BS HISTORY

# MUSLIM STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

**Code: 9146** **Units: 1-9**



**Department of History**
**Allama Iqbal Open University, Islamabad**

# STUDY GUIDE

**BS History**

# MUSLIM STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

**Code: 9146** **Units: 1–9**

**Department of History**
**Faculty of Social Sciences & Humanities**
**Allama Iqbal Open University, Islamabad**

**(All Rights Reserved with the Publisher)**

Year of Printing..... 2025

Quantity..... 1000

Layout Setting ..... Muhammad Zia Ullah

Incharge Printing ..... Dr. Sarmad Iqbal

Printer..... Allama Iqbal Open University

Publisher ..... Allama Iqbal Open University, Islamabad

## FOREWORD

The curriculum at AIOU has been designed on modern parameters using the latest information on recent trends, theories, and techniques. An extensive consultative process is also a basic component of this activity. The development of study material to help students throughout the country is a challenge. AIOU takes pride in undertaking this major task for the effective learning of the students.

The Department of History, Allama Iqbal University, offers BS History (4 Year) for students who are interested in the discipline of History. The scheme of studies for BS History (4 Year) has been designed, and the courses are developed in accordance with the emerging national and global trends and to meet the needs of society.

The study material provides a comprehensive coverage of the core contents of the BS History (4 Year) Program. The selection of, and the treatment of, study materials have been designed to meet both general and specific aims set out by the Higher Education Commission (HEC) through the National Curriculum Revision Committee (NCRC).

In the end, I am happy to extend my gratitude to the course team, Chairperson, Course Development Coordinator, unit writers, reviewers, and editor for their efforts in the development of the course. Any suggestions for improving the course will be warmly welcomed by the Department of History.

Prof. Dr Nasir Mehmud,
Vice Chancellor

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deep gratitude to all those who supported me in the completion of this study guide titled Constitutional Development in British India. I am indebted to the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Prof. Dr. Abdul Aziz Sahir, for his kind support of all the academic programs of the Department and especially to this course. My Chairperson, Dr. Kausar Parveen, deserves the acknowledgement for her trust in my abilities and for her constant motivation. The Course team has been instrumental in the process from conceiving the idea to the final materialization of this course content. And finally, the editor, Ms. Humera Ejaz, is appreciated for taking the time to complete the momentous task of editing the manuscript.

# COURSE TEAM

| | |
|---|---|
| **Chairperson:** | Dr. Kausar Parveen |
| **Course Team:** | Dr. Kishwar Sultana<br>Dr. Abdul Basit Mujahid<br>Dr. Kausar Parveen<br>Dr. Fozia Umar<br>Dr. Sadia Aziz<br>Dr. Malik Hammad Ahmad |
| **Course Coordinator:** | Dr. Fozia Umar |
| **Writer:** | Dr. Fozia Umar |
| **Reviewer:** | Dr. Kausar Parveen |
| **Editor:** | Ms. Humera Ejaz |

# CONTENTS

***Page #***


Forward ..... iii

Acknowledgment ..... iv

Structure of the Course ..... vii

Introduction..... .....x

Learning Outcomes of the Course ..... xi

Course Outline ..... xii

**Unit–1:** Constitutional Evolution: *Muslim Response*…… 1

**Unit–2:** British Policy: *Muslim Response* ..... 17

**Unit–3:** Constitutional Development Since Montague Chelmsford Reforms… 29

**Unit–4:** Constitutional Proposals of the Muslim Community ..... 41

**Unit–5:** The Government of India Act 1935 ..... 71

**Unit–6:** Elections 1937: *Performance of Muslim Parties* ..... 83

**Unit–7:** World War II and Muslim Politics ..... 97

**Unit–8:** Journey to Independence: *Role of AIML*..... 105

**Unit–9:** All India Muslim Leagues: *The Sole Spokesman of the Muslims*…….117

## STRUCTURE OF THE COURSE

A three-credit-hour course consists of nine units. The coursework of one unit will include the study of compulsory reading material and suggested books. It would be helpful if you created a timetable for your studies to complete the work within the allocated time.

Every course has a study package including compulsory reading material and suggested readings. For the books recommended at the end of each unit, you can visit a nearby library/study centre or the Central library at the main campus in AIOU.

## GUIDELINE TO STUDY MATERIAL

For a course, you are required to prepare yourself to get the maximum benefit from it. You are required to follow the following steps.

### Step 1

Go through the:

1. Course Outline
2. Course Introduction
3. Course Objectives
4. Structure of the Course
5. Assessment
6. Recommended Books
7. Suggested Readings

### Step 2

Read the whole unit and make notes of those points that you could not fully understand or wish to discuss with your teacher.

### Step 3

Go through the self-assessment questions at the end of each unit. If you find any difficulty in comprehension or locating relevant material, then discuss it with your teacher.

### Step 4

Read thoroughly, the study guide and course outline. In case any explanation is needed regarding the comprehension of the text, consult your teacher.

### Step 5

First, read the entire assignment you are required to do for this course. Highlight all the points that you find difficult to tackle, and then discuss them in detail with your teacher. This exercise will save you from a lot of trouble and ensure good results.

## Assessment

For each course, you will be assessed as follows:

- 2 Assignments (continuous assessment).
- Final Examination (three-hour written examination will take place at the end of the semester)
- Workshop
- Quiz

**The condition to qualify each component is given below:**

1. A minimum of 50% in each assignment.
2. A minimum of 50% of the final written examination.
3. An aggregate of 50% of both the components, i.e., assignments and final examination, is required to pass the course.
4. The assignment is compulsory for the appearance in the final examination.

## Assignments

- Assignments are written exercises that are required to be completed at your own home or place of work after having studied different parts of the suggested reading material within the scheduled period of study. (See the assignments scheduled).
- For this course, you will receive 02 assignments in the mailing package. You are advised to complete your assignments within the provided schedule.
- This is a compulsory coursework, and its successful completion will make you eligible to take the final examination at the end of the semester.
- To qualify for each assignment, you need to obtain a minimum of 50% marks.

## Workshop

- An online workshop for each course is mandatory to attend.

## Revision before the Final Examination

You must revise as systematically as you have been studying.

You may find the following suggestions helpful.

- Go through the course unit one by one, using your study notes to remind you of the key topics, concepts, or theories. If you have not already made notes, do so now.
- Note the key terms associated with each topic.
- Go through your assignments, and test yourself on each of the main topics, writing down the main points or revising them verbally.
- Make sure to attend the workshops and discuss all the points that you find difficult to comprehend.
- Try to get together with a small group of fellow students. Each person revises their topics intensively and then, in a group session summarizes them for the

other members, who should raise queries and questions. This approach will make your studies interesting and provide you with an opportunity to revise thoroughly.

- The paper in the final exam will be on the pattern of questions given at the end of each unit.
- Before your final exams, make sure
  - You get your roll number slip,
  - You know where the examination centre is,
  - You know the date and time of the examination.

**Note:**

- You can get information regarding your assignments, workshop Schedule, Assignment results
- and final examination from the AIOU website: www.aiou.edu.pk.
- You are advised to regularly visit the university website to update yourself about the activities of the university.

# INTRODUCTION OF THE COURSE

The period between 1900 and 1947 marks one of the most transformative eras in the history of South Asia, as Muslims engaged in a determined struggle for independence from British colonial rule. This study guide, *Muslim Struggle for Independence*, explores the key political movements, ideological developments, and leadership efforts that shaped the course of history and ultimately led to the creation of Pakistan in 1947.

The modern history of South Asia witnessed a clearer description of the objective towards which India was moving in the first decade of the 20th century. The supremacy of Europe disintegrated when Japan defeated Russia in 1905. The stretched doze that Asia was going through started to come to an end. The Muslim intelligentsia could not stand aloof from what was happening around them. The constitutional reforms, institutions, and steps introduced by the British put them into a competition with the Hindu majority due to their numerical strength in India. They need to prepare themselves to play their part in a modern democratic political system going to be formed soon. In response to constitutional steps introduced by British rulers, Muslims showed a planned and meaningful rejoinder from 1905 to 1947. This course will look into detail during the period mentioned above.

The early 20th century saw increasing political awareness among Muslims, largely in response to British policies and the growing dominance of Hindu-majority nationalism. The establishment of the All India Muslim League in 1906 provided a political platform for Muslims to voice their concerns and advocate for their rights. Over the decades, pivotal events such as the Lucknow Pact (1916), the Khilafat Movement (1919-1924), the Lahore Resolution (1940), and the Quit India Movement (1942) influenced the path of the independence movement.

This course will analyze the roles of key leaders, including Sir Syed Ahmad Khan's intellectual legacy, Allama Iqbal's vision of a separate Muslim state, and Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah's political strategy in achieving independence. It will also examine the socio-political and economic factors that contributed to the demand for Pakistan.

By the end of this course, students will gain a deeper understanding of the complex historical processes that led to the partition of the Indian subcontinent. Through critical analysis of primary and secondary sources, they will be equipped to evaluate the successes and challenges faced by Muslims during their struggle for an independent homeland.

The compulsory readings for the course included *Trek to Pakistan,* written by Ahmad Saeed and Kh. Mansur Sarwar and *Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857–1948,* written by Khalid bin Saeed. Let us embark on this historical journey to explore the sacrifices, strategies, and resilience of the Muslim community in shaping their destiny.

## COURSE OBJECTIVES

After the completion of this course, you will be able to;

1. Analyze the socio-political and economic conditions of Muslims in the Indian subcontinent during the early 20th century and their role in shaping the independence movement.
2. Explore major political developments such as the Partition of Bengal (1905), the formation of the All India Muslim League (1906), the Khilafat Movement (1919-1924), and the Lahore Resolution (1940).
3. Assess the contributions of key leaders, including Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Allama Iqbal, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and other prominent figures in the independence struggle.
4. Investigate British colonial policies and their effects on Muslim political consciousness, including constitutional reforms, communal representation, and repressive measures.
5. Discuss the role of mass mobilization, student activism, and religious and cultural influences in shaping the demand for a separate Muslim state.
6. Examine the events leading to the partition of India in 1947, the challenges of migration, communal violence, and the creation of Pakistan.
7. Engage with primary and secondary historical sources to assess different perspectives on the independence movement and formulate well-reasoned arguments.
8. Reflect on the long-term impact of the independence movement on South Asian politics, identity, and inter-state relations between Pakistan and India.

## LEARNING OUTCOMES

After the successful completion of this course, you will be capable of;

1. Explain the key events, movements, and figures that shaped the Muslim struggle for independence from 1900 to 1947.
2. Assess the significance of major political developments, including the Partition of Bengal (1905), the Khilafat Movement (1919-1924), the Lahore Resolution (1940), and the Cabinet Mission Plan (1946).
3. Critically examine the contributions of leaders such as Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Allama Iqbal, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and Liaquat Ali Khan in shaping Muslim political aspirations.
4. Analyze the impact of British constitutional reforms, such as the Government of India Acts (1909, 1919, and 1935), and their influence on Muslim political consciousness.
5. Engage with historical documents, speeches, and scholarly works to develop a nuanced understanding of the independence movement.
6. Investigate the factors leading to the partition of India, the challenges of mass migration, communal violence, and the early struggles of Pakistan as a newly independent state.
7. Formulate well-supported historical arguments using evidence from diverse sources, enhancing their ability to engage in academic discourse.
8. Reflect on the legacy of the independence movement and its influence on modern South Asian politics, identity, and inter-state relations.

**Unit–01**

# CONSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION: MUSLIM RESPONSE

*Written by:* **Dr. Fozia Umar**
*Reviewed by:* **Dr. Kausar Parveen**

# CONTENTS


| | | Page # |
|---|---|---|
| Introduction | | 3 |
| Objectives | | 3 |
| Learning Outcomes | | 3 |
| 1. | The Government of India Act 1858 | 5 |
| 2. | Acts -1861, 1892 | 5 |
| | 2.1 The Indian Councils Act 1861 | 5 |
| | 2.2 The Indian Councils Act 1892 | 6 |
| 3. | Land Alienation Act in Punjab 1900 | 6 |
| 4. | Creation of NWFP 1901 | 8 |
| 5. | Partition of Bengal-1905 and its Annulment: Muslim Reaction | 10 |
| 6. | Muslims' Assertiveness: Simla Deputation, Foundation of All India Muslim League (AIML) | 12 |
| 7. | Minto-Morley Reforms 1909: Recognition of Muslim Identity | 13 |
| Compulsory Readings | | 15 |
| Suggested Readings | | 15 |
| Self-Assessment Questions | | 16 |

# INTRODUCTION

The constitutional developments in British India played a crucial role in shaping the political consciousness of Muslims and their struggle for independence. The evolving legal and political framework, introduced through successive legislative reforms, impacted the socio-political status of Muslims and influenced their political strategies. This unit examines key constitutional changes from the late 19th to the early 20th century and explores Muslim responses to these developments.

The transformation began with the Government of India Act 1858, which transferred administrative control from the East India Company to the British Crown, marking the formal beginning of direct British rule. This act centralized governance and excluded Indian participation in decision-making, intensifying political awareness among various communities. The Indian Councils Act of 1861 was a modest step toward political inclusion, introducing a legislative council with limited Indian representation, yet failing to provide Muslims with adequate political safeguards. Similarly, the Indian Councils Act of 1892 expanded legislative councils and allowed indirect elections, but it did little to address the specific concerns of Muslims.

A significant legal development affecting Muslim interests was the Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1900, which sought to protect agricultural lands from moneylenders but also reinforced economic divisions. During this period, the British created the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in 1901, a move with strategic and political significance for Muslims, as it acknowledged the distinct identity of Pashtun-majority areas.

The growing realization of political marginalization led to the formation of the All India Muslim League in 1906, marking a decisive shift in Muslim political activism. This organization aimed to safeguard Muslim rights, promote loyalty to the British government, and counterbalance the growing influence of the Indian National Congress. Shortly after, the Minto-Morley Reforms (Indian Councils Act of 1909) introduced separate electorates for Muslims, ensuring their distinct political identity and representation in legislative bodies. This reform was a milestone in the constitutional evolution of British India, as it formally recognized Muslims as a separate political entity.

This unit will analyze how these constitutional developments shaped Muslim political thought and activism. By exploring the interplay between British policies and Muslim responses, students will gain insight into the early phases of Muslim political consolidation, which eventually led to their demand for a separate state.

## OBJECTIVES

After the study of this unit, you will be able to:

1. Explain the significance of key constitutional reforms, including the Government of India Act (1858), the Indian Councils Acts (1861 & 1892), and the Minto-Morley Reforms (1909).
2. Assess how these constitutional changes affected Muslim political, social, and economic conditions in British India.
3. Examine British motives behind legislative reforms, including the Punjab Land Alienation Act (1900) and the creation of the North-West Frontier Province (1901).
4. Investigate the reasons behind the establishment of the All India Muslim League (1906) and its role in Muslim political representation.
5. Analyze the introduction of separate electorates for Muslims under the Minto-Morley Reforms (1909) and its long-term impact on communal politics.
6. Compare and contrast various constitutional reforms to understand their role in shaping the Muslim struggle for political rights.
7. Explore how Muslim leaders and organizations reacted to these constitutional changes and how their strategies evolved.
8. Identify how early constitutional developments influenced later political movements, leading to the demand for Pakistan.

## LEARNING OUTCOMES

After the study of this unit, you will be able to:

1. Describe the major constitutional developments from 1858 to 1909 and their impact on governance in British India.
2. Assess the objectives and consequences of legislative reforms, including the Government of India Act (1858), Indian Councils Acts (1861 & 1892), Punjab Land Alienation Act (1900), and the Minto-Morley Reforms (1909).
3. Examine the growing political consciousness among Muslims in response to British policies and the formation of the All India Muslim League (1906).
4. Explain the significance of the creation of the North-West Frontier Province (1901) and its impact on Muslim political dynamics.
5. Discuss the implications of the introduction of separate electorates under the Minto-Morley Reforms (1909) for Muslim political representation.
6. Analyze how Muslim leaders and political organizations reacted to British constitutional changes and adapted their strategies for securing political rights.
7. Evaluate the differences in Muslim political approaches before and after the formation of the All India Muslim League.
8. Relate early constitutional reforms to later political movements, including the demand for Pakistan.

# 1. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT 1858

The constitutional evolution in India started with *the Government of India Act of 1858*. Originally, it was *An Act for the Better Government of India*. Lord Palmerstone, then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, introduced it, and on 2 August 1858, it became an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom.

## Main Provisions

1. Transfer of control and administration to the Crown.
2. *The Secretary of State* was empowered to exercise powers that were previously exercised by the Company or the board of control that was abolished.
3. A council of fifteen members was established.
4. The council was to conduct all business relating to the Government of India in the United Kingdom under the direction of the Secretary of State.
5. The Secretary of State could override the opinion of the majority of the Council but had to record reasons for doing so.
6. The expenditure of the revenues of India was made subject to the control of the Secretary of State and the Council.
7. The accounts for each financial year were to be laid before the British Parliament.
8. The Governor-General and governors were appointed by the British government.

The Act not only brought about the end of East India Company rule but also ushered in a new era of British imperial rule in India, which had far-reaching effects on the constitutional, political, social, cultural, and intellectual history of the subcontinent.

# 2. THE INDIAN COUNCILS ACTS

## 2.1 The Indian Councils Act 1861

***Executive Council of the Governor-General***

*Five members*, three to be appointed by the Secretary of State. The other two were appointed by the Crown, one being a barrister and the other the commander-in-chief of the Armed forces in India.

***Legislative Council of the Governor-General***

The Governor-General was empowered to nominate six to twelve additional members to his Legislative Council.

- Powers of the Council: make, repeal, amend, or alter any laws and regulations for India, subject to the assent of the Governor-General or the Crown.

- The Governor-General was also empowered to make ordinances having the force of law in case of urgent necessity.
- Provision was also made for the composition of Councils for the Governors of the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay. These Councils could frame laws and regulations for their respective Presidencies, subject to the Assent of the Governor concerned.
- The Governor-General could constitute new provinces, alter provincial boundaries, and appoint Lieutenant-Governors and their Councils for such provinces.
- No distribution of powers between the center and provinces.

### 2.2 The Indian Councils Act 1892

- The Indian Councils Act 1892 amended the Indian Councils Act 1861, and for the first time principle of election was introduced.
- Governor-General legislative Council's additional members were raised from six to twelve, to ten to twenty.
- Indian residents can be appointed as additional members of the Councils of the Governor-General, governors of the presidencies, or lieutenant governors of the provinces.
- The members were indirectly elected by municipal committees, district boards, universities, and the Chamber of Commerce and then nominated by the Governor-General.
- The local legislature of any province was empowered to repeal or amend any law or regulation as to that province.
- Debate on the budget was permitted.

## 3. LAND ALIENATION ACT IN PUNJAB 1900

The Land Alienation Act of 1900 was a significant piece of colonial legislation enacted by the British in Punjab to prevent the transfer of agricultural land from traditional landowning classes (zamindars) to moneylenders and non-agriculturists. The act was introduced by Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, as a response to growing rural distress and peasant indebtedness in Punjab.

**1. Background: Why Was the Act Introduced?**

**a. Rising Peasant Indebtedness**

- During the late 19th century, many Punjabi peasants were heavily in debt due to excessive borrowing from moneylenders (sahukars, banias).
- Frequent famines, low crop yields, and high taxes forced farmers to mortgage or sell their land.

- Many peasants lost their land to non-agriculturist moneylenders, leading to social unrest.

**b. British Concern for Rural Stability**

- The British saw Punjab as the "Sword Arm of India", a key supplier of soldiers for the British Indian Army.
- They feared that the displacement of traditional landowning classes would create instability and reduce their military recruitment base.
- The British wanted to protect the loyal landowning classes (zamindars and jagirdars) to maintain social order.

**2. Key Provisions of the Land Alienation Act (1900)**

**Restriction on Land Transfers:**

The Act banned the sale, mortgage, or transfer of land from agriculturists (zamindars) to non-agriculturists (moneylenders, traders).

**Definition of Agriculturists and Non-Agriculturists:**

- "Agriculturists" were those traditionally engaged in farming, such as Muslim, Sikh, and Hindu landlords and peasants.
- "Non-Agriculturists" were urban moneylenders, merchants, and traders, mostly belonging to Hindu communities.

**Protection of Zamindars:**

- The Act preserved the zamindari system, ensuring that land remained with traditional rural elites.

**Court Approval for Land Transfers:**

Any land transfer required approval from a revenue court, making it difficult for moneylenders to acquire land.

**3. Reaction to the Land Alienation Act**

**a. Peasant and Landlord Support**

Zamindars and big landlords (Jagirdars) welcomed the Act as it secured their land from moneylenders.

The British gained the loyalty of rural elites, especially in Punjab, which remained politically significant.

**b. Opposition from Moneylenders and Traders**

Hindu moneylenders and traders (mostly from the Baniya community) strongly opposed the Act, as it restricted their ability to recover debts through land

acquisitions.
Legal challenges and protests were launched, arguing that the law was discriminatory.

**c. Rise of Communal Tensions**
The Act worsened Hindu-Muslim-Sikh relations in Punjab, as it was seen as favoring Muslim and Sikh agriculturists while restricting Hindu moneylenders.
This led to the formation of political groups like the Punjab Hindu Sabha (1909), which later influenced the rise of Hindu nationalism.

**4. Long-Term Impact of the Act**

**a. Strengthening of Zamindars and British Control**
The Act helped the British secure the loyalty of Punjab's rural elite, ensuring a steady supply of soldiers for the British army.

**b. Growth of Peasant Movements**
Though the Act protected zamindars, smaller peasants remained vulnerable to exploitation by landlords.
This led to the rise of peasant movements in Punjab, such as the Pagri Sambhal Jatta Movement (1907) led by Sardar Ajit Singh (Bhagat Singh's uncle).

**c. Revisions and Modifications**
Due to continuous opposition, the Act was amended in 1926 to allow limited land transfers under specific conditions.

**5. The Act's Legacy**
The Land Alienation Act of 1900 was a landmark law that shaped Punjab's socio-economic and political landscape. While it protected zamindars, it also deepened economic divisions and communal tensions, which played a role in later movements, including partition politics and the demand for Pakistan.

## 4. CREATION OF NWFP 1901

The North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) was formally established on November 9, 1901, by Lord Curzon, the British Viceroy of India. This decision was driven by administrative, military, and political reasons, as the British sought to improve governance and security in the volatile Pashtun tribal belt.

**1. Background: The Need for a Separate Province**

Before 1901, the area that later became the NWFP was part of the Punjab Province. However, the British faced several challenges in managing this region effectively:

**a. Security Concerns and the Great Game**

- The British were deeply concerned about Russian expansion towards Afghanistan and India, which led to the geopolitical struggle known as the Great Game.
- The tribal areas of the Frontier were difficult to control due to their rugged terrain and strong tribal structures.
- Frequent uprisings, including the Pashtun resistance against British rule, made it necessary for the British to implement direct governance.

