* (CA: RAND Corporation, 2011), 46.

that there would be an interim authority consisting of a 30-member interim Administrator presided over by a Chairman, a special independent commission for the convening of the emergency Loya Jirga, a Central Bank, and a Supreme Court. Royalist ethnic Pashtun tribal leader Hamid Karzai was appointed as head of the six-month interim body. The Bonn Agreement also essentially restores the Constitution of 1964. These interim arrangements are intended as a first step towards the establishment of a broad-based, gender sensitive, multiethnic, and fully representative government.

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Self-Assessment Questions

1. Critically explain the different theories about the origin of the Talibans?
2. How did the Taliban ideology affect the social, political, and economic fabrics of Afghanistan? Explain with examples.
3. Explain how 9/11 paved the way for the US to launch an attack on Afghanistan?
4. Do you agree that the American attack on Afghanistan marked the end of a prolonged civil war in Afghanistan?
5. Discuss the causes of the formation of the Northern Alliance, along with the impact of the Bonn Accord on the political situation of Afghanistan.

a) Please select an appropriate answer.

1. What event brought Afghanistan back to the world centre stage in 2001?

a) The fall of the Taliban
b) The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US
c) The Bonn Conference
d) The formation of the Northern Alliance

2. Who formed the Taliban in the early 1990s?

a) Mullah Muhammad Omar
b) Osama bin Laden
c) Ahmad Shah Masood
d) Burhanuddin Rabbani

3. What was the Taliban's stance on girls' education?

a) They encouraged girls to attend school
b) They banned girls from attending school
c) They made education compulsory for girls
d) They had no policy on girls' education

4. What was the significance of the Bonn Conference in 2001?

a) It marked the beginning of the Taliban regime
b) It led to the formation of the Northern Alliance
c) It resulted in the signing of a power-sharing agreement
d) It led to the US invasion of Afghanistan

5. Who was appointed as the head of the interim government in Afghanistan in 2001?

a) Hamid Karzai
b) Burhanuddin Rabbani
c) Ahmad Shah Masood
d) Mullah Muhammad Omar

Answer Key

1. b) The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US
2.a) Mullah Muhammad Omar
3. b) They banned girls from attending school
4.c) It resulted in the signing of a power-sharing agreement
5. a) Hamid Karzai

Unit 09

POST TALIBAN AFGHANISTAN (2002-2006)

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Reviewed by: Dr. Razia Sultana

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INTRODUCTION

Rebuilding of the war-riven country anywhere in the world stipulates resources and hard work. In this regard, landlocked Afghanistan faces tremendous intricacy, not least because of the annihilation of the social and political fabric during the Russian intervention and the Taliban rule. Currently, Afghanistan is only very slowly learning how to build upon the ashes of destruction and how to establish an administration that would be acceptable for all Afghans.

OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you will be able to;

1. Evaluate the functioning of the Afghan Interim Administration under Hamid Karzai.
2. Enumerate the causes of the revitalization of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.
3. Discuss the role of the International community to state state-building, sustaining growth, and reducing poverty in Afghanistan.
4. Comment on the U.S. efforts to socially, politically, and economically stabilize Afghanistan.

1. AFGHANISTAN UNDER HAMID KARZAI

In December 2001, Afghan leaders in exile signed the Bonn Agreement, establishing an interim government under Hamid Karzai, who in 2002 took charge as a selected President of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan included disparate leaders of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. A new constitution for Afghanistan was written by a specially convened Loya Jirga and was endorsed early in 2004, including a presidential system which establishes an Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. In October 2004, Hamid Karzai became the elected President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.[1] However, regional warlords and large areas of Afghanistan remained beyond the control of the Karzai Government.

Despite substantial international aid, the Afghan government, which included representatives from many factions, was unable to address the numerous social and economic problems. The parliamentary elections of September 2005 gave regional warlords substantial power in both houses of the National Assembly, further jeopardizing Karzai's ability to unite the country. The Bonn Agreement lapsed after the 2005 elections. The agreement's successors, the Afghanistan Compact, went into effect in January 2006 to set goals for international assistance in economic development, security, protection of human rights, and the fight against corruption and drug trafficking through 2010.[2] Although Hamid Karzai was striving hard to establish his hegemony outside Kabul but his government had insufficient financial and economic resources to curb the military power of warlords and Pro-Taliban elements that control most of the periphery of Afghanistan.

2. RENEWED TALIBAN INSURGENCE

In 2001, the US gained a military victory in Afghanistan and putting an end to the fundamentalist Taliban's regime, and their al-Qaeda guests were gradually displaced. President Hamid Karzai assumed office with the hope to establish an accountable Afghan State, restore peace that brought economic prosperity and safety after more than two decades of war and destruction. However, this preliminary triumph was swiftly superseded by the emergence of the Taliban insurgents with their associated movements, foreign fighters, local militias, and drug traffickers who set forth an existential danger to overthrow the new Afghan government.[3] No less than four southern Pashtun-dominated provinces; Helmand, Uruzgan, Zabul, and Qandahar, were deeply penetrated by the Taliban by May and June 2006.[4]

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1 O'Hanlon, Michael E. and Hassina Sherjan, *Toughing It Out in Afghanistan* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 23.

2 Afghanistan Profile (2006/April), (Cambridge: World of Information, 2006), 2.

3 Jones, Seth G, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 1.

4 Robert, I. Rotberg, "Renewing the Afghan State" in Robert I. Rotberg, ed,. *Building a New Afghanistan* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 22.