**b. Administrative Difficulties Under Punjab Rule**

- The British found it increasingly difficult to govern the Pashtun-majority areas as part of Punjab, where a different administrative and cultural setup existed.
- The tribal system in the Frontier was unique, and the British wanted to enforce laws like the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), which were not applicable in Punjab.

**c. Military Strategy**

- The region served as the gateway to India from the northwest. Controlling it separately allowed the British to secure their borders against potential invaders or tribal revolts.
- The Malakand Field Force, a British military contingent, had already been established to keep the area under control.

**2. The Official Creation of NWFP**

On November 9, 1901, Lord Curzon formally separated the North-West Frontier from Punjab and created a new province.
Five settled districts were included in the NWFP:

- Peshawar
- Kohat
- Bannu
- Dera Ismail Khan
- Hazara
- Additionally, the Tribal Areas (FATA) were placed under British control but were not fully integrated into the NWFP's administration.

**Governance Structure**

- NWFP was initially established as a Chief Commissioner's Province (1901-1932), meaning it was directly administered by a British-appointed official rather than an elected legislature.

- The British imposed the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) in 1901, a draconian legal system that allowed the government to exercise strict control over the tribal areas without formal courts.

## 5. PARTITION OF BENGAL-1905 AND ITS ANNULMENT: MUSLIM REACTION

The Partition of Bengal was a major political event in British India during the early 20th century. It was implemented on October 16, 1905, by Lord Curzon, the then Viceroy of India. The partition divided the large province of Bengal into two separate administrative units:

- Eastern Bengal and Assam (a new Muslim-majority province)
- Western Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa (Hindu-majority region)

While Hindus strongly opposed the partition, Muslims largely welcomed it, as it gave them a separate identity and political advantage. However, due to massive protests, the British annulled the partition in 1911, which caused disappointment among Muslims.

### 1. Reasons for the Partition of Bengal (1905)

The British justified the partition on administrative grounds, but there were also political motives behind it.

#### a. Administrative Justifications

- Bengal was too large to govern effectively under a single administration.
- It had a population of over 78 million, making it difficult to manage law, order, and development.
- The British claimed that partition would help improve governance and economic development.

#### b. Political Motives (Divide and Rule Policy)

- The British sought to weaken the growing nationalist movement in Bengal, which was dominated by Hindus.
- By creating a Muslim-majority province in Eastern Bengal and Assam, they aimed to gain Muslim support and prevent Hindu-Muslim unity against British rule.
- The British wanted to appease Muslims, who had been politically inactive since the 1857 War of Independence.

### 2. Muslim Reaction to the Partition (1905)

Muslims welcomed the partition because it created a separate province where they

were the majority.

**a. Political and Social Benefits for Muslims**

- Muslims of Eastern Bengal felt that they would now have greater political representation and economic opportunities.
- Dhaka became the new capital of Eastern Bengal, which helped Muslims in Bengal develop their institutions.
- Sir Salimullah of Dhaka and other Muslim leaders supported the partition, seeing it as an opportunity for Muslim empowerment.

**b. Formation of the Muslim League (1906)**

- The partition indirectly led to the formation of the All India Muslim League (AIML) in 1906 in Dhaka.
- The Muslim League aimed to safeguard Muslim interests and later played a crucial role in the Pakistan Movement.

**3. Hindu Opposition and the Annulment of Partition (1911)**

Hindus strongly opposed the partition because it reduced their influence in Bengal.

**a. Hindu Protests and the Swadeshi Movement**

- Hindu leaders saw the partition as an attempt to divide Hindus and Muslims.
- The Swadeshi Movement (1905-1911) was launched, calling for the boycott of British goods and promotion of local industries.
- Violent protests, strikes, and mass mobilization took place, pressuring the British to reconsider their decision.

**b. Annulment of the Partition (1911)**

- Due to intense opposition and increasing instability, the British annulled the partition in 1911.
- King George V announced the reversal during the Delhi Durbar on December 12, 1911.
- The capital of British India was shifted from Calcutta to Delhi to appease Hindus.

**4. Muslim Reaction to the Annulment (1911)**

Muslims were deeply disappointed by the reversal of the partition, as they had seen Eastern Bengal as a new center for Muslim political and economic progress.

**a. Sense of Betrayal**

- Muslims felt betrayed by the British, as they had supported the partition believing it would protect their interests.

- The annulment reinforced the idea that Muslims needed a separate political identity.

**b. Strengthening of the Muslim League**

- The Muslim League became more active in advocating for Muslim rights.
- This event contributed to the later demand for a separate Muslim state (Pakistan).

**5. Impact of the Partition and Its Annulment**

- The Partition of Bengal highlighted Hindu-Muslim differences in British India.
- The Muslim League emerged as the representative organization for Muslims.
- The annulment weakened Muslim trust in British policies and intensified their demand for separate political safeguards, which ultimately led to the demand for Pakistan in 1940.

## 6. MUSLIMS' ASSERTIVENESS: SIMLA DEPUTATION, FOUNDATION OF ALL-INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE

With the commencement of the twentieth century, the Muslims began to assert themselves socially and politically. Simla deputation and formation of All India Mulsim League (AIML) were the indicators of the Muslims' persistence of their identity as a separate nation. The first step taken in this direction was the deputation of the Muslim elite led by Sir Agha Khan, who met with Viceroy Lord Minto in 1906.

It started from Simla Deputation, consisted of 35 members, who each represented their respective region proportionately, and are listed as following: Sir Sultan Muhammed Shah III who headed the Simla Delegation, Moulvi Rafiuddin (Bar at Law), Sir Ibraheem Bhai Adamji Pir Bhai, Khan Bahadur Ahmed Muhiuddin Khan, Raees Munshi Ehtasham Ali (Land lord), Raees Syed Nabiullah (Bar at Law), Moulvi Syed Karamat Hussain (Bar at Law), Syed Abdul Rauf (Bar at Law), Munshi Abdul Salam Khan (Sub judge), Khan Bahadur Muhammed Muzammilullah Khan (Landlord, Secretary Organization of Landlords), Haji Muhammed Ismail Khan (Bar at Law), Sahibzada Aftab Ahmed Khan (Bar at Law), Moulvi Mushtaq Hussain, Moulvi Habiburrehman Khan Sherwani (Landlord Bhikan Pur), Moulvi Nawab Syed Mehdi Ali Khan, Hakeem Muhammed Ajmal Khan, Maulana H. M. Malik, Nawab Syed Sardar Ali Khan (CIE), Shehzada Bakhtiar Shah (Head of the clan of Mysore), Khan Bahadur Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhary, Nawab Bahadur Syed Amir Hussain Khan, Naseer Hussain Khan Khayal, Khan Bahadur Mirza Shuja'at Ali Baig, Abdul Raheem (Bar at Law), Malik Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana, Khan Bahadur Mian Muhammed Shah Din (Bar at Law), Khan Bahadur Khalifa Syed Muhammed Hussain (Member Council of

Patiala State), Khan Bahadur Col. Abdul Majeed Khan (Foreign Minister State of Patiala), Khan Bahadur Khawaja Muhammed Yousuf Shah (Honorary Magistrate), Mian Muhammed Shafi (Bar at Law), Shaikh Ghulam Sadiq, Syed Allahdad Shah (Special Magistrate, Vice-president Organization of Landlords), Moulvi Syed Sharfuddin (Bar at Law), Syed Ali Imam (Bar at Law) and Nawab Sarfaraz Hussain Khan. Simla deputation met the Governor General and Viceroy Lord Minto in Simla on 1st October 1906. The deputation aimed to win the sympathies of the *Raj* on their side concerning matters relating to their interests as a community. The meeting remained extremely significant.

The deputation upheld that Muslims in India, according to the census of 1901, numbered over sixty-two million or between one-sixth and one-fourth of the total population. They understood vividly that under any system of representation, extended or limited, a community in itself more numerous than the entire population of any first-class European power except Russia, may justly lay claim to adequate recognition as an important factor in the state. They demanded that Muslim representation in the new setup should be proportionate not merely with their numerical strength but also with their political importance and the value of the contribution which they make to the defence of the empire. Therefore, for the first time, a demand for a separate electorate was tabled formally by the Muslims and had a favorable response from the Viceroy, who agreed that any electoral representation in India would be doomed to the mischievous failure aimed at granting a personal enfranchisement regardless of the beliefs and traditions of the communities. Later, in the same year 1906, Nawab Salimullah Khan of Dacca extended an invitation to the leading Muslims of India to get together for united, organized efforts towards the furtherance of the Muslim cause. This historic meeting of Muslim leaders formed a political organization, which was destined to play the epoch-making role in the realization of the Muslim quest for a separate identity. The organization was named as All India Muslim League, and Agha Khan was elected its first President. Though before the formation of AIML, other Muslim associations did exist, but the influence and status that the All India Muslim League was able to achieve could never be their fate. It assumed the only authoritative stature representing the voice of Muslim India. The surge for Muslim political and other rights was now to be led by the League.

## 7. MINTO-MORLEY REFORMS 1909: RECOGNITION OF MUSLIM IDENTITY

The Minto-Morley reforms of 1909 accepted the principle, suggesting election of a majority of appointed members in the central legislature as well as in the provincial legislation was maintained, but for Bengal, which had a slight majority of elected members, it was announced that elections were to be held on the basis of separate electorates for Muslims and non-Muslims. The scheme of separate electorates was

greatly resented by Hindus. They registered their antagonism in the same year when the Congress disapproved "the creation of separate electorates based on religion". The main issue in Indian politics was now the subject of joint or separate elections. Even the depressed and scheduled caste Hindus supported the separate electorates, but the high caste Hindus were not prepared to restrict their enhanced majority to a reasonable level.

They found it as a threat to Indian nationalism, which was considered to be secular and non-communal, but its inner spirit was inflamed by Hindu inspiration. It addressed its appeal to the patriotism of every citizen, Hindu, Muslim, or any other, but in case of any clash of interest, the Hindu view prevailed".

- *Expansion in Legislative and executive Councils:* The Indian Councils Act 1909 enlarged the size of the Legislative Councils of the Governor-General and the Governors of various Provinces, both nominated as well as elected members.
- *Nomination of Indians in Executive Councils:* Indians became entitled to nomination or election as members of Executive Councils, subject to conditions laid down in the regulations made by the Governor-General with the approval of the Secretary of State.

***Functions of the Legislative Assembly:***

- Individual members in the Imperial Legislative Council could move resolutions relating to alterations in taxation.
- Matters of general public interest could also be discussed in the legislative Councils.
- Members could ask questions and supplementary questions.
- Official majority was maintained in the Central Legislature, but it was given up in the provincial Legislature.
    - Unofficial members were in the majority in provincial councils
    - The separate electorates were introduced.
    - The franchise was limited due to the strict qualifications of property and education.
    - The principle of election was introduced, but it was indirect. The people were to elect the members of local bodies, who were to elect the members of the Electoral College, who in turn were to elect members of provincial legislatures. The members of the provincial legislature were to elect the members of the Imperial legislature.

## COMPULSORY READINGS

Saeed, Ahmed and Kh. Mansur Sarwar. *Trek to Pakistan.* Lahore: Institute of Pakistan Historical Research, 2002. (45–52 & 111–115)

I H Qureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan, Karachi: University Press, 2000, pp. 1–37.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

Coupland, Reginald, *The Constitutional Problem in India.* London: Oxford University Press, 1944.

Flynn, Vince. *Transfer of Power.* London: Pocket, 2003.

Sarkar, Sumit. *Modern India: 1885-1947.* Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989.

Sherwani, Latif Ahmed. ed. *Pakistan in Making.* Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1987.

Spear, T.G. Percival. *The Oxford History of Modern India 1740–1975*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978.

Wasti, Syed Razi. *Lord Minto and Indian Nationalist Movement.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964.

## SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS

1. What were the key provisions of the Government of India Act (1858), and how did it change British rule in India?
2. Discuss the significance of the Proclamation of 1858 for the people of India.
3. How did the Indian Councils Acts of 1861 and 1892 impact political representation in British India?
4. Discuss the main provisions of the Indian Councils Act 1861 and describe the changes the Indian Councils Act 1892 brought in it.
5. What was the purpose of the Punjab Land Alienation Act (1900), and how did it affect Muslim landowners and farmers?
6. Bring out the significance of the Land Alienation Act 1900 for the Agrarian society of the Punjab.
7. Why did the British establish the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in 1901, and what was its significance for Muslims?
8. Why was the NWFP separated from the province of Punjab in 1901? On what grounds, the people of Punjab protest this decision?
9. What were the major objectives behind the partition of Bengal? How had it affected the relations between the Muslims and the Hindus?
10. What were the main reasons for the formation of the All India Muslim League (1906), and what were its objectives?
11. Discuss the Simla deputation and the formation of AIML as the major indicators of the Muslims' assertiveness as a nation?
12. What were the major provisions of the Minto-Morley Reforms (1909), and how did they affect Muslim political representation?
13. Examine the significance of the Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909 in the context of the recognition of Muslim identity as a separate nation
14. Why was the introduction of separate electorates significant for Muslims, and what were its long-term consequences?
15. How did British constitutional reforms contribute to the development of Muslim political identity in India?
16. Do you think the British reforms were intended to empower Indians politically, or were they primarily aimed at maintaining colonial control? Explain with examples.
17. How did the Muslim response to British policies during this period shape their later demand for a separate state?

**Unit–02**

# BRITISH POLICY: MUSLIM RESPONSE

*Written by:* **Dr. Fozia Umar**
*Reviewed by:* **Dr. Kausar Parveen**

# CONTENTS


**Page #**

Introduction ..... 19

Objectives and Learning Outcomes ..... 19

1. Hindu-Muslim Unity ..... 21

    1.1 Differences between Hindus and Muslims: Reasons ..... 21

    1.2 Hindu-Muslim Unit (1916–1921): Major Factors ..... 21

2. Lucknow Pact 1916 ..... 23

3. Tehrik-i-Khilafat and Non-Cooperation Movement ..... 23

    3.1 Objectives of Khilafat Movement ..... 24

    3.2 Reasons of Hindu Support towards Khilafat Movement ..... 24

    3.3 Impact on the Political Development in the Subcontinent ..... 24

    3.4 Causes of the Failure ..... 24

4. Tehrik-i-Hijrat ..... 24

5. Pan-Islamism: Role of Ali Brothers ..... 24

Compulsory Readings ..... 26

Suggested Readings ..... 26

Self-Assessment Questions ..... 27

# INTRODUCTION

The early 20th century was marked by significant shifts in British colonial policies, which deeply impacted Hindu-Muslim relations and shaped the Muslim political response in India. British strategies, ranging from constitutional reforms to repressive measures, played a crucial role in influencing Muslim sentiments and fostering political movements. This unit explores how British policies contributed to communal divisions, the attempts at Hindu-Muslim unity, and the subsequent rise of Muslim political activism.

One of the key issues in this period was the British policy of divide and rule, which created mistrust between Hindus and Muslims. However, there were also efforts to bridge the communal divide, most notably the Lucknow Pact of 1916, where the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League came together to demand constitutional reforms from the British government. This temporary unity was significant in shaping future negotiations for self-rule.

The aftermath of World War I brought new challenges for Muslims. British actions against the Ottoman Caliphate, a revered institution in the Muslim world, led to widespread resentment among Indian Muslims. In response, the Khilafat Movement (1919-1924) was launched under the leadership of Maulana Muhammad Ali and Maulana Shaukat Ali (the Ali Brothers), alongside other Muslim leaders. This movement aimed to protect the Caliphate and resist British imperialism. It was closely linked to Pan-Islamism, a global movement advocating Muslim unity beyond national borders.

In solidarity with the Khilafat cause, many Muslims also participated in the Hijrat Movement (1920), a migration to Afghanistan as a form of protest against British rule. This movement, however, failed due to practical difficulties and the unpreparedness of the Afghan government. Meanwhile, Muslims also took part in the Non-Cooperation Movement (1920-1922) led by Mahatma Gandhi, which marked a rare period of Hindu-Muslim political cooperation. However, this unity was short-lived, as differences emerged over religious and political goals.

This unit will examine the various responses of Indian Muslims to British policies, including their support for and eventual disillusionment with the Congress-led nationalist movement. It will also analyze the role of the Ali Brothers and other leaders in mobilizing Muslim sentiment. By the end of this unit, students will gain a deeper understanding of how British policies shaped Muslim political identity and led to the eventual demand for a separate homeland.

## OBJECTIVES

After the study of this unit, you will be able to:

1. Understand how British policies influenced Hindu-Muslim relations and contributed to communal tensions in India.
2. Assess the significance of the Lucknow Pact (1916) and its impact on the Indian freedom movement.
3. Explain the causes, objectives, and consequences of the Khilafat Movement (1919-1924) and its role in shaping Muslim political activism.
4. Investigate how Pan-Islamism influenced Indian Muslims and their response to global Islamic concerns.
5. Discuss the motivations behind the Hijrat Movement (1920) and analyze the reasons for its failure.
6. Evaluate Muslim participation in the Non-Cooperation Movement (1920-1922) and the reasons for the eventual breakdown of Hindu-Muslim unity.
7. Analyze the role of Maulana Muhammad Ali and Maulana Shaukat Ali (Ali Brothers) and other key figures in mobilizing Muslims against British rule.
8. Understand how the Muslim response to British policies in this period laid the foundation for later demands for a separate Muslim state.

## LEARNING OUTCOMES

After the study of this unit, you will be able to:

1. Describe how British strategies, including the divide and rule policy, affected Hindu-Muslim relations and Muslim political consciousness.
2. Analyze the importance of the Lucknow Pact (1916) in fostering Hindu-Muslim cooperation and its eventual decline.
3. Discuss the goals, methods, and outcomes of the Khilafat Movement, including its influence on Indian Muslims and its connection to the Non-Cooperation Movement.
4. Assess how Pan-Islamic ideals shaped Muslim activism in British India and connected Indian Muslims to global Islamic issues.
5. Explain the causes and consequences of the Hijrat Movement (1920) and its effect on the Muslim struggle against colonial rule.
6. Examine the leadership of the Ali Brothers, their advocacy for Muslim political rights, and their influence on nationalist movements.
7. Understand and identify the reasons behind the collapse of Hindu-Muslim cooperation after the Non-Cooperation Movement and its impact on future political developments.
8. Relate early Muslim political responses to the emergence of the Pakistan Movement and the demand for a separate Muslim state.

# 1. HINDU-MUSLIM UNITY

## 1.1 Differences between Hindus and Muslims: Reasons

- The major cause of differentiation between the two communities was religious distinction. Both believed in a different set of beliefs that reflect in their socio-cultural systems.
- Social and cultural differences found expression in the form of language issues and Hindu reformist movements as Brahmo Samaj, Arya Samaj, Prarthana Samaj, Dev Samaj, and Theosophical Society.
- Although both communities had been living side by side for several years but with the introduction of /representative institutions/a new system of government was introduced by the British rulers (after the War of Independence 1857), and both communities got engaged in political competition. The rule of democracy based on majority favoured the Hindus but proved detrimental to the Muslims' interests in India.
- Economic differences between Hindus and Muslims grew to be central with the cut-throat competition in trade and government service. The Hindus became reliable/dependable supporters/servants of the British government, and the Muslims were distrusted. With the introduction of the Civil Service exams, the higher posts were occupied by the Hindu community. The Muslims lagged due to meager education, replacement of Persian/Urdu with English as an official language, and distrust and persecution of the new rulers.
- The Indian National Congress claimed to represent all the communities, but in practice, it was working to protect only the interests of the Hindu community. The Muslims got alienated from this political party and set up their own organization, the All India Muslim League (AIML).
- Historically, both communities did not share the same memories. The Hindus resented the rule of *foreign* Muslims and idealized the Hindu rebels as their *heroes,* whereas the Muslims relished the rule of Muslim rulers.

## 1.2 Hindu-Muslim Unity (1916-1921): *Major Factors*

The latter half of the nineteenth century marked the emergence of the above differences between the two communities. The leaders of the Muslim community convinced their members to develop reciprocal relations with the British government. Through cooperation with the government, they could extract favours and protect against the impression of the rulers that the Muslims had not accepted their supremacy, and they would try to rebel again whenever they got the opportunity. With the beginning of the twentieth century, the international and domestic.

Circumstances opened avenues of cooperation between the two neighbourhoods. A brief review of these factors is as follows:

***International Scenario*:**

1. *Italy-Turkish Tussle*: In September 1911, Italy invaded Tripoli, which had been under Turkish rule for several centuries. The Muslims of Tripoli were subjected to inhuman atrocities. This created a wave of uneasiness among the Indian Muslims.
2. *Balkan Problem:* At the instigation of Britain, Turkey invaded the Balkan States. He enhanced the anxiety of the Indian Muslims in an already deteriorated situation of the Muslims across the world.
3. *First World War and its Aftermath:*
4. *Russian Hostility towards the Iranians:* On March 3, 1912, the Russians bombed the city of Mashhad and damaged the mausoleum of Imam Ali Raza, a respected shrine for Iranians. It caused unease in Iran.
5. British government's anti-Muslim Policies

***Discontentment on Domestic matters***

1. *Aligarh Muslim University Issue 1911*: The Muslims wanted to upgrade the MAO College (founded in 1875) into a University and enhance its affiliation with Muslim colleges. The community succeeded in raising the required funds for the cause, but the government refused to accept the name *Aligarh Muslim University* and its proposed authority of affiliation. This refusal caused serious resentment among the Muslims.
2. *Kanpur Mosque Issue 1913:* The government of UP planned to reconstruct/widen one of its A.B. Roads. On a corner of the road, it had a temple, and opposite to it was a mosque. The Hindus and the Muslims both wanted the authorities to alter the suggested map to save their holy places from demolition. The Lt. Governor James Meston recommended demolishing the place fixed for public toilets and asked mosque authorities to choose another site for the purpose. When that part of the mosque was torn down, the Muslims tried to reconstruct that. The police guarding the site opened fire, and several were injured. The community across the country condemned and protested against the incident.
3. *Annulment of the Partition of Bengal 1911:* The British government claimed that the partition of Bengal was aimed at administrative convenience for the authorities; however, they were compelled to annul the decision under the hostility and pressure of the Hindus. This caused unrest among the Indian Muslims.

***Leadership's initiatives***

1. *Change in Muslim League leadership:* Aziz Mirza was appointed as the new secretary of AIML in 1910. He belonged to the "young group" of the AIML. Thus, the old advocating policy of reconciliation with the British was replaced with the young leadership taking a more aggressive stance on issues concerning Muslims.
2. *Shift of the central office of AIML from Aligarh to Lucknow*: The shift of the central office of AIML reduced the influence of Aligarh's first generation of

leaders and their policy of loyalty to the British government, and transformed it into a more vibrant environment for leaders to bring change in the policies of the government.

3. *Role of Jinnah:* Jinnah became a member of the AIML in 1913. He was a staunch advocate of Hindu-Muslim unity. His dual membership of both AIML and INC proved a major force for both communities, bringing them into closer contact

***Amendment in the Constitution of the AIML:***

On Jinnah's initiative, the constitution of the AIML was amended in 1913, including the clause of 'suitable self-government for India under the aegis of the British Crown' instead of 'the attainment of loyalty to the British government'.

## 2. LUCKNOW PACT 1916

***Cooperation at Party Level (Congress-Muslim League Agreement)***

The first experiment of Hindu-Muslim unity took place in 1916 at the party level when the INC and AIML signed an agreement generally known as the **Lucknow Pact.**

The main provisions were as follows:

- Administrative and financial provincial autonomy
- Increase in representations in councils
- Weightage to the minorities
- Separate electorates
- Constitutional safeguards for minorities

***Impact on political development:***

- Agreement on basic issues between both the significant parties of the Subcontinent
- Recognition of the separate Muslim identity by the Indian National Congress
- Recognition of the AIML as the representative of the Muslims of India
- Inclusion of many provisions of the agreement in the Reforms of 1919
- Agreement raised the stature of Jinnah as the Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity
- Muslims were reduced to parity in Punjab and a minority (40%) in Bengal
- Resentment in Muslim majority provinces of Punjab and Bengal

## 3. TEHRIK-I-KHILAFAT AND NON-COOPERATION MOVEMENT

**Hindu-Muslim Cooperation at the Mass Level**

The second experiment of Hindu-Muslim unity took place at the mass level during the Khilafat Movement.

### 3.1 Objectives of the Khilafat Movement

1. Preservation of the Ottoman Empire
2. Preservation of the institution of Khilafat
3. Preservation of Holy Places in Turkey by the Allied Forces

### 3.2 Reasons for Hindu Support towards the Khilafat Movement

- Rowlatt Act 1919
- Jallianwala Bagh Tragedy

### 3.3 Impact on the Political Development in the Subcontinent

- Training in political agitation/mobilization
- Awareness of potentialities in all communities of British India
- New pattern of politics: agitation, mobilization among all sections of society (ulama, students, women)
- Hindu reformist Movements of Shuddi and Sangathan
- Muslim counter-Movements of Tabligh and Tanzim

### 3.4 Causes of the Failure

- Weak basis of Hindu-Muslim unity: emotionalism being the only force behind both the communities, and their cooperation without any meaningful dialogue on the real issues
- Lack of synthesis between Pan-Islamism and Indian Nationalism
- Faction-ridden Khilafat Organization
- Political outrage

## 4. TEHRIK-I-HIJRAT

It was an offshoot of Tehrik-i-Khilafat. The ulema gave a fatwa that now the subcontinent had become a *Darul Harab,* so the Muslims should migrate from here to any other Muslim country. Innocent Muslims, mainly from the Punjab and the NWFP, started migrating towards Afghanistan. Due to the hardships and the unfavourable attitude of the Afghan government, they suffered a heavy loss of life and property. Many returned empty-handed.

## 5. PAN-ISLAMISM: ROLE OF ALI BROTHERS

Maulana Muhammad Ali Johar (1878-1931) and Maulana Shaukat Ali Johar (1872–1938)

(Ali Brothers) dominated the political stage from 1912–37. Their political mobilization was based on the following causes:

- Anti-British attitude

- Pan-Islamism/revival of Muslim glory
- World War I

The following issues contributed to their political mobilization
- Partition of Bengal
- Dispute at the Muslim University
- Dispute over Kanpur Mosque
- British's political interference in the Muslim Countries
- Issue of Khilafat

Both brothers adopted the following strategies to mobilize the masses.
- Agitational Politics
- Mobilizing the Student Community
- Mobilizing the Ulama (they issued *fatwas* (decrees) to mobilize the masses.

For instance, a fatwa for *Hijrat* and disclaiming government titles and services
- Propaganda through Newspapers *Comrade* and *Hamdard* started from Muslim leaders/journalists to counter the propaganda made by *Bengalee*, the *Tribune,* and other newspapers that had been opposing the AIML and Aligarh leadership and their vision. Muhammad Ali Johar wrote *the Choice of Turks,* listing the erroneous committed to Turkey by the British government. The article was confiscated and the Ali brothers were interned under the Defence of India Ordinance and were released in December 1919.
- Preaching Hindu-Muslim Unity
- Organizing deputations, demonstrations, meetings, processions

Ali Brothers' movement generated the following effects:
- Political Consciousness among the masses
- Self-confidence
- Realization of Muslim identity as a political entity
- Courage of conviction
- End to the political allegiance of the Muslims to the British rulers
- Learned the techniques of organizing mass movements/preparation, and training for the Pakistan Movement
- End of elite/drawing room politics
- Establishment of National Muslim University

## COMPULSORY READINGS

Saeed, Ahmed and Kh. Mansur Sarwar. *Trek to Pakistan.* Lahore: Institute of Pakistan Historical Research, 2002. (116–138 &151–168)

## SUGGESTED READINGS

Coupland, Reginald, *The Constitutional Problem in India.* London: Oxford University Press, 1944.

Flynn, Vince. *Transfer of Power.* London: Pocket, 2003.

Sarkar, Sumit. *Modern India: 1885–1947.* Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989.

Sherwani, Latif Ahmed. ed. *Pakistan in Making.* Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1987.

## SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS

1. Discuss the major factors that brought the two communities, Muslims and the Hindus, on one platform.

2. Discuss the cooperation between the Muslims and the Hindus at the party level and at the mass level during the period 1916–1921.

3. Examine the response of the Muslim majority provinces to the Lucknow Pact of 1916.

4. Evaluate the efforts of Hindu-Muslim unity met with failure in the end.

5. Analyse the strategy of the Muslim leaders during the period 1916–1921. To what extent was it justified and indispensable in the context of the Indian Muslims' relations with the British government?

6. Discuss the volume and significance of the Hijrat Movement in the early decades of 20th-century India. Whether a fatwa for Hijrat a wise decision in the context of contemporary circumstances?

7. Analyse the Role of Ali Brothers in the political struggle of the Indian Muslims in the 1920s.

8. How did British colonial policies contribute to Hindu-Muslim tensions in India?

9. What was the significance of the divide-and-rule policy of the British, and how did it affect communal relations?

10. What were the key provisions of the Lucknow Pact (1916), and why was it considered a milestone in Hindu-Muslim relations?

11. Why did Hindu-Muslim unity, established during the Lucknow Pact, eventually break down?

12. What were the main objectives of the Khilafat Movement (1919-1924), and how was it connected to global Islamic concerns?

13. How did the Ali Brothers (Maulana Muhammad Ali and Maulana Shaukat Ali) contribute to the Khilafat Movement?

14. What is Pan-Islamism, and how did it influence Indian Muslims during the early twentieth century?

15. What motivated Indian Muslims to participate in the Hijrat Movement (1920), and why did it fail?

16. What were the social and economic consequences of the Hijrat Movement for Indian Muslims?

17. Why did Indian Muslims support the Non-Cooperation Movement (1920-1922), and how was it linked to the Khilafat cause?

18. What led to the eventual collapse of Hindu-Muslim cooperation in the Non-Cooperation Movement?

19. How did the failure of the Non-Cooperation Movement influence Muslim political thought?

20. What role did the Ali Brothers play in shaping Muslim political activism?

21. How did the British government respond to Muslim leaders involved in the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation movements?

22. In what ways did the experiences of the Khilafat Movement and Non-Cooperation Movement influence later Muslim political strategies?

**Unit–03**

# CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT SINCE MONTAGUE CHELMSFORD REFORMS 1919

*Written by:* **Dr. Fozia Umar**
*Reviewed by:* **Dr. Kausar Parveen**

# CONTENTS


**Page #**

Introduction ..... 31

Objectives and Learning Outcomes ..... 32

1. Montague Chelmsford Reforms 1919 ..... 33

    1.1 Central Legislative Assembly (Lower House) with 145 ..... 33

    1.2 Council of State (Upper House with 60 ..... 33

    1.3 Diarchy in the Provinces ..... 34

    1.4 Centre-Province Relations ..... 35

    1.5 Demerits of the Act 1919 ..... 35

2. Delhi Proposals 1927 ..... 35

3. Simon Commission 1928 ..... 36

4. All Parties Conference ..... 37

5. Parting of the Ways: Nehru Report 1929 ..... 38

6. Emergence of Muslim Regional Parties ..... 38

Compulsory Readings ..... 39

Suggested Readings ..... 39

Self-Assessment Questions ..... 40

# INTRODUCTION

The period following World War I was marked by significant constitutional changes in British India, shaping the course of the independence movement. These reforms and proposals were instrumental in redefining political representation and governance structures, directly impacting the Muslim struggle for constitutional safeguards. This unit explores key constitutional developments from the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms (1919) to the emergence of Muslim regional parties, highlighting the evolving political landscape and Muslim responses to these changes.

The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms (1919) introduced the system of dyarchy, granting limited self-governance to Indians but failing to address Muslim political concerns adequately. In response, the Delhi Proposals (1927) were presented by Muslim leaders, demanding separate electorates, provincial autonomy, and religious freedom. These demands gained prominence after the Simon Commission (1927) was sent to review constitutional progress in India, which faced opposition for excluding Indian representation.

To counter the Simon Commission's recommendations, Indian political leaders convened the All Parties Conference (1928), which resulted in the Nehru Report (1928)—a proposal for a united India with a parliamentary system. However, the report ignored key Muslim demands, leading to its rejection by the Muslim leadership and furthering communal divisions. During this period, Muslim regional parties also gained strength, reflecting the growing political awareness among different Muslim communities across India.

This unit will examine these constitutional developments in detail, analyzing their impact on the Muslim struggle for political rights and self-determination. By understanding these important events, students will gain insights into the growing realization among Muslims that their political future could not be safeguarded within a united India, eventually leading to the demand for a separate homeland.

## OBJECTIVES

After the study of this unit, you will be able to:

1. Understand the key features of the reforms, particularly the system of dyarchy, and analyze their impact on Indian politics.
2. Evaluate the Muslim demands for constitutional safeguards and their significance in shaping future negotiations.
3. Explain the objectives of the Simon Commission, reasons for Indian opposition, and Muslim reactions.
4. Analyze the recommendations of the Simon Commission Report and why Muslims rejected it as a basis for constitutional development.
5. Examine the rise of regional Muslim political organizations and their influence on Muslim political thought.
6. Understand how these political events contributed to the eventual demand for a separate Muslim state.

## LEARNING OUTCOMES

After the study of this unit, you will be able to:

1. Explain the main provisions of the reforms and their limitations in addressing Indian and Muslim political aspirations.
2. Assess the significance of the Delhi Proposals and their role in shaping later constitutional discussions.
3. Discuss why Indians opposed the Simon Commission and the varying Muslim perspectives on its recommendations.
4. Explain the contents of the Nehru Report and analyze the reasons behind Muslim rejection.
5. Examine how different political groups attempted to formulate a consensus and why these efforts failed.
6. Identify key Muslim regional political movements and assess their role in strengthening the demand for separate Muslim representation.
7. Relate these reforms and proposals to later events leading to the Pakistan Movement..

# 1. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT 1919

The policy of the British Parliament was to associate Indians in every branch of administration and to provide for the gradual development of self-governing institutions to the progressive realization of responsible government in British India in successive stages.

The Secretary of State for India was to be paid out of British revenues. He continued to possess and exercise the powers of superintendence, direction, and control over the affairs of India.

The Governor-General was obliged to carry out the orders of the Secretary of State.

A bicameral legislature at the centre in place of the Imperial Council, consisting of one House.

## 1.1 Central Legislative Assembly (Lower House) with 145

- The duration of the term for the Central Legislative Assembly was three years.
- The Central Legislature had the power to make laws for all of British India, for Indian subjects wherever they might be, and for all persons employed in defence forces.
- It could also repeal or amend laws for the time being in force. However, prior sanction of the Secretary of State was required to pass a law abolishing a High Court.
- Prior sanction of the Governor-General was required to introduce Bills on the following subjects:

(a) The public debt or public revenues of India.
(b) Religion or religious rites and usage of British subjects in India.
(c) Discipline or maintenance of the land, naval, or air forces.
(d) Relations of the Government of India with foreign states or Indian States.
(e) Any measure repealing or amending any Act of the legislature or any Ordinance passed by the Governor-General.

- The central Budget was presented before the Central Legislature in the form of demands for grants. There were certain non-notable items, which were not open to discussion unless the Governor-General so allowed. All other items were submitted to a vote.

## 1.2 Council of State (Upper House) with 60 members for five years

*(A) Powers of the Governor-General*

- The duration of both Houses could be extended by the Governor-General.
- He had the power to summon, prorogue, and dissolve the Houses of the Central Legislature. He could address both Houses.

- He could also prevent consideration of a Bill or a part of it if, in his opinion it affects the safety or tranquillity of British India or any part thereof.
- He could issue an ordinance for a period of six months, which had the same force and effect as an Act of the Central Legislature.
- He had the power of veto over the Bills passed by the Central Legislature.
- He could withhold his assent and return a bill for reconsideration.
- He could also reserve a Bill for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure.
- The Crown could disallow any Bill passed by the Indian Legislature or Ordinance issued by the Governor-General.
- In an emergency, he was empowered to authorize such expenditure as, in his opinion, was necessary for the safety or tranquillity of British India or any part thereof.

**Direct elections** were provided for both Houses, though the franchise was very limited. The total number of electors in all of British India for the Council of State in 1925 did not exceed 17,000, and the total franchise for electing members of the Legislative Assembly in the year 1926 was only 1,128,331 throughout British India.

## 1.3 Diarchy in the Provinces

- A partially responsible government was introduced in the provinces in the form of Diarchy, that is, dual government. The executive of the provinces was divided into two parts: one responsible to the legislature and the other responsible to the British parliament through the Governor and Governor-General.
- The following subjects were allotted to the ministers who were elected members of the Provincial Legislature.

**(A) Transferred Subjects**

- Local self-government
- Public health, sanitation, and medical administration
- Education
- Public works
- Agriculture and fisheries
- Cooperative societies
- Excise
- Forests in Burma and Bombay only
- Industries

The following reserved subjects were headed by nominated officials, generally Indian Civil Service officers taken from the executive council of the Governor, who were responsible only to the Governor.

**(B) Reserved subjects**

- Police

- Administration of justice
- Irrigation and canals
- Drainage and embankments
- Water storage and water power
- Land revenue administration
- Land improvements and agricultural loans
- Famine relief
- Control of books, newspapers, and printing presses
- Pensions and reformatories
- Borrowing money on the credit of Providence
- Forests except in Bombay and Burma
- Factory inspection
- Settlements of labour disputes
- Industrial insurance and housing

### 1.4 Centre-Province Relations

- Two separate lists were drawn up under the Act for the centre and provinces. The central list included defence, foreign affairs, public debts, tariffs and customs, posts and telegraphs, currency and coinage, communications, civil and criminal law and procedure, major courts, and so on.
- The provincial list included local self-government, public health, sanitation and medical administration, education, public works, water supplies and irrigation, land revenue administration, famine relief, agriculture, forests, co-operative societies, law and order, including justice, police, and jails.
- There was no concurrent list, but all the residuary subjects were to fall within the domain of the centre. In case of doubt, the Governor-General and not the courts decided whether a particular subject did or did not belong to a province.

### 1.5 Demerits of the Act 1919

- Lack of 'collective responsibility' of the Cabinet
- Unnatural division of departments
- Powers of Governors
- Dual check on ministers of transferred subjects

## 2. DELHI PROPOSALS 1927

Delhi Proposals are important because the Muslims showed their willingness to withdraw from separate electorates in return for certain demands, but the Congress missed the opportunity.

"In 1927, Mr. Jinnah was in Delhi regarding the budget session of the Central legislature. On his invitation, 30 eminent Muslims got together at Western Hotel,

Delhi, and prepared a formula for the sake of Hindu-Muslim unity. This formula was later called the Delhi Muslim proposals. Some of the participants were, Raja of Mahmudabad, Maulvi Shafi daudi, Nawab Ismael Khan, Sir Abdur Rahim, Maulana Muhamed Ali, Sir Abdul Qadir, Abdul Mateen Chaudhry, Mian Muhammad Shafi, Sir Zulfikar Ali Khan, Maulvi Muhammad Yaqoob, Syyid Aal-e-Nabi, Anwar ul Azeem, Dr LK Haider, Dr Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari, , Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy and Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan. For the sake of Hindu-Muslim Unity, these Muslim leaders were prepared to forgo their right of separate electorates if only their following demands were met. In case these demands were met, they agreed to accept joint electorates immediately.

1. Sindh should be separated from the Bombay presidency and constituted as a separate province.
2. On the pattern of other provinces, legislative councils should be established in the NWFP and Balochistan.
3. Representation in the legislative assemblies of the Punjab and Bengal should be according to the population.
4. One-third seats in the Central Legislature should be reserved for Muslims." (Ahmad Saeed *Trek to Pakistan*, Institute of Pakistan Historical Research, Lahore, 2002. P. 172.

## 3. SIMON COMMISSION 1928

It was a review commission for the Government of India Act 1919. Both the major parties, the Congress and the AIML, boycotted the commission for not including the natives in it.

According to, on November 26, 1927, the Government announced the appointment of a Statutory Commission which consisted of Sir John Simon (chairman), Viscount Burnham, Baron Strathcona and Mount Royal, Edward Codogan, Veron Hartshorn, Richard Lane-Fox, and Clement Attlee. The Quaid, while criticizing the appointment of an all-whites commission, said, "I cannot even imagine the appointment of a commission which has been given the task of deciding the future constitution of India and its 350 million inhabitants but which does not contain even a single Indian member". He opined that the appointment of a non-Indian commission was fundamentally wrong, which must be responded to with a total boycott. In a telegram to the Punjab Congress Committee, he called for the boycott of the Commission and said, "I believe that treason against India would benefit no community except those who have been given the task of misleading the Indian". In another similar statement, he said, "The Jallianwala Bagh was a physical butchery. The Simon Commission is the butchery of our souls". (Ahmad Saeed, *Trek to Pakistan*, p 178-9.)

The Simon Commission Report was finally published in May 1930. The first volume included Indian communal, constitutional, administrative, financial, and educational systems and an analysis of the problems that India had been facing. The second volume consisted of constitutional reforms/proposals.
The Commission made the following suggestions:

i. The Diarchy system in the provinces should be abolished, and all the portfolios should be handed over to the provincial ministers.
ii. A federal system of government should be introduced in India.
iii. The right to vote should be extended to more people.
iv. An expert committee should be constituted regarding the separation of Sidh from Bombay.
v. The demand of the Frontier for equal status was also neglected.

The Report's biggest bombshell was its hostility to the Muslim demand for majority rule by separate electorates in the Punjab and Bengal. (Ahmad Saeed, *Trek to Pakistan,* p. 184.)

The Executive Board of the All Parties Muslim Conference described the report as "unacceptable for the Muslims of India and retrograde and reactionary in spirit." It demanded that Muslims should be granted a clear majority in Punjab and Bengal, that Sindh should be separated, and that reforms must be introduced in the North Western Frontier and Baluchistan. (Ahmad Saeed, *Trek to Pakistan,* p. 185.)

## 4. ALL PARTIES CONFERENCE

While announcing the formation of the Commission after every ten years, the Secretary of State for India, lord Birkenhead, had challenged the Indians to frame a unanimous constitution. All the political parties accepted the challenge and called for an All Parties Conference in 1928. The conference was attended by the National Liberal Federation, the Hindu Mahasabha, All-India Muslim League, Central Khilafat Committee, Central Sikh League, Home Rule League, and Nationalist Party. In its preliminary meeting, almost a hundred delegates participated, including Pandit Madan Mohan Malavia, Moonji, Tej Bahadur Sapru, Motilal Nehru, Mrs. Sarojni Naidu, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Muhammad Ali Johar, Nawab Ismail Khan, Shoaib Qureshi, Hasrat Mohani, Shafi Daudi, Abdoola Haroon, and the Raja of Mahmudabad. The focal point of the meeting remained the form of the Indian constitution. On this issue, a controversy arose which divided public opinion into two groups; some parties insisted that the constitution should include a declaration of complete independence, while others stressed Dominion Status. After a long discussion, the Conference decided in favour of Dominion Status for India. Another significant development was the formation of a Committee on February 28, 1928, aimed at the investigation of fundamental rights, the right of vote, the position of

Indian States, and whether the nature of the Indian Parliament in the future (unicameral or bicameral). The Conference had to hold a second meeting in 1928, to settle rampant controversies between the Muslims and the Hindus, particularly on issues of separation of Sindh from Bombay, separate electorate, and reservation of seats. The Conference appointed two sub-committees in March 1928, which were supposed to submit their reports in the very next meeting in Bombay.

## 5. PARTING OF THE WAYS: NEHRU REPORT 1929

The Nehru Report was significant in the political and constitutional history of India because it created a wedge between the Muslims and the Hindus. The Report was prepared by the Nehrus, Motilal Lal Nehru as the head of the Committee and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru as Secretary of that. The Committee submitted its report within three months. The Muslims of India reacted sharply to the recommendations of the Nehru Report. Both communities never reconciled after this report, and it proved to be a parting of the ways for both communities.

## 6. EMERGENCE OF MUSLIM REGIONAL PARTIES

Only the provincial part of the Government of India Act 1919 was enforced. This encouraged the emergence of regional parties in India. There was a plethora of new Muslim regional parties, which had important consequences for the national and regional politics in the context of the Muslim community. This trend has also affected the post-partition politics, particularly in Pakistan.

## COMPULSORY READINGS

Saeed, Ahmed and Kh. Mansur Sarwar. *Trek to Pakistan.* Lahore: Institute of Pakistan Historical Research, 2002. (pp. 170–196, 139–144.)

I. H. Qureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan, Karachi: University Press, 2000, pp. 43–49)

## SUGGESTED READINGS

Coupland, Reginald, *The Constitutional Problem in India.* London: Oxford University Press, 1944.

Flynn, Vince. *Transfer of Power.* London: Pocket, 2003.

Sarkar, Sumit. *Modern India: 1885-1947.* Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989.

Sherwani, Latif Ahmed. ed. *Pakistan in Making.* Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1987.

Wasti, Syed Razi. *Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist Movement.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964.

## SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS

1. Describe the system of government introduced at the centre in the Government of India Act 1919.
2. Examine the merits and demerits of the System of Dyarchy introduced in the Government of India Act 1919.
3. Analyze the emergence of Muslim regional parties after the enforcement of the Government of India Act 1919 and its far-reaching consequences on the All-India level Muslim politics.
4. Examine the major objections of the Muslims to the provisions of the Nehru Report.
5. Why did the Muslim League offer to withdraw from separate electorates in Delhi Proposals in 1927?
6. What were the key features of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms (1919), and how did they impact Indian governance?
7. What was the dyarchy system, and why was it criticized by Indian political leaders?
8. What were the main demands outlined in the Delhi Proposals (1927), and why were they significant for Muslim political rights?
9. How did the Simon Commission's formation and recommendations contribute to political unrest in India?
10. What was the purpose of the All Parties Conference (1928), and what challenges did it face?
11. Why did Muslim leaders reject the Nehru Report (1928), and what alternative proposals did they offer?
12. How did Muslim regional parties influence the political landscape of British India?
13. What were the key differences between the All India Muslim League and regional Muslim political groups?
14. How did the constitutional developments between 1919 and 1928 shape the future demands of Muslims in India?
15. In what ways did the rejection of the Nehru Report contribute to the growing divide between Hindus and Muslims?

**Unit–04**

# CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS OF THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY

*Written by:* **Dr. Fozia Umar**
*Reviewed by:* **Dr. Kausar Parveen**

# CONTENTS


| | | Page # |
|---|---|---|
| Introduction | | 43 |
| Objectives and Learning Outcomes | | 44 |
| 1. | Jinnah's Fourteen Points | 56 |
| 2. | Allama Iqbal's Address of Allahabad | 46 |
| 3. | Round Table Conference 1930–32 | 61 |
| 4. | Student Activities in Cambridge | 64 |
| 5. | Iqbal-Jinnah Correspondence | 65 |
| Compulsory Readings | | 67 |
| Suggested Readings | | 67 |
| Self-Assessment Questions | | 68 |

# INTRODUCTION

The late 1920s and early 1930s were a crucial period in the political struggle of Indian Muslims. Faced with increasing marginalization in a Hindu-majority India and the failure of constitutional reforms to address their concerns, Muslim leaders proposed alternative frameworks to safeguard their political, religious, and cultural rights. This unit explores the key constitutional proposals put forward by the Muslim community, including Jinnah's Fourteen Points (1929), the Allahabad Address (1930), the Round Table Conferences (1930-1932), student activities in Cambridge, and the Iqbal-Jinnah Correspondence (1936-1937).

In response to the Nehru Report (1928), which ignored Muslim demands, Muhammad Ali Jinnah presented his famous Fourteen Points (1929), outlining the essential conditions for Muslim political rights in India. This became a foundational document for future negotiations. Shortly after, Allama Iqbal's Allahabad Address (1930) took a more radical approach by envisioning a separate Muslim state in the northwest of India, an idea that later shaped the Pakistan Movement.

The Round Table Conferences (1930-1932), convened by the British government, were an effort to resolve constitutional disagreements. These conferences saw major debates over separate electorates, federalism, and Muslim autonomy. At the same time, Muslim students and intellectuals studying in Cambridge played an influential role in advocating for Muslim nationalism, further strengthening the ideological basis for a separate Muslim state.

The Iqbal-Jinnah Correspondence (1936-1937) was another milestone in shaping the course of Muslim politics. In these letters, Allama Iqbal persuaded Jinnah to take up the cause of Muslim self-determination, reinforcing the idea that Muslims needed an independent state to protect their identity.

By studying these constitutional proposals, students will understand the transition from demands for safeguards within a united India to the articulation of a separate Muslim homeland.

## OBJECTIVES

After the study of this unit, you will be able to:

1. Understand the key demands made by Jinnah and their significance in shaping Muslim political aspirations in Jinnah's Fourteen Points.
2. Evaluate Iqbal's vision of a separate Muslim state and its impact on future political developments.
3. Assess the objectives, key discussions, and outcomes of the Round Table Conferences from a Muslim perspective.
4. Explore the role of Muslim students in Cambridge in shaping nationalist thought and political discourse.
5. Analyze the content of the Jinnah Iqbal Correspondence and its influence on Jinnah's leadership and the Muslim League's direction.

## LEARNING OUTCOMES

After the study of this unit, you will be able to:

1. Discuss Jinnah's Fourteen Points and their impact on Muslim political strategy.
2. Analyze how Iqbal's vision influenced the ideological foundation of the Pakistan Movement.
3. Discuss the impact of the Round Table Conferences on the politics of India.
4. Explain how student activism in Cambridge contributed to the political awakening of Muslims in India.
5. Examine how Iqbal's ideas influenced Jinnah's decision to lead the demand for Pakistan.
6. Relate these constitutional proposals to later events, including the Lahore Resolution (1940) and the eventual creation of Pakistan engaging Through discussions, debates, and written reflections, students will develop critical thinking skills and historical empathy, recognizing and understanding diverse perspectives on "The Crown Takes Charge" and its consequences for British India.

# 1. JINNAH'S FOURTEEN POINTS 1929

The Nehru Report fruitfully resulted in the harmony of alienated Muslim groups. On March 28, 1929, a meeting of the Council of the India Muslim League was held. Both sections of the (Shafi) League and (Jinnah) League joined that. Quaid-i-Azam called the Nehru Report *a Hindu document*, but he measured simply that rejection of the report was not enough. He decided to offer an alternative Muslim response, later called Jinnah's Fourteen Points. (see also Ahmad Saeed's *Trek to Pakistan*, pp. 197–99.)

1. The form of the future constitution should be federal, with the residuary powers vested in the provinces.
2. A uniform measure of autonomy shall be granted to all provinces.
3. All legislatures in the country and other elected bodies shall be constituted on the definite principle of adequate and effective representation of minorities in every province without reducing the majority in any province to a minority or even equality.
4. In the Central Legislative, Muslim representation shall not be less than one-third.
5. Representation of communal groups shall continue to be by means of a separate electorate as at present, provided it shall be open to any community at any time to abandon its separate electorate in favor of a joint electorate.
6. Any territorial distribution that might at any time be necessary shall not in any way affect the Muslim majority in the Punjab, Bengal, and the North West Frontier Province.
7. Full religious liberty, i.e., liberty of belief, worship and observance, propaganda, association and education, shall be guaranteed to all communities.
8. No bill or any resolution or any part thereof shall be passed in any legislature or any other elected body if three-fourth of the members of any community in that particular body oppose such a bill resolution or part thereof on the ground that it would be injurious to the interests of that community or in the alternative, such other method is devised as may be found feasible and practicable to deal with such cases.
9. Sindh should be separated from the Bombay presidency.
10. Reforms should be introduced in the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan on the same footing as in the other provinces.
11. Provision should be made in the constitution giving Muslims an adequate share, along with the other Indians, in all the services of the state and in local self-governing bodies, having due regard to the requirements of efficiency.
12. The constitution should embody adequate safeguards for the protection of Muslim culture and for the protection and promotion of Muslim education, language, religion, personal laws, and Muslim charitable institutions, and for

their due share in the grants-in-aid given by the state and by local self-governing bodies.

13. No cabinet, either central or provincial, should be formed without there being a proportion of at least one-third Muslim ministers.
14. No change shall be made in the constitution by the Central Legislature except with the concurrence of the State's contribution to the Indian Federation.

The council of the All India Muslim League not only approved the fourteen points of Jinnah but also resolved that '*no scheme for the future constitution of the Government of India would be acceptable to the Muslims unless and until it included the demands of Jinnah, presented in the fourteen points*'.

## 2. ALLAMA IQBAL'S ADDRESS OF ALLAHABAD

Allama Iqbal's Presidential address in 1930 is very significant as he proposed a separate homeland from the platform of a political party. Before that, this demand was coming from people in their private capacity. You can study the original address as follows.

*The following extensive address of Dr. Mohammad Iqbal is usually considered to be the first clear exposition of the idea of Pakistan. Iqbal argued that religion provides a more ethical identity than geographical patriotism, and therefore he would "like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-Government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire..." The word Pakistan did not exist at that time, as it was coined later by Rahmat Ali in his pamphlet* ***Now or Never*** *(he insisted that his scheme was different from Iqbal's).*

*Delivered by Dr. Mohammad Iqbal at the Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League, held at Allahabad in 1930*

***Gentlemen,***

*I am deeply grateful to you for the honour you have conferred upon me in inviting me to preside over the deliberations of the All-India Muslim League at one of the most critical moments in the history of Muslim political thought and activity in India. I have no doubt that in this great assembly there are men whose "political experience is far more extensive than mine, and for whose knowledge of affairs I have the highest respect. It will, therefore, be presumptuous on my part to claim to guide an assembly of such men in the political decisions which they are called upon to make to-day. I lead no party; I follow no leader. I have given the best part of my life to a careful study of Islam, its law and policy, its culture, its history, and its literature. This constant contact with the spirit of Islam, as it unfolds itself in time, has, I think, given me a kind of insight into its significance as a world-fact. It is in the light of this insight, whatever its value, that, while assuming that the Muslims of India are determined to remain true to the spirit of Islam, I propose, not to guide you in your decisions, but to attempt the humbler task of bringing clearly to your*

*consciousness the main principle which, in my opinion, should determine the general character of these decisions.*

***Islam and Nationalism***

*It cannot be denied that Islam, regarded as an ethical ideal plus a certain kind of polity - by which expression I mean a social structure, regulated by a legal system and animated by a specific ethical ideal - has been the chief formative factor in the life-history of the Muslims of India. It has furnished those basic emotions and loyalties which gradually unify scattered individuals and groups, and finally transform them into a well-defined people, possessing a moral consciousness of their own. Indeed it is no exaggeration to say that India is perhaps the only country in the world where Islam, as a people-building force, has worked at its best. In India, as elsewhere, the structure of Islam as a society is almost entirely due to the working of Islam as a culture inspired by a specific ethical ideal. What I mean to say is that Muslim society, with its remarkable homogeneity and inner unity, has grown to be what it is, under the pressure of the laws and institutions associated with the culture of Islam. The ideas set free by European political thinking, however, are now rapidly changing the outlook of the present generation of Muslims both in India and outside India. Our younger men inspired by these ideas, are anxious to see them as living forces in their own countries, without any critical appreciation of the facts which have determined their evolution in Europe. In Europe, Christianity was understood to be a purely monastic order which gradually developed into a vast Church-organisation. The protest of Luther was directed against this Church-organisation, not against any system of polity of a secular nature, for the obvious reason that there was no such polity associated with Christianity. And Luther was perfectly justified in rising in revolt against this organisation; though, I think, he did not realize that in the peculiar conditions which obtained in Europe his revolt would eventually mean the complete displacement of universal ethics of Jesus by the growth of a plurality of national and hence narrower systems of ethics. Thus the upshot of the intellectual movement initiated by such men as Rousseau and Luther was the break-up of the one into a mutually ill-adjusted many, the transformation of a human into a national outlook, requiring a more realistic foundation, such as the notion of country, and finding expression through varying systems of polity evolved on national lines, i.e., on lines which recognize territory as the only principle of political solidarity. If you begin with the conception of religion as complete other-worldliness, then what has happened to Christianity in Europe is perfectly natural. The universal ethics of Jesus is displaced by national systems of ethics and polity. The conclusion to which Europe is consequently driven is that religion is a private affair of the individual, and has nothing to do with what is called man's temporal life. Islam does not bifurcate the unity of man into an irreconcilable duality of spirit and matter. In Islam God and the universe, spirit and matter, church and state, are organic to each other. Man is not the citizen of a profane world to be renounced in the interest of a world of spirit situated, elsewhere. To Islam matter is spirit realizing itself in space and time. Europe uncritically accepted the duality of spirit and matter probably from Mannichaean thought. Her best thinkers are realizing this initial mistake to-day, but her statesmen are indirectly forcing the world to accept it as an unquestionable dogma. It is, then, this mistaken separation of spiritual and*

*temporal which has largely influenced European religious and political thought, and has resulted practically in the total exclusion of Christianity from the life of European states. The result is a set of mutually ill-adjusted states dominated by interests, not human but national. And these mutually ill-adjusted states, after trampling over the moral and religious convictions of Christianity, are to-day feeling the need of a federated Europe, i.e. the need of a unity which the Christian Church-organisation originally gave them, but which, instead of reconstructing in the light of Christ's vision of human brotherhood, they considered it fit to destroy under the inspiration of Luther. A Luther in the world of Islam, however, is an impossible phenomenon; for here there is no Church-organisation, similar to that of Christianity in the middle ages, inviting a destroyer. In the world of Islam we have a universal polity whose fundamentals are believed to have been revealed, but whose structure, owing to our legists' want of contact with the modern world, stands to-day in need of renewed power by fresh adjustments. I do not know what will be the final fate of the national idea in the world of Islam, whether Islam will assimilate and transform it, as it has assimilated and transformed before many ideas expressive of a different spirit, or allow a radical transformation of its own structure by the force of this idea, is hard to predict. Professor Wensinck of Leiden (Holland) wrote to me the other day: "It seems to me that Islam is entering upon a crisis through which Christianity has been passing for more than a century. The great difficulty is how to save the foundations of religion when many antiquated notions have to be given up. It seems to me scarcely possible to state what the outcome will be for Christianity, still less what it will be for Islam." At the present moment the national idea is racialising the outlook of Muslims, and thus materially counteracting the humanising work of Islam. And the growth of racial consciousness may mean the growth of standards different and even opposed to the standards of Islam. I hope you will pardon me for this apparently academic discussion. To address this session of the All-India Muslim League you have selected a man who is not despaired of Islam as a living force for freeing the outlook of man from its geographical limitations, who believes that religion is a power of the utmost importance in the life of individuals as well as states, and finally who believes that Islam is itself Destiny and will not suffer a destiny! Such a man cannot but look at matters from his own point of view. Do not think that the problem I am indicating is a purely theoretical one. It is a very living and practical problem calculated to affect the very fabric of Islam as a system of life and conduct. On a proper solution of it alone depends your future as a distinct cultural unit in India. Never in our history Islam has had to stand a greater trial than the one which confronts it to-day. It is open to a people to modify, reinterpret or reject the foundational principles of their social structure; but it is absolutely necessary for them to see clearly what they are doing before they undertake to try a fresh experiment. Nor should the way in which I am approaching this important problem lead anybody to think that I intend to quarrel with those who happen to think differently. You are a Muslim assembly and, I suppose, anxious to remain true to the spirit and ideals of Islam. My sole desire, therefore, is to tell you frankly what I honestly believe to be the truth about the present situation. In this way alone it is possible for me to illuminate, according to my light, the avenues of your political action.*

***The Question of Unity***

*What, then, is the problem and its implications? Is religion a private affair? Would you like to see Islam, as a moral and political idea, meeting the same fate in the world of Islam as Christianity has already met in Europe? Is it possible to retain Islam as an ethical ideal and to reject it as a polity in favour of national politics in which religious attitude is not permitted to play any part? This question becomes of special importance in India where the Muslims happen to be in a minority. The proposition that religion is a private individual experience is not surprising on the lips of a European. In Europe the conception of Christianity as a monastic order, renouncing the world of matter and fixing its gaze entirely on the world of spirit, led, by a logical process of thought, to the view embodied in this proposition. The nature of the Prophet's religious experience, as disclosed in the Quran, however, is wholly different. It is not mere experience in the sense of a purely biological event, happening inside the experiment and necessitating no reactions on its social environment. It is individual experience creative of a social order. Its immediate outcome is the fundamentals of a polity with implicit legal concepts whose civic significance cannot be belittled merely because their origin is revelational. The religious ideal of Islam, therefore, is organically related to the social order which it has created. The rejection, of the one will eventually involve the rejection of the other. Therefore, the construction of a polity on national lines, if it means a displacement of the Islamic principle of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim. This is a matter which at the present moment directly concerns the Muslims of India. "Man," says Renan, "is enslaved neither by his race nor by his religion, nor by the course of rivers, nor by the direction of mountain ranges. A great aggregation of men, sane of mind and warm of heart, creates a moral consciousness which is called a nation." Such a formation is quite possible, though it involves the long and arduous process of practically re-making men and furnishing them with a fresh emotional equipment It might have been a fact in India if the teachings of Kabir and the Divine Faith of Akbar had seized the imagination of the masses of this country. Experience, however, shows that the various caste units and religious units in India have shown no inclination to sink their respective individualities in a larger whole. Each group is intensely jealous of its collective existence. The formation of the kind of moral consciousness which constitutes the essence of a nation in Renan's sense demands a price which the peoples of India are not prepared to pay. The unity of an Indian nation, therefore, must be sought, not in the negation, but in the mutual harmony and co-operation of the many. True statesmanship cannot ignore facts, however unpleasant they may be. The only practical course is not to assume the existence of a state of things which does not exist, but to recognise facts as they are, and to exploit them to our greatest advantage. And it is on the discovery of Indian unity in this direction that the fate of India as well as of Asia really depends. India is Asia in miniature. Part of her people have cultural affinities with nations in the East, and part with nations in the middle and west of Asia. If an effective principle of co-operation is discovered in India it will bring peace and mutual goodwill to this ancient land which has suffered so long, more because of her situation in historic space than because of any inherent incapacity of her people. And it will at the same time solve the entire political problem of Asia.*

*It is, however, painful to observe that our attempts to discover such a principle of internal harmony have so far failed. Why have they failed? Perhaps, we suspect each other's intentions, and inwardly aim at dominating each other. Perhaps, in the higher interests of mutual co-operation, we cannot afford to part with monopolies which circumstances have placed in our hands, and conceal our egoism under the cloak of a nationalism, outwardly simulating a large-hearted patriotism, but inwardly as narrow-minded as a caste or a tribe. Perhaps, we are unwilling to recognize that each group has a right to free development according to its own cultural traditions. But whatever may be the causes of our failure, I still feel hopeful. Events seem to be tending in the direction of some sort of internal harmony. And as far as I have been able to read the Muslim mind, I have no hesitation in declaring that, if the principle that the Indian Muslim is entitled to full and free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own Indian home-lands is recognized as the basis of a permanent communal settlement, he will be ready to stake his all for the freedom of India. The principle that each group is entitled to free development on its own lines is not inspired by any feeling of narrow communalism. There are communalisms and communalisms. A community which is inspired by feeling of ill-will towards other communities is low and ignoble. I entertain the highest respect for the customs, laws, religious and social institutions of other communities. Nay, it is my duty, according to the teachings of the Quran, even to defend their places of worship if need be. Yet I love the communal group which is source of my life and behaviour; and which has formed me what l am by giving me its religion, its literature, its thought, its culture, and thereby recreating its whole past, as a living operative factor, in my present consciousness. Even the authors of the Nehru Report recognise the value of this higher aspect of communalism. While discussing the separation of Sind they say: 'To say from the larger view-point of nationalism that no communal provices should be created is, in a way, equivalent to saying from the still wider international viewpoint that there should be no separate nations. Both these statements have a measure of truth in them. Both the staunchest internationalist recognises that without the fullest national autonomy it is extraordinarily difficult to pirate the international state. So also without the fullest cultural autonomy, and communalism in its better aspect is culture, it will be difficult to create a harmonious nation."*

***Muslim India within India***

*Communalism, in its higher aspect, then, is indispensable to the formation of a harmonious whole in a country like India. The units of Indian society are not territorial as in European countries. India is a continent in human groups belonging to different races, speaking different languages and professing different religions. Their behaviour is not at all determined by a common race consciousness. Even the Hindus do not form a homogeneous group. The principle of European democracy cannot be applied to India without recognising the fact of communal groups. The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified. The resolution of the All-Parties Muslim Conference at Delhi is, to my mind, wholly inspired by this noble ideal of a harmonious whole which, instead of stiffling the respective individualities of its component wholes, affords them chances of fully working out the possibilities that may be latent in them. And I have no doubt that this house will emphatically endorse*

*the Muslim demands embodied in this resolution. Personally I would go further than the demands embodied in it. I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-Government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of the North-West India. The proposal was put forward before the Nehru Committee. They rejected it on the ground that, if carried into effect, it would give a very unwieldy state. This is true in so far as the area is concerned; in point of population the state contemplated by the proposal would be much less than some of the present Indian provinces. The exclusion of Ambala Division and perhaps of some districts where non-Muslims predominate, will make it less extensive and more Muslim in population - so that the exclusion suggested will enable this consolidated state to give a more effective protection to non-Muslim minorities within its area. The idea need not alarm the Hindus or the British. India is the greatest Muslim country in the world. The life of Islam as a cultural force in this country very largely depends on its centralisation in a specified territory. This centralisation of the most living portion of the Muslims of India whose military and police service has, notwithstanding unfair treatment from the British, made the British rule possible in this country, will eventually solve the problem of India as well as of Asia. It will intensify their sense of responsibility and deepen their patriotic feelings. Thus, possessing full opportunity of development within the body-politic of India, the North-West Indian Muslims will prove the best defenders of India against a foreign invasion, be that invasion the one of ideas or of bayonets. The Punjab with fifty-six per cent Muslim population supplies fifty-four per cent of the total combatant troops in the Indian Army, and if the nineteen thousand Gurkhas recruited from the independent state of Nepal are excluded, the Punjab contingent amounts to sixty two per cent of the whole Indian Army. This percentage does not take into account nearly six thousand combatants supplied to the Indian Army by the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. From this you can easily calculate the possibilities of the North-West Indian Muslims in regard to the defence of India against foreign aggression. The Right Hon'ble Mr. Srinivasa Sastri thinks that the Muslim demand for the creation of autonomous Muslim states along with North-West border is actuated by a desire "to acquire means of exerting pressure in emergencies on the Government of India." I may frankly tell him that the Muslim demand is not actuated by the kind of motive he imputes to us; it is actuated by a genuine desire for free development which is practically impossible under the type of unitary government contemplated by the nationalist Hindu politicians with a view to secure permanent communal dominance in the whole of India.*

*Nor should the Hindus fear that the creation of autonomous Muslim states will mean the introduction of a kind of religious rule in such states. I have already indicated to you the meaning of the word religion, as applied to Islam. The truth is that Islam is not a church. It is state, conceived as a contractual organism long before Rousseau ever thought of such a thing, and animated by an ethical ideal which regards man not as an earth-rooted creature, defined by this or that portion of the earth, but as a spiritual being understood in terms of a social mechanism, and possessing rights and duties as a living factor in that mechanism. The character*

*of a Muslim state can be judged from what the Times of India pointed out sometime ago in a leader on the Indian Banking Inquiry Committee. "In ancient India," the paper points out, "the state framed laws regulating the rates of interest; but in Muslim times, although Islam clearly forbids the realization of interest on money loaned, Indian Muslim states imposed no restrictions on such rates." I, therefore, demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim state in the best interests of India and Islam. For India it means security and peace resulting from the internal balance of power; for Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian Imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilize its law, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and with the spirit of modern times.*