3. COALITION RESPONSE

US military forces worked closely with the Northern Alliance and other resistance groups to overthrow the Taliban in October and November of 2001. After the defeat, Taliban fighters "went to ground" and stopped supporting the movement; many of its top leaders, along with al Qaeda, fled to Pakistan's nearby mountainous tribal regions. However, the International community is providing substantial aid to Afghanistan, but not enough to hinder the Taliban insurgents' regrouping.

After the retreat of the Taliban and its al-Qaeda allies, Afghanistan remains a long way from achieving the U.S. purpose of a stable, self-governing state that no longer serves as a sanctuary for terrorists.[5] However, the U.S failure to stop the deteriorating security environment and to stimulate economic conditions could lead to a revival of warlords and anarchy in Afghanistan.[6] To prevent this from happening, the Task Force recommends that the United States strengthen the Central government and increase support for security, diplomatic, and economic reconstruction in Afghanistan.

From 2002 through 2005, U.S. troop levels grew from around 5,000 to 19,000, as the security situation worsened somewhat and efforts to build up Afghan security forces (Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) and extend the reach of the central government gradually increased. In August 2003, NATO officially took command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that had been established under a U.N. mandate in Kabul in 2002. ISAF included some American troops, but others remained organized and commanded separately in a counterterrorism operation that continued to be known as Operation Enduring Freedom.[7] The United States initially played the lead role in the counterinsurgency campaign, though command and control over most international forces shifted to NATO in late 2006.[8]

4. RISK OF A FAIL-STATE

Afghanistan today is one of the poorest and most troubled countries in the world.[9] No longer detached from the modern world, Afghanistan is susceptible to regional security, faced challenges of its geographical location, dependence, and

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5 Chairman Report on independent Task Force, *Afghanistan: Are We Losing the Peace?* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003), 1.

6 Ibid.

7 O'Hanlon, *Toughing It Out in Afghanistan*, 23.

8 Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan* (CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 87.

9 For detail see; *Afghanistan: State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty* (Washington: World Bank Publications, 2005), 15.

ambivalence once again as it has faced since its inception. It entered the twentieth century as the buffer state that divided the British and Russian empires in the subcontinent that severely hampering the country's political development, dipping its future into darkness, and turning Afghanistan into a nation ever vulnerable to outsiders. Would Afghanistan ever enjoy the twenty-first century with harmony and stability, economically sound and prosperous, social transformation, and human resource development in this region of the world? Would Afghanistan once again find itself on the verge of chaos as a failed state?

Keeping in mind the troubled history of Afghanistan, it depends how you analyze this situation and draw conclusions. In 2001, the world community sought to restore peace and stability to Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. This goal was well short of being achieved as the country approached the end of its first decade in the new century. There were many positives. The presence of international forces and outside aid had ended the civil war. Millions of refugees had rapidly returned from exile in Iran and Pakistan. A political process for creating and ratifying a constitution had run smoothly, allowing the popular election of a national leader, Hamid Karzai, for the first time in Afghan history. On the other hand, the huge military and financial resources allocated to the country were grossly inadequate to provide security and improve one of the world's lowest standards of living. So they rightly questioned the wisdom of building schools and hospitals without teachers and doctors or repairing roads with foreign labour while local people remained unemployed.[10] The Afghan people had a right to be disappointed by how little was being accomplished at such great expense.

At the regional level, all of Afghanistan's neighbours are very much concerned with manoeuvring its domestic matters. Pakistan and Iran, Russia and India, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Saudi Arabia, even Turkey and China: all have major interests in Afghanistan, and most of them have aided and abetted at least one of the many parties contesting for power in that country's endless and devastating civil war.[11] This volatile situation encouraged the Taliban to step into this frustration. Though they could not hope to overthrow the government, yet could reduce its effectiveness through threats of violence, and questioned its legitimacy and staying in power.

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[10] Thomas Barfield, *Princeton Shorts: War for Afghanistan: A Very Brief History: From Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012), 3.

[11] Larry P. Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise of the Taliban* (Vancouver: University of Washington Press, 2012), 4.

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Self-Assessment Questions

1. How far Karzai is able to curtail the power of warlords and pro-Taliban elements in Afghanistan?
2. Briefly discuss the causes of the revitalization of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.
3. Critically evaluate the role of the international community to state state-building, sustaining growth, and reducing poverty in Afghanistan.
4. Do you agree that the U.S. failure to stabilize Afghanistan would allow the country to become a haven for terrorists and criminals in the near future? Comment.

a) Please select an appropriate answer.

1. Who became the President of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan in 2002?
   a) Hamid Karzai
   b) Burhanuddin Rabbani
   c) Ahmad Shah Masood
   d) Mullah Muhammad Omar
2. What was the name of the agreement signed in 2001 to establish an interim government in Afghanistan?
   a) Bonn Agreement
   b) Afghan Compact
   c) Taliban Surrender Agreement
   d) US-Afghanistan Treaty
3. Which organization took command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in August 2003?
   a) NATO
   b) US Military
   c) UN Peacekeeping Forces
   d) Afghan National Army
4. What was the main goal of the US-led coalition in Afghanistan?
   a) To establish a stable self-governing state
   b) To defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda
   c) To promote economic development
   d) To reduce poverty
5. Who was the leader of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan?
   a) Mullah Muhammad Omar
   b) Osama bin Laden
   c) Hamid Karzai
   d) Ahmad Shah Masood

Answer Key

1.a) Hamid Karzai
2.a) Bonn Agreement
3.a) NATO
4.a) To establish a stable self-governing state
5. a) Mullah Muhammad Omar

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