***Federal States***

*Thus it is clear that in view of India's infinite variety in climates, races, languages, creeds and social systems, the creation of autonomous states, based on the unity of language, race, history, religion and identity of economic interests, is the only possible way to secure a stable constitutional structure in India. The conception of federation underlying the Simon Report necessitates the abolition of the Central Legislative Assembly as a popular assembly, and makes it an assembly of the representatives of federal states. It further demands a redistribution of territory on the lines which I have indicated. And the Report does recommend both. I give my whole-hearted support to this view of the matter, and venture to suggest that the redistribution recommended in the Simon Report must fulfil two conditions. It must precede the introduction of the new constitution, and must be so devised as to finally solve the communal problem. Proper redistribution will make the question of joint and separate electorates automatically disappear from the constitutional controversy of India. It is the present structure of the provinces that is largely responsible for this controversy. The Hindu thinks that separate electorates are contrary to the spirit of true nationalism, because he understands the word nation to mean a kind of universal amalgamation in which no communal entity ought to retain its private individuality. Such a state of things, however does not exist Nor is it desirable that it should exist. India is the land of racial and religious variety. And to this, the general economic inferiority of the Muslims, their enormous debt, especially in the Punjab, and their insufficient majorities in some of the provinces as at present constituted, and you will begin to see clearly the meaning of our anxiety to retain separate electorates. In such a country and in such circumstances, territorial electorates cannot secure adequate representation of all interests, and must inevitably lead to the creation of an oligarchy. The Muslims of India can have no objection to purely territorial electorates if provinces are demarcated so as to secure comparatively homogeneous communities possessing linguistic, racial, cultural and religious unity.*

***Federation as understood in Simon Report***

*But in so far as the question of the powers of the Central Federal States is concerned, there is a subtle difference of motive in the constitutions proposed by the Pundits of India and the Pundits of England. The Pundits of India do not disturb the central authority as it stands at present. All that they desire is that this authority*

*should become fully responsible to the Central Legislature which they maintain intact, and where their majority will become further reinforced on the nominated element ceasing to exist. The Pundits of England, on the other hand, realizing that democracy in the centre tends to work contrary to their interests, and is likely to absorb the whole power now in their hands, in case a further advance is made towards responsible government, have shifted the experiment of democracy from the centre to the provinces. No doubt, they introduce the principle of federation and appear to have made a beginning by making certain proposals, yet their evaluation of this principle is determined by considerations wholly different to those which determine its value in the eyes of Muslim India. The Muslims demand federation because it is pre-eminently a solution of India's most difficult problem i.e. the communal problem. The Royal Commissioners' view of federation, though sound in principle, does not seem to aim at responsible government for federal states. Indeed it does not go beyond providing means of escape from the situation which the introduction of democracy in India has created for the British, and wholly disregards the communal problem by leaving it where it was.*

*Thus it is clear that, in so far as real federation is concerned, the Simon Report virtually negatives the principle of federation in its true significance. The Nehru Report realizing Hindu majority in the Central Assembly reaches a unitary form of government because such an institution secures Hindu dominance throughout India; the Simon .Report retains the present British dominance behind the thin veneer of an unreal federation, partly because the British are naturally unwilling to part with the power they have so long wielded, and partly because it is possible for them, in the absence of an inter-communal understanding in India, to make out a plausible case for the retention of that power in their own hands. To my mind a unitary form of Government is simply unthinkable in a self-governing India. What is called 'residuary powers' must be left entirely to self-governing states, the Central Federal State exercising only those powers which are expressly vested in it by the free consent of federal states. I would never advise the Muslims of India to agree to a system, whether of British or of Indian origin, which virtually negatives the principle of true federation, or fails to recognize them as a distinct political entity.*

***Federal Scheme***

*The necessity for a structural change in the Central Government was seen probably long before the British discovered the most effective means for introducing this change. That is why at a rather late stage it was announced that the participation of the Indian Princes in the Round Table Conference was essential. It was a kind of surprise to the people of India, particularly the minoritiies, to see the Indian Princes dramatically expressing their willingness at the Round Table Conference to join an All-India Federation and, as a result of their declaration, Hindu delegates - uncompromising advocates of a unitary form of government - quietly agreeing to the evolution of a federal scheme. Even Mr. Sastri who, only a few days before, had severely criticised Sir John Simon for recommending a federal scheme for India, suddenly became a convert and admitted his conversion in the plenary session of the Conference - thus offering the Prime Minister of England an occasion*

*for one of his wittiest observations in his concluding speech. All this has a meaning both for the British who have sought the participation of the Indian Princes, and the Hindus who have unhesitatingly accepted the evolution of an All-India Federation. The truth is that the participation of the Indian Princes - among whom only a few are Muslims - in a federation scheme serves a double purpose. On the one hand it serves as an all-important factor in maintaining the British power in India practically as it is, on the other hand it gives overwhelming majority to the Hindus in an All-India Federal Assembly. It appears to me that the Hindu-Muslim differences regarding the ultimate form of the Central Government are being cleverly exploited by British politicians through the agency of the Princes who see in the scheme prospects of better security for their despotic rule. If the Muslims silently agree to any such scheme it will simply hasten their end as a political entity in India. The policy of the Indian Federation, thus created, will be practically controlled by Hindu Princes forming the largest group in the Central Federal Assembly. They will always lend their support to the Crown in matters of Imperial concern; and in so far as internal administration of the country is concerned they will help in maintaining and strengthening the supremacy of the Hindus. In other words the scheme appears to be aiming at a kind of understanding between Hindu India and the British Imperialism -you perpetuate me in India, and I in return give you a Hindu oligarchy to keep all other Indian communities in perpetual subjection. If therefore the British Indian provinces are not transformed into really autonomous states, the Princes' participation in a scheme of Indian federation will be interpreted only as a dexterous move on the part of British politicians to satisfy, without parting with any real power, all parties concerned - Muslims with the word federation, Hindus with a majority in the centre, and British Imperialists - whether Tory or Labourite - with the substance of real power.*

*The number of Hindu States in India is far greater than Muslim states; and it remains to be seen how the Muslim demand for 33 per cent seats in the Central Federal Assembly is to be met within a House or Houses constituted of representatives taken from British India as well as Indian states. I hope the Muslim delegates are fully aware of the implications of the federal scheme as discussed in the Round Table Conference. The question of Muslim representation in the proposed All-India Federation has not yet been discussed. "The interim report", says Renter's summary, "contemplates two chambers in the Federal Legislature - each containing representatives both of British India and States, the proportion of which will be a matter of subsequent consideration under the heads which have not yet been referred to the Sub-Committee." In my opinion the question of proportion is of the utmost importance, and ought to have been considered simultaneously with the main question of the structure of the Assembly.*

*The best course, I think, would have been to start with a British Indian Federation only. A federal scheme born of an unholy union between democracy and despotism cannot but keep British India in the same vicious circle of a unitary Central Government. Such a unitary form may be of the greatest advantage to the British, to the majority community in British India and to the Indian Princes; it can be of no advantage to the Muslims unless they get majority rights in five out of eleven Indian Provinces with full residuary powers, and one-third share of seats in the*

*total House of the Federal Assembly. In so far as the attainment of sovereign powers by the British Indian Provinces is concerned the position of H.H. the Ruler of Bhopal, Sir Akbar Hydari and Mr. Jinnah is unassailable. In view, however, of the participation of the Princes in the Indian Federation we must now see our demand for representation in the British Indian Assembly in a new light. The question is not one of Muslim share in a British Indian Assembly, but one which relates to representation of British Indian Muslims in an All-India Federal Assembly. Our demand for 33 per cent must now be taken as a demand for the same proportion in the All-India Federal Assembly exclusive of the share allotted to the Muslim states entering the Federation.*

***Problem of Defence***

*The other difficult problem which confronts the successful working of a federal system in India is the problem of India's defence. In their discussion of this problem the Royal Commissioners have marshalled all the deficiencies of India in order to make out a case for Imperial administration of the army. "India and Britain," say the Commissioners, "are so related that India's defence cannot now or in any future which is within sight, be regarded as a matter of purely Indian concern. The control and direction of such an army must rest in the hands of agents of the Imperial Government. Now, does it necessarily follow from this that further progress towards the realization of responsible Government in British India is barred until the work of defence can be adequately discharged without the help of British officers and British troops? As things are, there is a block on the line of constitutional advance. All hopes of evolution in the Central Government towards the ultimate goal described in the declaration of 20th August 1917 are in danger of being indefinitely frustrated if the attitude illustrated by the Nehru Report is maintained that any future change involves the putting of the administration of the army under the authority of an elected Indian Legislature." Further to fortify their argument they emphasise the fact of competing religions and rival races of widely different capacity, and try to make the problem look insoluble by remarking that "the obvious fact, that India is not, in the ordinary and natural sense, a single nation is nowhere made more plain than in considering the difference between the martial races of India and the rest." These features of the question have been emphasised in order to demonstrate that the British are not only keeping India secure from foreign menace but are also the "neutral guardians of internal security. However, in federated India, as I understand federation, the problem will have only one aspect, i.e. external defence. Apart from provincial armies necessary for maintaining internal peace, the Indian Federal Congress can maintain, on the North-West Frontier, a strong Indian Frontier Army, composed of units recruited from all provinces and officered by efficient and experienced military men taken from all communities. I know that India is not in possession of efficient military officers, and this fact is exploited by the Royal Commissioners in the interest of an argument for Imperial administration. On this point I cannot but quote another passage from the Report which, to my mind, furnishes the best argument against the position taken up by the Commissioners. "At the present moment," says the Report, "no Indian holding the King's Commission is of higher army rank than a captain. There are, we believe, 39 captains of whom 25 are in ordinary regimental*

*employ. Some of them are of an age which would prevent their attaining much higher rank, even if they passed the necessary examination before retirement. Most of these have not been through Sandhurst, but got their Commissions during the Great War. Now, however genuine may be the desire, and however earnest the endeavour to work for this transformation the overriding conditions so forcibly expressed by the Skeen Committee (whose members, apart from the Chairman and the Army Secretary, were Indian gentlemen) in the words, "Progress....must be contingent upon success being 'secured at each stage and upon military efficiency being maintained throughout must in any case render such development measured and slow. A higher command cannot be evolved at short notice out of existing cadres of Indian officers, all of junior ranks and limited experience. Not until the slender trickle of suitable Indian recruits for the officer class - and we earnestly desire an increase in their numbers - flows in much greater volume, not until sufficient Indians have attained the experience and training requisite to provide all the officers for, at any rate, some Indian regiments, not until such units have stood the only test which can possibly determine their efficiency, and not until Indian officers have qualified by a successful army career for high command, will it be possible to develop the policy of Indianisation to a point which will bring a completely Indianised army within sight. Even then years must elapse before the process could be completed."*

*Now I venture to ask who is responsible for the present state of things? Is it due to some inherent incapacity of our martial races or to the slowness of the process of military training? The military capacity of our martial races is undeniable. The process of military training may be slow as compared to other processes of human training. I am no military expert to judge this matter. But as a layman I feel that the argument, as stated, assumes the process to be practically endless. This means perpetual bondage for India, and makes it all the more necessary that the Frontier Army, as suggested by the Nehru Report, be entrusted to the charge of a committee of defence the personnel of which may be settled by mutual understanding.*

*Again it is significant that the Simon Report has given extraordinary importance to the question of India's land frontier, but has made only passing references to its naval position. India has doubtless had to face invasions from her land frontier; but it is obvious that her present masters took possession of her on account of her defenceless sea coast. A self-governing and free India, will, in these days have to take greater care of her sea coast than her land frontiers.*

*I have no doubt that if a Federal Government is established, Muslim federal states will willingly agree, for purposes of India's defence, to the creation of neutral Indian military and naval forces. Such a neutral military force for the defence of India was a reality in the days of Mughal Rule. Indeed in the time of Akbar the Indian frontier was, on the whole, defended by armies officered by Hindu generals. I am perfectly sure that the scheme of a neutral Indian army, based on a federated India, will intensify Muslim patriotic feeling, and finally set at rest the suspicion, if any, of Indian Muslims joining Muslims from beyond the frontier in the event of any invasion.*

***The Alternative***

*I have thus tried briefly to indicate the way in which the Muslims of India ought, in my opinion, to look at the two most important constitutional problems of India. A redistribution of British India, calculated to secure a permanent solution of the communal problem, is the main demand of the Muslims of India. If, however, the Muslim demand of a territorial solution of the communal problem is ignored, then I support, as emphatically as possible, the Muslim demands repeatedly urged by the All-India Muslim League and the All-India Muslim Conference. The Muslims of India cannot agree to any constitutional changes which affect their majority rights, to be secured by separate electorates, in the Punjab and Bengal, or fail to guarantee them 33 per cent representation in any Central Legislature. There were two pitfalls into which Muslim political leaders fell. The first was the repudiated Lucknow Pact which originated in a false view of Indian nationalism, and deprived the Muslims of India from chances of acquiring any political power in India. The second is the narrow-visioned sacrifice of Islamic solidarity in the interest of what may be called Punjab Ruralism resulting in a proposal which virtually reduces the Punjab Muslims to a position of minority. It is the duty of the League to condemn both the Pact and the proposal.*

*The Simon Report does great injustice to the Muslims in not recommending a statutory majority for the Punjab and Bengal. It would either make the Muslims stick to the Lucknow Pact or agree to a scheme of joint electorates. Despatch of the Government of India on the Simon Report admits that since the publication of that document the Muslim community has not expressed its willingness to accept any of the alternatives proposed by the Report. The despatch recognizes that it may be a legitimate grievance to deprive the Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal of representation in the councils in proportion to their population merely because of weightage allowed to Muslim minorities elsewhere. But the despatch of the Government of India fails to correct the injustice of the Simon Report. In so far as the Punjab is concerned - and this is the most crucial point - it endorses the so-called 'carefully balanced scheme' worked out by the official members of the Punjab Government which the Punjab Muslims a majority of two over the Hindus and Sikhs combined, and a proportion of 49 per cent of the Houses as a whole. It is obvious that the Punjab Muslims cannot be satisfied with less than a clear majority in the total House. However, Lord Irwin and his Government do recognize that the justification for communal electorates for majority communities would not cease unless a two-third majority of the Muslim members in a provincial council unanimously agree to surrender the right of separate representation. I cannot however understand why the Government of India, having recognized the legitimacy of Muslim grievance, have not had the courage to recommend a statutory majority for the Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal.*

*Nor can the Muslims of India agree to any such changes which fail to create at least Sind as a separate province and treat the North-West Frontier Province as a province of inferior political status. I see no reason why Sind should not be united with Baluchistan and turned into a separate province. It has nothing in common with the Bombay Presidency. In point and civilization the Royal Commissioners*

*find it more akin to Mesopotamia and Arabia than India. The Muslim geographer Mas'udi noticed this kinship long ago when he said, "Sind is a country nearer to the dominions of Islam." The first Omayyad ruler is reported to have said of Egypt: "Egypt has her back towards Africa and face towards Arabia." With necessary alterations the same remark describes the exact situation of Sind. She has her back towards India and face towards Central Asia. Considering further the nature of her agricultural problems which can invoke no sympathy from the Bombay Government, and her infinite commercial possibilities, dependent on the inevitable growth of Karachi into a second metropolis of India, it is unwise to keep her attached to a Presidency which, though friendly to-day, is likely to become a rival at no distant period. Financial difficulties, we are told, stand in the way of separation. I do not know of any definite authoritative pronouncement on the matter. But, assuming there are any such difficulties, I see no reason why the Government of India should not give temporary financial help to a promising province in her struggle for independent progress.*

*As to the North-West Frontier Province, it is painful to note that the Royal Commissioners have practically denied that the people of this province have any right to. Reform. They fall far short of the Bray Committee, and the council recommended by them is merely a screen to hide the autocracy of the Chief Commissioner. The inherent right of the Afghan to light a cigarette is curtailed merely because he happens to be living in a powder house. The Royal Commissioners' epigrammatic argument is pleasant enough, but far from convincing. Political reform is light, not fire; and to light every human being is entitled whether he happens to live in a powder house or a coal mine. Brave, shrewd and determined to suffer for his legitimate aspirations, the Afghan is sure to resent any attempt to deprive him of opportunities of full self-development. To keep such a people contented is in the best interest of both England and India. What has recently happened in that unfortunate province is the result of a step-motherly treatment shown to the people since the introduction of the principle of self-government in the rest of India. I only hope that the British statesmanship will not obscure its view of the situation by hoodwinking itself into the belief that the present unrest in the province is due to any extraneous causes.*

*The recommendation for the introduction of a measure of reform in the N.W.F.P. made in the Government of India's despatch is also unsatisfactory. No doubt the despatch goes further than the Simon Report in recommending a sort of representative Council and a semi-representative cabinet, but it fails to treat this important Muslim province on an equal footing with the other Indian Provinces. Indeed the Afghan is, by instinct, more fitted for democratic institutions than any other people in India.*

***Round Table Conference***

*I think I am now called upon to make a few observations on the Round Table Conference. Personally, I do not feel optimistic as to the results of this conference. It was hoped that away from the actual scene of the communal strife, and in a changed atmosphere, better councils would prevail; and a genuine settlement of*

*the differences between the two major communities of India would bring India's freedom within sight. Actual events, however, tell a different tale. Indeed the discussion of the communal question in London has demonstrated, more clearly than ever, the essential disparity between the two great cultural unity of India. Yet the Prime Minister of England apparently refuses to see that the problem of India is international and not national. He is reported to have said that "his Government would find it difficult to submit to Parliament proposals for the maintenance of separate electorates, since joint electorate were much more in accordance with British democratic sentiments." Obviously he did not see that the model of British democracy cannot be of any use in a land of many nations; and that a system of separate electorates is only a poor substitute for a territorial solution of the problem. Nor is the Minorities Sub-Committee likely to reach a satisfactory settlement. The whole question will have to go before the British Parliament; and we can only hope that the keen sighted representatives of the British nation, unlike most of our Indian politicians will be able to pierce through the surface of things and see clearly the true fundamentals of peace and security in a country like India. To base a constitution on the concept of a homogenous India, or to apply to India principles dictated by British democratic sentiments, is unwittingly to prepare her for a civil war. As far as I can see, there will be no peace in the country until the various people that constitute India are given opportunities of free self-development on modern lines without abruptly breaking with their past.*

*I am glad to be able to say that our Muslim delegates fully realize the importance of a proper solution of what I call India's international problem. They are perfectly justified in pressing for a solution of the communal question before the question of responsibility in the Central Government is finally settled. No Muslim politician should be sensitive to the taunt embodied in that propaganda word - communalism - expressively devised to exploit what the Prime Minister calls the British democratic sentiment, and to mislead England into assuming a state of things which does not really exist in India. Great interests are at stake. We are seventy million, and far more homogenous that any other people in India. Indeed, the Muslims of India are the only Indian people who can fitly be described as a nation in the modern sense of the word. The Hindus, though ahead of us in almost all respects, have not yet been able to achieve the kind of homogeneity which is necessary for a nation and which Islam has given you as a free gift. No doubt they are anxious to become a nation but the process of becoming a nation is a kind of travail, and in the case of Hindu India, involves a complete overhauling of her social structure. Nor should the Muslim leaders and politicians allow themselves to be carried away by the subtle but fallacious argument that Turkey and Persia and other Muslim countries progressing on national i.e. territorial lines. The Muslims of India are differently situated. The countries of Islam outside India are practically wholly Muslim in population. The minorities there belong, in the language of the Quran, to the 'people of the Book.' There are no social barriers between Muslims and the 'people of the Book.' A Jew or Christian or a Zoroastrian does not pollute the food of a Muslim by touching it, and the Law of Islam allows intermarriage with the 'people of the Book.' Indeed the first practical step that Islam took towards the realization of a final combination of humanity was to call upon peoples possessing practically the same ethical ideal to come forward and combine. The Quran*

*declares, "O people of the Book! Come let us join together on the 'word' (Unity of God), that is common to us all." The wars of Islam and Christianity, and, later, European aggression in its various forms, could not allow the infinite meaning of this verse to work itself out in the world of Islam. To-day it is being gradually being realized in the countries of Islam in the shape of what is called Muslim Nationalism.*

*It is hardly necessary for me to add that the soul test of the success of our delegates is the extent to which they are able to get the non-Muslim delegates of the Conference to agree to our demands as embodied in the Delhi Resolution. If these demands are not agreed to, then a question of a very great and far-reaching importance will arise for the community. Then will arrive the moment for an independent and concerted political action by the Muslims of India. If you are at all serious about your ideals and aspirations you must be ready for such an action. Our leading men have done a good deal of political thinking, and their thought has certainly made us, more or less, sensitive to the forces which are now shaping the destinies of peoples in India and Outside India. But I ask, has this thinking prepared us for the kind of action demanded by the situation which may arise in the near future? Let me tell you frankly that, at the present moment, the Muslims of India are suffering from two evils. The first is the want of personalities. Sir Malcolm Hailey and Lord Irvin were perfectly correct in their diagnosis when they told the Aligarh University that the community had failed to produce leaders. By leaders I mean men who, by Divine gift or experience, possess a keen perception of the spirit and destiny of Islam, along with an equally keen perception of the trend of modern history. Such men are really the driving forces of a people, but they are God's gift and cannot be made to order. The second evil from which the Muslims of India are suffering is that the community is fast losing what is called the herd-instinct. This makes it possible for individuals and groups to start independent careers without contributing to the general thought and activity of the community. We are doing to-day in the domain of politics what we have been doing for centuries in the domain of religion. But sectional bickerings in religion do not much harm to our solidarity. They at least indicate an interest in what makes the sole principle of our structure as a people. Moreover, this principle is so broadly conceived that it is almost impossible for a group to become rebellious to the extent of wholly detaching itself from the general body of Islam. But diversity in political action, at a moment when concerted action is needed in the best interest of the very life of our people, may prove fatal. How shall we, then, remedy these two evils? The remedy of the first evil is not in our hands. As to the second evil I think it is possible to discover a remedy. I have got definite views on the subject; but I think it is proper to postpone their expression till the apprehended situation actually arises. In case it does arise leading Muslims of all shades of opinion will have to meet together, not to pass resolutions, but finally to determine the Muslim attitude and to show the path to tangible achievement. In this address I mentioned this alternative only because I wish that you may keep it in mind, and give some serious thought to it in the meantime.*

***The Conclusion***

*Gentlemen, I have finished. In conclusion I cannot but impress upon you that the present crisis in the history of India demands complete organisation and unity of will arid purpose in the Muslim community, both in your own interest as a community, and in the interest of India as a whole. The political bondage of India has been and is a source of infinite misery to the whole of Asia. It has suppressed the spirit of the East, and wholly deprived her of that joy of self-expression which once made her the creator of a great and glorious culture. We have a duty towards India where we are destined to live and die. We have a duty towards Asia, especially Muslim Asia. And since 70 millions of Muslims in a single country constitute a far more valuable asset to Islam than all the countries of Muslim Asia put together, we must look at the Indian problem not only from the Muslim point of view but also from the standpoint of the Indian Muslim as such. Our duty towards Asia and India cannot be loyally performed without an organised will fixed on a definite purpose. In your own interest, as a political entity among other political entities of India, such an equipment is an absolute necessity. Our disorganized condition has already confused political issues vital to the life of the community. I am not hopeless of an inter-communal understanding but I cannot conceal from you the feeling that in the near future our community may be called upon to adopt an independent line of action to cope with the present crisis and an independent line of political action, in such a crisis, is possible only to a determined people, possessing a will focalised by a single purpose. Is it possible for you to achieve the organic wholeness of a unified will? Yes, it is. Rise above sectional interests and private ambitions, and learnt to determine the value of your individual and collective action, however directed on material ends, in the light of the ideal which you are supposed to represent. Pass from matter to spirit. Matter is diversity; sprit is light, life and unity. One lesson I have learnt from the history of Muslims. At critical moments in their history it is Islam that has saved Muslims and not vice versa. If to-day you focus your vision on Islam and seek inspiration from the ever-vitalising idea embodied in it, you will be only reassembling your scattered forces, regaining your lost integrity, and thereby saving yourself from total destruction. One of the profoundest verses in the Holy Quran teaches us that the birth and rebirth of the whole of humanity is like the birth and rebirth of a single individual. Why cannot you who, as a people, can well claim to be the first practical exponent of this superb conception of humanity, live and move and have your being as a single individual? I do not mystify anybody when I say that things in India are not what they appear to be. The meaning of this, however, will dawn upon you only when you have achieved a real collective ego to look at them. In the words of the Quran, "Hold fast to yourself; no one who erreth can hurt you, provided you are well-guided." (5:104) All India Muslims League Annual Session at Allahabad, 1930 Presidential Address. Published by Directorate of Films & Publications, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad. Revised through comparison with other editions.*

## 3. ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE 1930–32

The British government held talks in London with the Indian political leaders. Both Congress and the Muslim League were invited. Important decisions were taken for

the future constitution of India. You must focus on the decisions and their implications for future politics in India, particularly the announcement of the Communal Award after the Conference.

The Round Table Conferences were a series of three meetings held in London between 1930 and 1932 to discuss constitutional reforms in British India. These conferences were called by the British government in response to growing nationalist demands, particularly after the Civil Disobedience Movement launched by the Indian National Congress (INC) under Mahatma Gandhi in 1930.

**1. Background and Reasons for the Conferences**

- The British had introduced the Simon Commission (1927) to propose reforms, but it was boycotted by Indians because it lacked any Indian representation.
- The Nehru Report (1928) demanded dominion status for India, but it was ignored by the British.
- The Civil Disobedience Movement (1930), led by Gandhi, increased pressure on the British to negotiate political reforms.
- The British called the Round Table Conferences to discuss a new constitutional framework for India, aiming to involve Indian leaders in shaping future governance.

**2. First Round Table Conference (November 1930 – January 1931)**

**Key Features:**

- Held in London from November 12, 1930, to January 19, 1931.
- No representation from the Indian National Congress (INC) because it was leading the Civil Disobedience Movement.
- Attended by 16 British delegates, 58 Indian delegates, including Muslims, Sikhs, Dalits, and Princely States, but no mainstream nationalist leaders.

**Key Outcomes:**

- The British agreed in principle that India would be granted self-governing institutions.
- There was a discussion on federalism, minority rights, and the role of Princely States.
- The Muslim League, led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, strongly demanded separate electorates for minorities.
- The conference failed because Congress was absent and could not endorse any decisions.

**3. Second Round Table Conference (September – December 1931)**
**Key Features:**

- Held in London from September 7 to December 1, 1931.

- Mahatma Gandhi attended as the sole representative of Congress, after signing the Gandhi-Irwin Pact (March 1931).
- Other key participants included:
- Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (Dalit leader)
- Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Muslim League)
- Hindu Mahasabha, Sikh leaders, Princely States representatives

**Key Outcomes:**

- Gandhi demanded an end to British rule and a unified India, but the British refused to grant immediate independence.
- Dr. B.R. Ambedkar strongly advocated separate electorates for Dalits, which led to tensions with Gandhi.
- Muslims and other minorities demanded constitutional safeguards, making it difficult to reach a consensus.
- The conference failure, with the British concluding that Indians were too divided to form a unified self-government.

**4. Third Round Table Conference (November – December 1932)**

**Key Features:**

- Held in London from November 17 to December 24, 1932.
- Congress boycotted the conference again, as Gandhi was arrested during the Second Civil Disobedience Movement.
- Attended mostly by the Muslim League, the Princely States, and Dalit leaders like Dr. Ambedkar.

**Key Outcomes:**

- The British decided to proceed with constitutional reforms without Congress's approval.
- The demands for separate electorates were accepted for Muslims, Sikhs, Dalits, and other minorities.
- The British laid the foundation for the Government of India Act (1935), which provided provincial autonomy but retained British control at the center.

**5. Impact and Significance of the Round Table Conferences**

**a. Successes**

- The conferences led to the Government of India Act (1935), which introduced provincial autonomy and elections in 1937.
- Muslim and Dalit demand for separate electorates were recognized, increasing their political influence.
- The conferences highlighted the deep divisions between Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and Dalits, shaping future politics.

**b. Failures**

- No agreement was reached on full independence, leading to continued nationalist struggles.
- The Indian National Congress boycotted two out of three conferences, reducing their effectiveness.
- The British continued their divide-and-rule policy, deepening religious and social divisions in India.

The Round Table Conferences failed to achieve Indian independence but played a crucial role in shaping future political developments. They highlighted the increasing demand for minority rights, the rise of Muslim separatism, and the British strategy of delaying self-rule by exploiting internal divisions. The failure of these conferences eventually led to the demand for Pakistan in 1940 and the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947.

## 4. STUDENT ACTIVITIES IN CAMBRIDGE

Chaudhury Rahmat Ali, with other students, was actively advocating for the separate homeland of the Muslims. For the first time, they demarcated the boundaries of that homeland and named Pakistan in a pamphlet, *Now or Never.* You must study their point of view and their arguments for their demarcation of boundaries.

The University of Cambridge has historically been a center for intellectual and political activity, attracting students from across the world, including many from British India. Several prominent Muslim leaders who later played key roles in India's freedom struggle and the Pakistan Movement were associated with Cambridge.

**1. Student Activities in Cambridge**

**a. Academic and Political Societies**

- **Cambridge Union Society:** A famous debating platform where students discussed colonialism, independence, and global politics. Many future Indian and Pakistani leaders engaged in debates here.
- **Cambridge Majlis:** A student society founded by South Asian students, where discussions on political issues, including India's independence, were held.

Student Newspapers and Publications: Indian students at Cambridge often wrote articles advocating independence and social reforms.

**b. Role of Cambridge-Educated Muslims in the Freedom Struggle**

Several key Muslim leaders studied at Cambridge and later contributed to India's independence and the Pakistan Movement:

- Allama Iqbal (Trinity College, Cambridge, 1905-1907): The poet-philosopher who envisioned Pakistan and inspired the idea of a separate Muslim state.

- Chaudhry Rahmat Ali (Emmanuel College, Cambridge): Coined the term "Pakistan" in his famous 1933 pamphlet Now or Never.
- Liaquat Ali Khan (Exeter College, Oxford, but closely associated with Cambridge intellectual circles): Pakistan's first Prime Minister.

**2. Muslim Struggle for Freedom and Cambridge's Influence**

**a. Cambridge as an Intellectual Hub for Indian Muslims**

- Cambridge was a key center where Indian Muslim students developed political awareness and leadership skills.
- Many Muslim leaders were influenced by European political thought, which helped shape their views on self-governance and Muslim identity.
- The idea of Muslim nationalism gained traction through debates and discussions at Cambridge.

**b. Impact of Cambridge-educated Leaders on the Pakistan Movement**

- Allama Iqbal laid the ideological foundation for a separate Muslim state through his famous Allahabad Address (1930).
- Chaudhry Rahmat Ali formally proposed the name "Pakistan", representing Punjab, Afghania (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), Kashmir, Sindh, and Baluchistan.
- These leaders, along with others, contributed to the rise of the Muslim League, which ultimately led to the creation of Pakistan in 1947.

Cambridge was not just an academic institution for Indian Muslim students but a political and ideological training ground. It played a crucial role in shaping the ideas of Muslim leaders who later led the struggle for Pakistan's independence. The student activities, debates, and societies at Cambridge provided a platform for discussing and promoting the idea of a separate Muslim identity, which eventually became the foundation of Pakistan.

## 5. IQBAL-JINNAH CORRESPONDENCE

During the period May 1936 to November 1937, a series of letters was written by 'sage, philosopher and national poet of Islam' Allama Iqbal to Mr. Jinnah on various issues of significance for both the leaders of Muslim India. Later, that correspondence was published by Mr. Jinnah with a foreword by himself. He writes, "This period synchronizes with a very eventful period in the history of Muslim India – between the establishment of the All India Muslim League Central Parliamentary Board in June 1936 and the great historic sessions at Lucknow in October 1937." Mr. Jinnah wrote,

> "these letters are of very great historical importance particularly those which explain his views in clear and unambiguous terms on the political future of Muslim India. His views were substantially in consonance with my own and

> had finally led me to the same conclusions as a result of careful examination and study of the constitutional problems facing India and found expression in due course in the united will of Muslim India as adumbrated in the Lahore Resolution of All-India Muslim League, popularly known as the 'Pakistan Resolution', passed on 23rd March, 1940." (*Introduction* of the published Correspondence).

This correspondence was made in the background of the 1930s when the Communal Award was being introduced as a result of the Round Table Conferences and the 1935 Act for Colonial India. Allama Muhammad Iqbal had already shown his concerns and presented a solution for the Muslim community of Colonial India in his Presidential Address at the Allahabad Conference by the All India Muslim League in 1930. He had been constantly suggesting various political motions and rulings for Mr. Jinnah, whom he considered as,

> "I have no doubt that you fully realize the gravity of the situation as far as Muslim India is concerned..Muslim India hopes that at this serious juncture your genius will discover some way out of our present difficulties…" (Allama Iqbal wrote Mr. Jinnah, Lahore, 28 May 1937, *Jinnah Iqbal Correspondence*).

This correspondence was made at a very important juncture of time when Muslim India had been going through the constitutional procedure towards its destiny as a separate nation. Allama Iqbal and Mr. Jinnah both had been leading the nation cautiously, as he wrote,

> "you must restate as clearly and as strongly as possible the political objective of the Indian Muslims as a distinct political unit in the country. It is absolutely necessary to tell the world both inside and outside India that the economic problem is not the only problem in the country. From the Muslim point of view the cultural problem is of much greater consequence to most Indian Muslims… it would test the credentials of those Muslim Legislators who have formed parties contrary to the aims and aspirations of Indian Muslims. It would farther make it clear to the Hindus that no political device, however subtle can make the Indian Muslim lose sight of his cultural entity" (20 March 1937, Lahore).

## COMPULSORY READINGS

Saeed, Ahmed and Kh. Mansur Sarwar. *Trek to Pakistan.* Lahore: Institute of Pakistan Historical Research, 2002. (45–52 & 111–115)

I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, Karachi: University Press, 2000, (pp. 39)

Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase*, Karachi: OUP, 1967, (pp. 34–133)

## SUGGESTED READINGS

Coupland, Reginald, The Constitutional Problem in India. London: Oxford University Press, 1944.

Flynn, Vince. Transfer of Power. London: Pocket, 2003.

Sarkar, Sumit. Modern India: 1885–1947. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989.

Sherwani, Latif Ahmed. ed. Pakistan in Making. Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1987.

Spear, T. G. Percival. The Oxford History of Modern India 1740–1975. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978.

## SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS

1. What were the main factors that led to the transfer of power from the East India Company to the British Crown in 1858? Discuss the significance of this transition in the context of British imperialism in India.
2. Explain the key provisions of the Queen's Proclamation of 1858 and analyse its impact on Indian society. How did the proclamation reshape British colonial policy and governance structures in India?
3. Describe the major reforms introduced by the Government of India Act 1858. How did these reforms alter the administrative, legal, and political framework of British India?
4. Evaluate the immediate and long-term consequences of the Government of India Act 1858 on Indian governance, economy, and society. What were the reactions of various Indian communities to the Act?
5. Compare and contrast the perspectives of British imperial officials and Indian nationalists on the transition of power from Company to Crown in British India. How did these differing viewpoints shape the historical narrative of this period?
6. What were the Fourteen Points of Jinnah (1929), and why were they considered significant for Muslim political rights?
7. How did Jinnah's Fourteen Points respond to the Nehru Report (1928)?
8. What was the main idea presented by Allama Iqbal in the Allahabad Address (1930)?
9. How did Iqbal's vision in the Allahabad Address differ from earlier Muslim demands?
10. What were the objectives of the Round Table Conferences (1930-1932), and why did they fail to resolve the communal issue?
11. How did Muslim leaders advocate for separate electorates and federalism during the Round Table Conferences?
12. What role did Muslim students in Cambridge play in shaping the nationalist movement?
13. How did intellectuals and student organizations contribute to the Muslim political cause?
14. What were the main themes of the Iqbal-Jinnah Correspondence (1936-1937)?
15. How did Iqbal convince Jinnah to take up the leadership of the Muslim League?
16. How did Jinnah's Fourteen Points and the Allahabad Address contribute to the demand for a separate Muslim state?
17. In what ways did the failure of the Round Table Conferences push the Muslim League towards an independent political strategy?

**Unit–05**

# THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT 1935

*Written by:* **Dr. Fozia Umar**
*Reviewed by:* **Dr. Kausar Parveen**

# CONTENTS


| | | Page # |
|---|---|---|
| Introduction | | 73 |
| Objectives and Learning Outcomes | | 74 |
| 1. | The Government of India Act 1935 | 75 |
| 2. | Issue of Provincial Autonomy in the constitutional history of the British India 1909–47 | 75 |
| 3. | Princes and Federation | 80 |
| Compulsory Readings | | 81 |
| Suggested Readings | | 81 |
| Self-Assessment Questions | | 82 |

# INTRODUCTION

The Government of India Act 1935 was the most comprehensive constitutional reform introduced by the British in colonial India. It aimed to restructure the governance system by providing a federal structure, provincial autonomy, separate electorates, and direct elections. While the Act was an attempt by the British to address Indian demands for self-rule, it also had limitations that fuelled political discontent, particularly among Muslims.

This unit examines the key provisions of the Government of India Act 1935, the reactions of various political groups, and its impact on the Muslim struggle for independence. The Act introduced a federal system, but the princely states were reluctant to join, making the federal scheme ineffective. The introduction of provincial autonomy allowed Indian political parties to form ministries, leading to the 1937 elections in which the Indian National Congress secured major victories. However, Congress's policies during its rule alienated Muslims, further strengthening their demand for a separate state.

By studying this unit, students will understand the importance of the Government of India Act 1935, its role in shaping the political landscape of British India, and how it influenced the Muslim League's stance toward independence.

## OBJECTIVES

After the study of this unit, you will be able to:

1. Understand its federal and provincial structure, the role of separate electorates, and its administrative framework.
2. Evaluate how increased autonomy in provinces affected political parties, especially the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League.
3. Understand how different parties, including the Muslim League, Congress, and Hindu Mahasabha, responded to the Act.
4. Analyze the impact of Congress ministries on Muslim politics and the League's demand for Pakistan.
5. Identify why the Act failed to satisfy Indian demands for full independence.
6. Explain how the Act played a role in shifting Muslim political strategies toward a separate homeland.

## LEARNING OUTCOMES

After the study of this unit, you will be able to:

1. Explain the structure, administrative provisions, and electoral system introduced by the Act.
2. Discuss how provincial self-governance impacted political developments, particularly for the Muslim League.
3. Compare the responses of the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League, and other political groups.
4. Examine how Congress's rule in provinces influenced Muslim political thought and strengthened the idea of a separate Muslim state.
5. Discuss why the Act was seen as inadequate by Indian political leaders and how it led to further demands for independence.
6. Relate the Act to later developments, including the Lahore Resolution (1940) and the Pakistan Movement.

# 1. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT 1935

- The Act was a comprehensive statute with 321 sections and two schedules.
- The Act created a **federation,** although the Constitution was unitary and the provincial governments derived their powers by devolution from the central government and discharged their functions under the superintendence, direction, and control of the Governor-General and ultimately the Secretary of State for India.
- Partial responsibility in the form of a diarchy at the centre was introduced.
- The provinces were granted autonomy and responsible government.
- The Governor-General and Governors of the provinces were granted extensive powers by way of safeguards, reservations, special responsibilities, overriding powers, and so on.
- New institutions like the Federal Court, Federal Railway Authority, the Reserve Bank of India, and the Public Service Commissions for the Federation and the provinces were created under the Act. The rulers of states were provided an instrument of accession through which they can define the matters in which the state agreed to federate and thereby accept the jurisdiction of the federation in all matters.
- The Federal Legislature consisted of two Chambers. The **Council of State with 156** representatives of India and not more than 104 representatives of the Indian states. It was a permanent body not subject to dissolution, but one–third of its members were to retire every third year. The **House of Assembly with 250** representatives of British India and not more than 125 representatives of the Indian states. The life of the Assembly was five years unless sooner dissolved. It was indirectly elected by the provincial assemblies.
- **Centre-Province Relations**

The subjects were divided into the **federal, provincial, and concurrent lists**. The federal legislature had the authority to make laws on the subjects in the federal list. The provincial legislature can make laws on the subjects in the provincial list. Both the federal and provincial legislatures can make laws on the subjects in the concurrent list. In case of conflict or inconsistency, the federal law prevailed.

# 2. ISSUE OF PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA 1909–47

Federation

A state made up of some subdivisions or individual states, which share power with

the central government.

**Provincial Autonomy**
Distribution of power between the centre and the units in a federal state

**Factors in the Issue of Provincial Autonomy**
- British Policy to 'Divide and Rule'
- To weaken the Nationalist leaders
- Fear of Hindu domination at the centre
- Interests of Provincial leaders

**Evolution of the issue of Provincial Autonomy**
- Impact of **Electoral Institutions**
- Effects of Reforms of 1909 [encouraged provincial-level politics]
- **Lucknow Pact** [All provinces should have full autonomy]
- Impact of **Reforms of 1919** [devolution of power at the provincial level]
- **Nehru Report** [Federal system, but residuary powers should be vested in the centre]
- **Quaid's Fourteen Points** [federal form of government with residuary powers vested in provinces and uniform measure of autonomy to all provinces]
- Impact of **Round Table Conferences** and **Communal Award** [emergence of Muslim Majority provinces, Punjab, Bengal, Sindh, and NWFP]
- Impact of the **India Act 1935** [no power devolution at the national level, so focus of power politics at the provincial level]

1. "From the outset of British rule India has been divided into two parts under different forms of government: (1) British India, comprising some Provinces, under direct British administration, (2) Indian States, which, by treaty or usages, are, broadly speaking, autonomous as regards their domestic affairs but accept the suzerainty of the Crown and its control of their external relations.
2. The government of the Indiana has maintained, with modifications, the Oriental tradition of autocracy. Till 1919, the government of British Indian was controlled by the British Parliament, operating since 1858 through the Secretary of State for India. It was a highly centralized administration. The Provincial Governments were agents of the Central Government and under its legislative and executive control.
3. Already in 1833, Englishmen were contemplating the ultimate withdrawal of British rule in Indian, and it was hoped that Indians would someday acquire the capacity for representative self-government of the Western type. By the Acts of 1861, 1892, and 1909 the representative principle was recognized by the admission of Indians to the Legislative Councils in the Provinces and at the Centre. But British statesmen of all parties emphatically asserted that this development was not intended to lead to parliamentary government as practiced in Britain. Indian society, it was held, was so diversified by race, creed, and custom as to preclude the normal operation of majority rule.

4. The outstanding example of schism in Indian society is the deep-rooted antagonism between the Hindus, who constitute about two-thirds of the population of India, and the Muslims, who constitute nearly one-quarter. In the constitutional field, this antagonism showed itself in the repudiation by the Muslims of majority rule in principle and of 'joint' electorates in particular. Since 1909, the Muslims and other minority communities have been represented in the legislatures through 'separate' electorates.
5. Meantime, the Indian nationalist movement, which had begun with the birth of the Indian National Congress in 1885, had come to regard the constitutional development of the British self-government Colonies as the model for Indian advance. Dominantly Hindu in fact, thought non-communal in principle, the Congress looked forward to acquiring the same kind of parliamentary government as existed in the Dominions were then in the process of attaining.
6. The nationalist movement was intensified by the War of 1914, and the Congress demanded the speeding up of the process of constitutional advance on Colonial lines. In 1916, the chief obstacle to it seemed for the moment to have been overcome by an agreement between the Congress and the Muslim League known as the 'Lucknow Pact', in which the most striking point was the Congress concession of separate electorates.
7. In 1917, the British Government defined its policy as 'the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire'. This policy was explained in the 'Montagu-Chelmsford Report' and its first stage was embodied in the Act of 1919. The main provisions of this Act were as follows. (i) It established a measure of Provincial autonomy by devolving authority in Provincial matters onto the Provincial Government and freeing them to a large extent from Central control. (ii) It began the process of realizing responsible government in the Provinces by dividing the field of government ('diarchy'); while such vital subjects as law and order were 'reserved' to the control of the Governor and his Executive Councillor's responsible as before to the Secretary of State and Parliament, the rest of the field was 'transferred' to Indian Ministers responsible to their Provincial legislatures. (iii) It converted the existing Central Legislative Council into a bi-cameral legislature for British India, directly elected for the most part on a national or unitary basis; diarchy was not introduced at the Centre, the whole Executive remaining responsible to the Secretary of State and Parliament. (iv) It established a Chamber of Princes representing the rulers of the Indian States for deliberative purposes. (v) It provided, lastly, for the appointment of a Statutory Commission in ten years' time to consider the possibility of the further extension of responsible government.
8. This new policy signified a change in the British attitude to the constitutional problem. Parliamentary government was no longer ruled out. On the contrary, the development of responsible government was generally interpreted to mean the development of parliamentary or cabinet government of the British type, for which diarchy was to serve as a training. The authors of the policy

did not evade or minimize the difficulties in the path, especially Hindu-Muslim antagonism, but they expressed the hope that such obstacles would be overcome by the patriotic co-operation of all communities in the common task of self-government. Only thus could India achieve her nationhood and take her equal place, united and free, beside the other nations of the British Commonwealth. Since, however, the Muslims and other communities insisted on it, separate electorates were retained.

9. In the course of the next decade, a real attempt was made to carry out this policy. On the one hand, Provincial diarchy proved workable, and the measure of responsible government it conceded was shown to be genuine. On the other hand, as if in anticipation of her coming nationhood, India was accorded a new status in her relations with the rest of the world. She had become a member of the Imperial Conference and of the League of Nations in her own right, and in other respects, notably fiscal policy, her status now seemed to be approximating to that of a Dominion.

10. The hopes of 1919 were mostly disappointed. In the first place, the Congress, far the most powerful political organization in India, became under Mr. Gandhi's leadership, a quasi-revolutionary body, pledged to obtain complete independence by all non-violent means. It therefore rejected the Act of 1919 and refused to co-operate in working it. Secondly, partly because of the Congress's attitude, partly because communal divisions prevented the development of a party system, the diarchy provided no effective training in parliamentary government. Thirdly –and this was the most discouraging feature—Hindus –Moslem antagonism increased.

11. In these circumstances, a re-examination of the whole constitutional question was undertaken. It began with the appointment of the Statutory Commission under Sir John Simon in 1927 and ended with the passing of a new Government of India Act in 1935. The first contribution to this long discussion was the work of a group of Indian leaders. The Nehru Report, published in 1923, admitted the gravity of the communal problem, and proposed to deal with it on the principle of 'balance' between the Hindu-majority and Muslim-majority provinces. It recommended that the number of the latter should be increased to 4 (as against 7 or 8 of the former) by the advancement of the North-West Frontier Province to full Provincial status and by the separation of Sind as a distinct Province from Bombay, but it insisted at the same time on the abolition of separate electorates. The proposed all-India constitution, moreover, under which India would attain Dominion Status with full responsible government at the Centre as well as in the Province, was more unitary than federal in character, although it was intended to cover the States. Most of the Muslim leaders reacted to the Report with a full-scale declaration of their claims. They insisted that separate electorates must be retained and that, since the theory of Provincial 'balance' required that the Provinces should be as free as possible from the control of a Centre

which must reflect the great Hindu majority in India as a whole, the future constitution must be essentially federal.

12. The Report of the Simon Commission, published in 1930 recommended (a) that Provincial autonomy should be strengthened by further devolution from the Centre and by the extension of responsible government over the whole field of administration including law and order, and (b) that no change should be made for the present in the Central Executive, but that the Central Legislature should be reconstituted on a federal instead of a unitary basis, its members being indirectly elected by the Provincial legislatures, not directly by British-Indian constituencies. The ultimate establishment of an all-Indian federation, including the States, was relegated to the distant future; nor was any reference made to Dominion Statutes, though in 1929 the attainment of that status had been officially declared to be the 'natural issue' of the policy of 1917. A marked feature of the Report was its reversion to the scepticism which had prevailed before 1917 as to the practicability of British parliamentary government in India; it suggested that the Provinces might in course of time develop other and varying constitutional practices and asserted that in any case the Central or federal Government could never operate on British Lines.

13. The next phase of the discussions was that of the Round Table Conference, which held three sessions in London in 1930, 1931and 1932. Its personnel consisted of representatives of the British political parties, of parties and communities in British Indian, and of the States. The Congress, which during this period was in open revolt, was represented only at the second session and then by Mr. Gandhi alone. The outcome of the Conference was a substantial, if incomplete, measure of agreement as to the main lines of a new constitution for India—a federal constitution, with responsible government, subject to specific 'safeguards' operating fully in the Provinces and partially at the Centre. Communal dissension was still the outstanding feature of the discussions. Mr. Gandhi's personal efforts to obtain agreement having failed, a 'Communal Award' was made by the British Prime Minister, maintaining separate electorates and arranging the distribution of seats on the lines of the 'Lucknow Pact' of 1916, as the only means of resolving the deadlock. The communal issue was also reflected in the controversy as to the character of the proposed Central Government, the Hindu representatives favouring a strong and unitary centre based on direct election, the Muslims and other minorities insisting on a strictly federal system, with the maximum of Provincial autonomy and indirect election to the Centre on a Provincial footing.

14. In the light of the proceedings of the Conference, the British Government formulated its proposals in a White Paper which was submitted to the consideration of a Joint Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament. Its report formed the basis of a bill which was introduced at the end of 1934 and became law in the summer of 1935.

15. The main provisions of the Act of 1935 were as follows. (i) it completed the development of Provincial autonomy by giving the Provinces a separate legal personality and liberating them entirely from Central control except for certain specific purposes. (ii) It established full responsible government, subject to safeguards in all the Provinces (which with the new Provinces of Sind and Orissa, now numbered eleven). (iii) It established 'The Federation of India, comprising both Provinces and States, with a federal Central Government and Legislature for the management of Central subjects. (iv) Diarchy, abolished in the Provinces, was reproduced at the Centre. The subjects of foreign affairs and defence were 'reserved' to the control of the Government-General; the other Central subjects were 'transferred' to the Minister, subject to similar 'safeguards' as in the Provinces. (v) The federal principle was recognized in the provision for the indirect or provincial election to the lower house of the Central Legislature, but in general, the constitution accorded more with the closer than the looser type of federation. (vi) On the other controversial issue, the Act maintained the policy of 1917. On the one hand it confirmed and extended parliamentary government in the Provinces and introduced it at the Centre; on the other hand it retained separate electorates both Provincial and Central, distributing the seats on the lines of the 'Communal Award' (vii) As to Dominion Status, it was officially declared that the provisions of the Act which precluded full self-government were to be regarded as transitional and it was intimated that, mainly by usage and convention, India under the new constitution might quickly acquire the same freedom internal and external, as that of the other members of the British Commonwealth.
16. The part of the Act which established the Federation was not to operate until a specified number of States had acceded to it. The rest of the Act came into force partly on July 3, 1936, when the electoral provisions began to operate, and completely on April 1, 1937." (*Summary* of Part I, cited in Reginald Coupland, ***The Indian Problem***, Oxford: OUP, 1942, pp. 149–52.)

## 3. PRINCES AND FEDERATION

The federal part of the constitution could not be implemented due to the princes of princely states' reservations on the federal part of constitution. You must focus on the reservations of the princes and their implications, as the people of India were deprived of a valuable experience of running government at the federal level.

## COMPULSORY READING

Saeed, Ahmed and Kh. Mansur Sarwar. *Trek to Pakistan.* Lahore: Institute of Pakistan Historical Research, 2002. (pp. 45–52 & 111–115)

## SUGGESTED READINGS

Coupland, Reginald, The Constitutional Problem in India. London: Oxford University Press, 1944.

Flynn, Vince. Transfer of Power. London: Pocket, 2003.

Sarkar, Sumit. Modern India: 1885–1947. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989.

Sherwani, Latif Ahmed. ed. Pakistan in Making. Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1987.

Spear, T. G. Percival. The Oxford History of Modern India 1740–1975. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978.

## SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS

1. What were the main provisions of the Government of India Act 1935?

2. How did the Act introduce a federal structure in India, and why did it fail?

3. What was provincial autonomy, and how did it change governance in British India?

4. How did the Indian National Congress respond to the Government of India Act 1935?

5. What was the Muslim League's reaction to the Act, and why was it significant?

6. How did the 1937 elections shape Hindu-Muslim political relations?

7. What role did the Congress ministries (1937-1939) play in alienating Muslim communities?

8. What were the major flaws of the Government of India Act 1935 that led to dissatisfaction among Indians?

9. How did the failure of the Act contribute to the Pakistan Movement?

10. In what ways did the provincial elections of 1937 influence Jinnah's political strategy?

11. Discuss the main provisions of the Government of India Act 1935.

12. Examine the response of the political parties to the Government of India Act 1935.

13. Analyse the issue of Provincial Autonomy in the constitutional history of British India.

14. Discuss the relations of the British government with the Princes in the context of the Government of India Act 1935.

**Unit–06**

# ELECTIONS 1937: PERFORMANCE OF MUSLIM PARTIES

*Written by:* **Dr. Fozia Umar**
*Reviewed by:* **Dr. Kausar Parveen**

# CONTENTS


| | | Page # |
|---|---|---|
| Introduction | | 85 |
| Objectives and Learning Outcomes | | 87 |
| 1. | Party Positions in Provinces | 88 |
| 2. | Working of Provincial Governments | 89 |
| 3. | Muslim Mass Contact Campaign | 90 |
| 4. | Day of Deliverance | 93 |
| 5. | Congress Rule and the Muslim Response | 93 |
| Compulsory Readings | | 95 |
| Suggested Readings | | 95 |
| Self-Assessment Questions | | 96 |

# INTRODUCTION

The Government of India Act of 1935 was virtually functional in 1937. The provincial elections were held in 1937 winter two major political parties' participation in the election, Congress and the Muslim League. Both parties tried hard to convince the masses before these elections through their political manifestoes, almost identical. The basic agenda of both parties was opposite. Congress stood for joint electorate and *Hindi* as the official language with Devanagari script, whereas the League propagated for separate electorates along with *Urdu* with the Persian script. Both the major parties, the All-India Muslim League and the Congress, participated in these elections.

The manifestoes of the two rival parties for the elections showed little difference. In essence, the League's manifesto could be summed up in the following objectives:

(a) Protection of the religious rights of the Muslims
(b) Quashment of all oppressive laws.
(c) Opposing all those laws which were antagonistic to the interests of India and which adversely affected the basic human rights.
(d) Curtailing administrative expenditure and using the savings on constructive projects.
(e) Curtailing expenditure on the Indian army, ensuring Indians' induction into the army, and using the savings on constructive projects.
(f) Industrialization and improvement in the economic, social, and educational conditions in rural areas.
(g) Compulsory primary education.
(h) Protection of the Urdu language and its script.
(i) Improvement in the general welfare of the Muslims
(j) Cultivating correct public opinion and reawakening of general political awareness.' (See Ahmad Saeed, *Trek to Pakistan*, pp. 232-33).

According to the election results, the Indian National Congress, being the oldest and organized political party, appeared as the single largest party in the Legislative Assembly in 1937. Yet it could not secure 40 percent of the total number of seats. Out of the 1771 total seats in the 11 provinces, Congress won 750 plus. The results clearly challenged Mr. Gandhi's claim that *his party represented 95 percent of the population of India*. Congress's sway was mainly confined to the Hindu majority constituencies of Colonial India. Out of the 491 Muslim seats, Congress could only obtain 26. Muslim Leagues could only capture 106 Muslim seats. The party could only manage to get two seats from the Muslim majority province of Punjab.

The election results were declared in February 1937. The Indian National Congress had a clear majority in Madras, U. P., C. P., Bihar, and Orissa. It could therefore be able to form a coalition government in Bombay and N. W. F. P. Congress also had secured political weight in Sindh and Assam, where the party was part of the ruling coalition. Consequently, Congress was in power in 9 out of 11 provinces. The Unionist Party of Sir Fazl-i-Hussain and the Praja Krishak Party of Maulvi Fazl-i-Haq were able to form governments in Punjab and Bengal, respectively, without the interference of Congress. The Muslim League failed to form a government in any province. Mr Jinnah offered Congress to form a coalition government with the League, but Congress rejected his offer. The Congress declined to set up its government until the British agreed that the Governor would not interfere in legislative matters. After several negotiations between the Congress and the British Government, the Government consented (Although it was 'a verbal commitment and no amendment was made in the Act of 1935'). After a four-month holdup, Congress formed its ministries in July 1937.

The 1937 elections marked a turning point in Indian politics and significantly impacted the Muslim struggle for independence. These elections, held under the Government of India Act 1935, were the first to introduce provincial autonomy, allowing Indian political parties to form ministries. The results of the elections revealed the political strength of the Indian National Congress and exposed the weaknesses of the All India Muslim League and other Muslim parties, as they failed to secure a significant victory.

This unit examines the party positions in provinces, the working of provincial governments, the Muslim League's mass contact campaign, the Congress rule, and the Muslim response, including the Day of Deliverance. The Congress's refusal to share power with the Muslim League and its governance policies led to growing dissatisfaction among Muslims. The Congress ministries (1937-1939) implemented policies that were perceived as discriminatory, pushing many Muslims toward the League. In response, Jinnah launched the Muslim Mass Contact Campaign to strengthen the League's influence among the Muslim population.

By the end of this unit, students will understand how the 1937 elections transformed Muslim politics, deepened Hindu-Muslim divisions, and set the stage for the demand for Pakistan.

## OBJECTIVES

After the study of this unit, you will be able to:

1. Analyze and understand the results and impact of these elections on Indian politics.
2. Examine how Congress ministries operated and their impact on Muslims.
3. Evaluate Jinnah's efforts to expand the Muslim League's influence.
4. Discuss the Significance of the Day of Deliverance (1939) and analyze why Jinnah declared this event and its political implications.
5. Identify key policies of Congress ministries and why Muslims opposed them.
6. Relate the 1937 Elections to the Pakistan Movement and connect these events to the growing demand for a separate Muslim state.

## LEARNING OUTCOMES

After the study of this unit, you will be able to:

1. Describe how different political parties, including Congress, the Muslim League, and regional Muslim parties, performed.
2. Examine the role of Congress ministries and their treatment of Muslim communities.
3. Understand its goals, challenges, and impact on Muslim political mobilization.
4. Explain why Jinnah called for this event and how it influenced Muslim sentiments.
5. Critically evaluate how Congress's governance alienated Muslims and strengthened their political awareness.
6. Trace how these events contributed to the eventual demand for an independent Muslim state.

# 1. PARTY POSITIONS IN PROVINCES

## Bengal

| | |
|---|---|
| Congress | 54 |
| Non-Congress Hindus | 42 |
| Muslim Independents | 43 |
| Muslim League | 40 |
| Other Muslims | 38 |
| Europeans and Anglo-Indians | 31 |
| No Party (Muslims) | 2 |
| Total: | 250 |

I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, p. 69.

## Punjab

| | |
|---|---|
| Congress | 18 |
| Muslim League | 2 |
| Other Muslims | 4 |
| Non-Congress Hindus and Sikhs | 36 |
| No Party | 88 |
| Total: | 175 |

I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, p. 71.

## Assam

| | |
|---|---|
| Congress | 35 |
| Independent Muslims | 9 |
| Muslim League | 9 |
| Assam Valley Muslims | 5 |
| Surma Valley Muslims | 5 |
| Krishak Proja Party | 1 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Independent Hindus | 10 |
| Labour | 4 |
| United People's Party | 3 |
| Indian Planters | 2 |
| Indian Christians | 1 |
| Independent Women | 1 |
| Europeans | 9 |

I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, p. 72.

**Sind**

| | |
|---|---|
| Sind United Party (Muslim) | 18 |
| Sind Hindu Sabha | 11 |
| Independent Muslims | 9 |
| Congress | 8 |
| Sind Muslim Party | 4 |
| Sind Azad Party (Pro-Congress) | 3 |
| Independent Hindus | 2 |
| Labour Independent | 1 |
| No-Party | 4 |

I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, p. 73.

## 2. WORKING OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS

The Congress proved to be a mere *Hindu party* and focused only on the welfare of the Hindus. Twenty-seven months of the Congress rule was like a nightmare for the Muslims of South Asia. Few of the Congress leaders showed their revengeful behavior towards Muslims for *the last 700 years of their slavery*. Even before the formation of government, the Congress started decreasing the weight of the Muslim League by giving them that impression that there were only two political actors/parties in colonial India, Hindus and British. After taking over in July 1937, Congress confirmed Hindi as the national language and Deva Nagri as the official script. The Congress flag was approved as the' national flag', and the slaughtering

of cows was prohibited. The most dreadful command was the worship of Mr. Gandhi;s picture at schools as compulsory. Band-i-Mataram, an anti-Muslim song taken from Bankim Chandra Chatterji's novel Ananda Math, was made the national anthem of the country. Religious intolerance prevailed everywhere, mostly focused on Muslims. They were not given permission to construct new mosques. Hindus were allowed to play drums in front of mosques when Muslims busying praying. The Congress government introduced a new educational policy called the Warda Taleemi Scheme. It was based on 'brain washing' of the Muslim children against Muslim ideology and to hatch a conspiracy to convert them into Indian and not Muslim Indian living in India were Indian and thus belonged to one nation. In Bihar and C. P., the *Vidya Mandar* Scheme was introduced, another blow for Muslim children at the elementary level. The purpose of the scheme was to eliminate the cultural traditions of the Muslims and to instill into the minds of Muslim children the superiority of the Hindu culture. The Congress ministries emphasized to weaken the economy of Muslims. They blocked the access of government offices for Muslims, the main sources of income for Muslims in the county. They also troubled Muslim trade and agriculture. Consequently, when Hindu-Muslim riots broke out against the biased policies of the Congress ministries, the government strained the judges; decisions were made against the Muslims. To investigate Muslim accusations, the following Reports were Muslim League formulated the ***Pirpur Report***, chaired by Raja Syed Muhammad Mehdi of Pirpur; A. K. Fazl-ul-Haq's ***Muslim Sufferings Under Congress Rule***, and ***The Sharif Report***. A few renowned British personalities, like Marquees of Lothian in April 1938, described the Congress rule as *a rising tide of Hindu rule,* and Sir William Barton in the ***National Review*** in June 1939, phrased the Congress rule as the ***rising tide of political Hinduism***.(See I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, pp. 86-90)

## 3. MUSLIM MASS CONTACT CAMPAIGN

The Muslim League Mass Contact Campaign (1937–1947) was a strategic effort by the All India Muslim League (AIML) to mobilize Muslim support for the demand for a separate Muslim state—Pakistan. This campaign was a response to the Congress-led Muslim Mass Contact Campaign and the League's poor performance in the 1937 provincial elections. The campaign eventually helped the Muslim League gain mass popularity among Indian Muslims and played a crucial role in the Pakistan Movement.

## 1. Background

### a. Poor Performance in 1937 Elections

- In the 1937 provincial elections, the Muslim League won only 109 out of 482 reserved Muslim seats, showing weak grassroots support.
- The Indian National Congress formed governments in eight provinces but refused to share power with the League, isolating it politically.
- The Congress's Muslim Mass Contact Campaign (1937) tried to gain Muslim support, which alarmed the League.

### b. Need for Muslim Political Unity

- The Muslim League realized that it could not rely only on elite support (landlords, businessmen) but needed to mobilize the Muslim masses.
- Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who had initially supported Hindu-Muslim unity, became convinced that a separate Muslim identity was necessary for political survival.

## 2. Key Features of the Muslim League Mass Contact Campaign

### a. Grassroots Mobilization

- The League expanded its presence in rural areas, reaching out to Muslim peasants, workers, and clerics.
- Public meetings, pamphlets, and newspapers were used to spread the idea of Muslim nationalism.
- Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, and other leaders traveled across India to directly connect with Muslims.

### b. Religious and Cultural Appeal

- The campaign emphasized Islamic identity and presented the Muslim League as the sole defender of Muslim rights.
- It countered Congress's claims of Hindu-Muslim unity by highlighting Hindu majoritarian tendencies, such as the Bande Mataram controversy and the Vidya Mandir Scheme in UP.
- The idea of Pakistan was promoted as a safe homeland for Muslims, where they would be free from Hindu domination.

### c. Muslim League's Use of Media and Institutions

- Newspapers like Dawn (founded by Jinnah in 1941) played a vital

role in spreading the League's message.

- The Ulema (Islamic scholars) and Sufi leaders were encouraged to support the League, helping to gain mass acceptance.
- The League organized student groups and women's wings to broaden its influence.

**3. Major Milestones and Growth (1940–1947)**

**a. Lahore Resolution (March 23, 1940)**

- The turning point in the campaign was the Lahore Resolution, which formally demanded separate Muslim states.
- After this, the League's mass support increased rapidly, especially in Punjab, Bengal, and Sindh.

**b. 1942-1945: Strengthening the Movement**

- During World War II, the League worked with the British while Congress launched the Quit India Movement (1942), leading to the arrest of Congress leaders.
- The League used this opportunity to expand its influence without Congress's opposition.

**c. 1946 Elections: The League's Victory**

- In the 1946 provincial elections, the League won 90% of Muslim votes and 75% of Muslim seats, proving that it was the true representative of Muslims.
- This victory gave Jinnah a strong position in negotiations for independence and partition.

**4. Impact on the Freedom Movement and the Creation of Pakistan**

**a. Muslim League Becomes the Sole Representative of Muslims**

- The campaign successfully countered Congress's outreach and united Muslims under the League's leadership.
- By 1946, even those Muslims who had initially supported Congress shifted towards the League.

**b. Strengthening of the Two-Nation Theory**

- The campaign solidified the idea that Muslims and Hindus were two separate nations with different cultures, religions, and political needs.

- This ideology ultimately led to the demand for Pakistan in 1940 and its realization in 1947.

**c. Direct Action Day (August 16, 1946) and Partition**

- After the British proposed the Cabinet Mission Plan (1946), the League rejected it and called for Direct Action Day, leading to communal riots.
- The failure of compromise led to the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan on August 14, 1947.

The Muslim League Mass Contact Campaign (1937–1947) was a crucial strategy that transformed the League from an elite party into a mass movement representing Indian Muslims. By successfully mobilizing the Muslim population, the League overcame Congress's influence, won key elections, and ultimately secured the creation of Pakistan in 1947.

(See I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, pp. 80-81 for details)

## 4. DAY OF DELIVERANCE

After the outbreak of World War II, the Viceroy proclaimed India's involvement without prior discussions with the main political parties. The British government refused Congress's demand that they would immediately transfer their powers to the largest political party in return for cooperation in the war efforts. As a result, Congress Ministries resigned from power. Quaid-i-Azam advised the Muslims to celebrate December 22, 1939, as a **day of deliverance** and thanksgiving in token of relief from the domination and subjugation of the Congress rule.

## 5. CONGRESS RULE AND MUSLIM RESPONSE

In U.P, the Congress showed its expected narrow-mindedness with regard to the formation of the ministry. The province had a special significance,

- Firstly, this area had been the fortress of Mughal glory, and its leftovers were present at every inch of the land.
- Secondly, the Indian culture and literature had developed here due to deep Hindu-Muslim social intermixture.
- Thirdly, the Muslims of U.P., despite being in a minority, had been leading the Indian Muslims in culture and civilization, literature, and traditional national aspiration.
- Fourthly, U.P., being the home province of the Nehru family, had been the hub of Congress activities.

Therefore, the whole of India had been observing keenly the developments taking place in this province. It was commonly believed that whatever adjustment would be made between the Hindus and the Muslims in this province was the real shadow on the whole of the country after provincial elections. In the U.P. Legislative Assembly, the number of elected Muslim members was sixty-six. Out of these sixty-six, only one Muslim member had been elected on the Congress party ticket. Abul Kalam Azad, the president of the Congress, sent a letter to Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman, the President of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party, offering that the Muslim League could join the Government only if it acceded to the following condition:

1. The UP.: Muslim League Parliamentary Party shall cease to exist.
2. The existing members of the Muslim League Party in the Assembly shall become a part of the Congress Party.
3. Those new members of the Congress would abide by the code of conduct prepared by the Working Committee of the Congress.
4. The Muslim League Parliamentary Board would be dissolved, and the League would not nominate its candidates in future elections.
5. If the Congress Party decides on resignation from the Ministry or the Assembly seats, the new members would follow the party rules.

The Muslim League took these conditions as 'disgraceful'. The Congress intentions and prejudices were clear to the Muslim. The Congress believed that the was the symbol of Muslim power for the League and its exclusion from there would virtually demise League from Indian politics. Abul Kalam Azad wrote, if the U.P. League's offer of cooperation had been accepted, the Muslim League party would for all practical purposes have merged in Congress. The League was reorganized in U.P. Mr. Jinnah took full advantages of the situation and started an offensive which ultimately led to Pakistan. Even Jawaharlal Nehru, without mincing words, wrote to Rajendra Prasad, 'The winding up of the Muslim League group in the U.P. and its absorption in the Congress. This would have a great effect not only in U.P. but all over India and even outside. This would mean a free field for our without communal troubles. (See Ahmad Saeed, *Trek to Pakistan*, pp. 235-6). Mr Jinnah refused the unsustainable condition of Abul Kalam Azad out precisely. The Muslims were compelled to believe that they were removed from power only because the Congress was an entirely Hindu party.

## COMPULSORY READING

Saeed, Ahmed and Kh. Mansur Sarwar. *Trek to Pakistan.* Lahore: Institute of Pakistan Historical Research, 2002. (45–52 & 111–115)

## SUGGESTED READINGS

Coupland, Reginald, *The Constitutional Problem in India.* London: Oxford University Press, 1944.

Flynn, Vince. *Transfer of Power.* London: Pocket, 2003.

Sarkar, Sumit. *Modern India: 1885–1947.* Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989.

Sherwani, Latif Ahmed. ed. *Pakistan in Making.* Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1987.

Spear, T. G. Percival. *The Oxford History of Modern India 1740–1975*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978.

## SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS

1. Describe the election results in the Elections of 1937 and analyze the performance of the Muslim Parties.
2. Discuss the working of provincial governments in the Muslim majority provinces.
3. Discuss the working of Congress governments in provinces.
4. Bring out the significance of the experience of fully responsible self-governments in provinces for the future of India.
5. What were the main features of the 1937 elections, and under which constitutional framework were they held?
6. How did the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League perform in the elections?
7. What factors contributed to the Muslim League's poor performance in the 1937 elections?
8. What was the structure of the provincial governments formed after the elections?
9. Why did the Congress refuse to form coalition governments with the Muslim League?
10. What were some of the key policies of Congress ministries, and how did they affect Muslims?
11. What was Jinnah's Muslim Mass Contact Campaign, and what were its objectives?
12. What were the main grievances of Muslims under Congress rule?
13. How did the events following the 1937 elections strengthen the demand for Pakistan?
14. In what ways did the political failures of the Muslim League in 1937 contribute to its later success in 1946?

**Unit–07**

# WORLD WAR-II AND MUSLIM POLITICS

*Written by:* **Dr. Fozia Umar**
*Reviewed by:* **Dr. Kausar Parveen**

# CONTENTS


| | | Page # |
|---|---|---|
| Introduction | | 99 |
| Objectives and Learning Outcomes | | 100 |
| 1. | Rise of All India Muslim League | 101 |
| 2. | The Second World | 101 |
| | 2.1 Second World War and the Response of Congress | 101 |
| 3. | Cripps Mission | 102 |
| 4. | Response of Muslim League | 102 |
| 5. | Reaction of British Government on Congress and League Demands | 103 |
| 6. | Impact on the Nationalist Movements | 103 |
| Compulsory Readings | | 104 |
| Suggested Readings | | 104 |
| Self-Assessment Questions | | 104 |

# INTRODUCTION

The outbreak of World War II (1939-1945) had a profound impact on Indian politics, particularly on the relationship between the British government, the Indian National Congress, and the All India Muslim League. While the Congress opposed British war efforts and demanded immediate independence, the Muslim League saw the war as an opportunity to further its demand for a separate Muslim state.

This unit explores the Indian National Congress's response to the war, the rise of the Muslim League, the Cripps Mission (1942), and how the nationalist movement evolved during the war years. The Congress, led by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, launched the Quit India Movement (1942), demanding the end of British rule. In contrast, the Muslim League, under Jinnah's leadership, strategically supported the British, gaining political leverage. The Cripps Mission was an attempt by the British to negotiate self-rule for India, but its failure led to further political unrest.

By the end of this unit, students will understand how World War II acted as a catalyst for major political developments, strengthening the Muslim League and setting the stage for the creation of Pakistan.

## OBJECTIVES

After the study of this unit, you will be able to:

1. Examine why Congress opposed British war efforts and launched the Quit India Movement.
2. Assess how Jinnah used the war period to strengthen the League's political position.
3. Understand its proposals, Congress's rejection, and the Muslim League's response.
4. Evaluate how the war shaped political strategies and demands for independence.
5. Assess how their differing responses to WWII influenced the future of the independence movement.
6. Trace how the war led to the Lahore Resolution (1940) and the eventual partition of India.

## LEARNING OUTCOME

After the study of this unit, you will be able to:

1. Describe why Congress opposed British war efforts and how it influenced their political decisions.
2. Analyze how Jinnah used the war years to consolidate Muslim political demands.
3. Evaluate the Cripps Mission (1942), its significance, why it failed, and its impact on Indian politics.
4. Examine how the war influenced the strategies of both Congress and the Muslim League.
5. Explain how the events of WWII strengthened the demand for a separate Muslim state.
6. Relate the political developments of the war period to later events, including the 1945-46 elections and the partition of India (1947).

# 1. RISE OF ALL-INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE

Whilst the history of Muslim nationalism in India stemmed from the Muslim conquests of the subcontinent and from the demands presented by the Simla Deputation to Lord Minto, the Governor General of India, in October 1906, proposing separate electorates for the Indian Muslims. The major motive behind the demand was the protection of a separate identity of the Muslims in South Asia

In the same year, the founding of the All India Muslim League, a separate political organization for Muslims, revealed that the Muslims of India had lost trust in the Hindu-oriented Indian National Congress. The Congress leaders, in order to win majority support (comprised mostly of Hindus) for their political motives, used religious symbols and slogans, thereby stimulating Muslim reservations regarding the secular character of the Congress. After the short period of collision during the Khilafat Movement, Hindu-Muslim rivalry rose once again. The All India Muslim League rejected the proposals forwarded by the Nehru Report, and 'parting of ways' took place. The idea of a separate homeland for the Muslims of Northern India, as proposed by Allama Iqbal in his famous Allahabad Address, was to complete the Muslim separation from Congress politics. The idea was restated during the Sindh provincial meeting of the Muslim League, and finally resolved as the official League position in the Lahore Declaration of March 23, 1940. Consequently, the historical, cultural, religious, and social disparities between the two nations gained momentum during the 1940s leading to the partition of British India into two separate, independent states, Pakistan and India, on August 14 & 15, 1947, respectively.

# 2. THE SECOND WORLD

World War II was an important event for the colonized world had deeper effects on Hindu-Muslim politics before partition. It had paved the way for the freedom of Muslims in British India. It had also far-reaching effects on the national politics in British India during 1939-47. It had raised the stature of the AIML and facilitated the task of achieving an independent Muslim state by creating favorable circumstances. This unit will focus on the impact of World War II on the Muslim politics.

## 2.1 Second World War and the Response of Congress

- Condemned declaration of War (See the *The Declaration of War,* in I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, pp.119–25.)
- Congress Demands (See the *Indian Reaction* in I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, pp.152-53.)
- Resignation of Congress Ministries (See the *Resignation of Congress Ministries* in I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, pp.125–29.)

## 3. CRIPPS MISSION

The British government had severely needed to get the cooperation of the Indian political parties in order to deal with the war situation. The disagreement between the two major representative parties of the country stressed the British government. It found it difficult to make the war a success without the cooperation of both the Hindus and the Muslims. On March 22, 1942, Britain sent Sir Stafford Cripps with constitutional proposals. The major points of the declaration were as follows:

i. General elections in the provinces would be arranged as soon as the war ended.
ii. A new Indian dominion, associated with the United Kingdom, would be created.
iii. Those provinces not joining the dominion could form their own separate union.
iv. Minorities were to be protected. (See the *Cripps Mission and the Congress Revolt* in I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, pp.148–56.)

Due to several reasons, both Congress and the Muslim League rejected these proposals. Jinnah opposed the plan, as it did not concede Pakistan. Thus, the plan came to nothing.

## 4. RESPONSE OF MUSLIM LEAGUE

- Offer of Support and Cooperation to the British government.
  The Muslim League offered to cooperate with the British Government in its war efforts with a few conditions to be met.
- Muslim League demands:
- No constitutional advance without the prior consultation of AIML
- Reconsideration of the Government of India Act 1935
- Protection of Minorities
- Day of deliverance

The cooperation was offered due to the following reasons:

a. to get rid of Hindu domination.
b. gaining time to popularize the idea of Pakistan.
c. to extract maximum advantages.
d. acceptance of ML demand of consulting ML in any future constitutional advance; and
e. minorities' protection.

## 5. REACTION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ON CONGRESS AND LEAGUE DEMANDS

- August offer 1940/Civil Disobedience Movement (See *Congress Civil Disobedience Movement and the Muslims* in I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, pp. 137–41.)
- Weightage to minorities
- Constituent Assembly will be established with two conditions. 1) At the end of the War. 2). Cooperation of Indians.

## 6. IMPACT ON THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS

The situation during and after the war had the following impact on the British Indian politics:

- Enhanced the stature of the Muslim League
- Enhanced authority and position of Jinnah inside and outside the Muslim League (For both points see, *The Consolidation of the Muslim League* in I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, pp. 167-73.)
- Increased the support base of the Muslim League (See the *Quit India* in I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, pp. 162–66.)
- Strategic errors of Congress (See *The Aftermath* in I. H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, pp.159–62.)
- Decline of Regional Parties

The events like World War II and its following Indian political situation, the British Government concentrated on the politics of two major political forces in British India, and the roles of regional parties were overshadowed till the next elections, 1945-6.

## COMPULSORY READINGS

Saeed, Ahmed and Kh. Mansur Sarwar. *Trek to Pakistan.* Lahore: Institute of Pakistan Historical Research, 2002.

Spear, T. G. Percival. *The Oxford History of Modern India 1740-1975*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

1. Coupland, Reginald, *The Constitutional Problem in India.* London: Oxford University Press, 1944.
2. Flynn, Vince. *Transfer of Power.* London: Pocket, 2003.
3. Sarkar, Sumit. *Modern India: 1885–1947.* Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989.
4. Sherwani, Latif Ahmed. ed. *Pakistan in Making.* Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1987.

## SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS

a. Discuss the consequences of the World War-II for the colonized people of Asia and Africa.
2. Examine the response of the AIML and the Congress on the declaration of the Indian government to participate in the World War-II.
3. Analyze the circumstances after the World War-II that led to raise the stature of the AIML in Indian politics.
4. Evaluate AIML's strategy of alliance politics. To what extent it has been successful?
5. What was the Indian National Congress's position on WWII, and why did it refuse to support the British?
6. How did the Quit India Movement (1942) impact the Indian struggle for independence?
7. What was the Muslim League's response to WWII, and how did it differ from that of Congress?
8. How did the Second World War help the Muslim League gain political strength?
9. What role did Muhammad Ali Jinnah play in positioning the League as the representative party of Indian Muslims during the war?
10. What were the proposals of the Cripps Mission (1942), and why did Congress reject them?
11. How did the Muslim League react to the Cripps Mission, and what did it mean for their demand for Pakistan?
12. How did WWII accelerate the demand for Pakistan?
13. In what ways did the events of the war influence the Lahore Resolution (1940)?

How did the British government's dependence on Indian political support during WWII shape the final phase of the independence movement?

**Unit–08**

# JOURNEY TO INDEPENDENCE: ROLE OF AIML

*Written by:* **Dr. Fozia Umar**
*Reviewed by:* **Dr. Kausar Parveen**

# CONTENTS


| | Page # |
|---|---|
| Introduction | 107 |
| Objectives and Learning Outcomes | 108 |
| 1. Lahore Resolution | 109 |
| 2. August Offer | 110 |
| 3. Mobilization for Pakistan Scheme | 111 |
| 4. Cripps Proposals | 113 |
| 5. Simla Conference: Victory of AIML | 114 |
| Compulsory Readings | 115 |
| Suggested Readings | 115 |
| Self-Assessment Questions | 116 |

# INTRODUCTION

The All India Muslim League (AIML) played a decisive role in shaping the demand for a separate Muslim state and ultimately securing the creation of Pakistan. From the Lahore Resolution (1940) to the Simla Conference (1945), the League transformed itself into the sole representative of Indian Muslims, effectively countering the Indian National Congress and British efforts to maintain a united India.

This unit explores the key milestones in the AIML's journey to independence, including the Lahore Resolution, which formally articulated the demand for Pakistan, the League's response to the Cripps Proposals (1942), and its mobilization for the Pakistan scheme through mass political engagement. The Simla Conference (1945) proved to be a significant political victory for the League, as it established Jinnah as the sole spokesperson for Muslims, effectively sidelining Congress's claim to represent all Indians.

By studying this unit, students will gain insight into how the AIML consolidated its political position, mobilized public support, and successfully led the struggle for Pakistan..

## OBJECTIVES

After studying this unit, you will be able to:

1. Analyze the Lahore Resolution (1940), its significance, and the reactions it generated from Congress and the British.
2. Evaluate the Cripps Proposals (1942) and analyze why the League rejected these proposals and how they influenced the Pakistan movement.
3. Examine how the AIML engaged the Muslim masses through political campaigns, propaganda, and organizational expansion.
4. Assess the role of the Simla Conference (1945) and discuss how the League's political strategy led to its recognition as the sole representative of Muslims.
5. Analyze how the AIML transformed from a political party to the leading force behind Pakistan's creation.
6. Discuss the Muslim League's achievements in the events leading up to the partition of India in 1947.

## LEARNING OUTCOMES

After studying this unit:

1. Explain the importance of the Lahore Resolution. Describe its key points and how it set the foundation for Pakistan.

2. Assess the Cripps Mission and its impact on Muslim politics. Understand why the League opposed the proposals and how this rejection furthered their demand for Pakistan.

3. Analyze the Muslim League's Mobilization Strategies. Explain how Jinnah and the League engaged the Muslim population in the independence movement.

4. Evaluate the political significance of the Simla Conference. Discuss how it established Jinnah's leadership and strengthened the League's political position.

5. Examine the organizational growth of the Muslim League. Identify the strategies used to consolidate its position as the dominant Muslim political party.

# 1. LAHORE RESOLUTION

From March 22 to March 24, 1940, the All India Muslim League held its annual session at Minto Park, Lahore. This session proved to be historic. On the first day of the session, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah described the political developments of the last few months. In a straightforward, informal speech, he presented his solution to the Muslim problem. He elaborated the problem of India, not of an 'inter-communal nature ', but clearly an international one and must be treated as such. He reiterated that the differences between Hindus and Muslims were so great and sharp in nature that their union under one central government would prove fatal for both. He explained that the Hindus and Muslims belonged to two separate nations and therefore should be given a chance to have separate states. He said,

> "Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different religions, philosophies, social customs and literature. They neither inter-marry nor inter-dine and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations that are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their concepts on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Muslims derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, different heroes and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other, and likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state".He further said, "Mussalmans are a nation according to any definition of nation. We wish our people to develop to the fullest spiritual, cultural, economic, social and political life in a way that we think best and in consonance with our own ideals and according to the genius of our people".

On the basis of the ideas of Mr. Jinnah, A. K. Fazl-ul-Haq, then Chief Minister of Bengal, moved the historical resolution which has since come to be known as the **Lahore Resolution** or **Pakistan Resolution**. The Resolution declared:

> "No constitutional plan would be workable or acceptable to the Muslims unless geographical contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary. That the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign". It further reads, "That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in the units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights of the minorities, with their consultation. Arrangements thus should be made for the security of Muslims where they were in a minority".

The Resolution denounced the concept of a united India and recommended the creation of an independent Muslim state consisting of Punjab, NWFP, Sindh, and Baluchistan in the northwest and Bengal and Assam in the northeast. The Resolution was seconded by Maulana Zafar Ali Khan from Punjab, Sardar Aurangzeb from the NWFP, Sir Abdullah Haroon from Sindh, and Qazi Esa from

Baluchistan, along with several others. The Resolution was passed on March 24. It laid down only the principles, with the details left to be worked out at a future date. It was made a part of the All India Muslim League's constitution in 1941. It was based on this resolution that in 1946 the Muslim League decided to go for a separate state for the Muslims, instead of two. Having passed the Pakistan Resolution, the Muslims of India announced their ultimate goal. Instead of seeking a coalition with the Hindu community, they chose a new path whose destination was a separate homeland for the Muslims of India.

## 2. AUGUST OFFER 1940

In 1940, the British government desired the cooperation of the problems of the sub-continent in winning that war. That's why, Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, made an important declaration on behalf of the British government called the August Offer. The following are the salient features of this offer:

i. Though the differences which prevented national unity remained unabridged in India, the expansion of the Executive Council of the Governor-General and the establishment of an Advisory War Council should no longer be postponed.
ii. Because of the doubts as to whether the position of minorities would be sufficiently safeguarded in any future constitutional change, the British Government reaffirmed its desire that full weight should be given to minority opinion. Could not contemplate the transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any system of Government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements of India's national life. Nor could they be parties to the coercion of such elements into submission to such a government. This indicated that the British Government was prepared to allow the Muslim League to have here own way in the matter of the partition of the country.
iii. Subject to the fulfilment of their obligations an allusion to such questions as defence, minority rights, the treaties with the States, and the position of the Secretary of State Services the British Government concurred in the Indian desire that the framing of the new Constitution should be primarily the responsibility of Indians themselves, and about originate from Indian conceptions of the social, economic and political structure of the Indian life.
iv. Constitutional issues could not be decided at a moment when the national life is engaged in a struggle for existence, but after the war, a representative Indian body should be set up to formulate a new Constitution, and in the meantime, the British Government would welcome and assist any efforts to reach agreement as to the form and operation of this constitution-making body and as to the principles of the Constitution.
v. In the interval, the British Government hoped that all parties and communities in India would cooperate in India's war effort, and thus, working together, pave the way for India's attainment of free and equal partnership in the British Commonwealth of Nations.

But despite this threatening situation, the attitude of the Indian leaders did not change. The Congress was as hostile as ever. It was not prepared to help the British against anybody. It could help only if India were given independence. The Congress

regarded this offer as quite unsatisfactory and started the Civil Disobedience campaign under the leadership of Gandhi. AIML did not support that movement that started with Gandhi. But Quaid again and again realized that whenever the Britishers they formulated any constitution for India, they should remember the Muslims as well as other communities. The Muslim League was more concerned with the partition of India than its immediate salvation from the Japanese conquest. In the meantime, the Quaid-i-Azam had declared that he would not be a party to any change in the composition of the central government unless it was arranged on a basis of parity between the Hindus and Muslims. When the Viceroy formed a National Defence Council in 1941, the Quaid-i-Azam directed its Muslim League members to resign.

## 3. MOBILIZATION FOR 'PAKISTAN SCHEME'

The mass mobilization had started after the Pakistan resolution was passed in 1940. Muslim men, women, and children all gathered under the flag of AIML and struggled for their single cause: Pakistan. The adoption of the Lahore Resolution gave the Muslims an objective: the establishment of an independent State, and the struggle started for its achievement. They got united under the leadership of Quaid-i-Azam and started a movement to get rid of British colonialism and forestall Hindu imperialism. The British made every possible effort to save "Indian Union", which they considered the greatest achievement of the British in India, and the Hindus made their best to stop the creation of Pakistan, as it would frustrate their dream of substitution of Hindu Raj for the British Raj. In his Presidential address at the Twenty-Ninth Session of All India Muslim League, (April 3-6, 1942). Quaid-i-Azam observed:

> "The document (Cripps proposals) shows that Pakistan is treated as a remote possibility and there is definite preference for a new Indian Union which is the main objective and suggestion: and the rules of procedure and the process indicated in the document, and the interviews and explanation of Sir Stafford Cripps so far are against us". The proposals were therefore rejected by the Muslim league.

Saeedud Din Dar, explains the AIML role in Ideology of Pakistan,

"The British made a number of efforts, during 1942-46 to keep India united. The first attempt was made in March 1942. The Cripps Mission brought a draft declaration, which stated that an elected body was to be set up after the war to frame a new constitution for Indian. While in the proposals there was a reference to the right of any province to secede, yet united Indian remained the ideal. Sir Stafford Cripps said: "The constitution-making body will have as its objects the framing of a single constitution for the whole of India that is of British India together with such Indian States as may decide to join it. We hope and expect to see an Indian Union strong and united…" In his Presidential address at the Twenty-ninth Session of All India Muslim League, (April 3-6, 1942). Quaid-i-Azam observes: "The document shows that Pakistan is treated as a remote possibility and there is definite preference for a new Indian Union which is the main objective and suggestion: and the rules of procedure and the process indicated in the document, and the interviews and explanation of Sir Stafford Cripps so far are against us". The proposals were rejected by the Muslim league.

Jinnah-Gandhi talks (September 1944) and Simla Conference (June 1945) failed due to fundamental differences between the Congress and the Muslim league on the future of Indian. The Congress wanted to settle the differences after the withdrawal of the British, while the Muslim league demanded that the settlement must precede independence. In the elections to the Central and Provincial Legislatures, held in the winter of 145-46, the Muslims rejected the idea f United India and fully supported the demand for Pakistan. The Muslim League won 425 out of 441 seats in the provincial legislatures and all seats reserved for the Muslims in the Central Legislature. In 1946 the British made the last attempt to save the federation. The Cabinet Mission Plan (March 1946) presented a compromise formula. The Muslim League accepted the Plan in the hope that it would ultimately lead to the establishment of Pakistan. But the manner in which Congress interpreted it and the British Government tried to favour the Congress in its implementation forced the Muslim League to withdraw its acceptance and resort to "direct action:" to achieve Pakistan.

The formation and working of the interim Government, (1946) showed that Hindus and the Muslim could not share power. The cabinet was seriously divided from within and its Hindu and Muslim members differed on almost every issue that came up for consideration. On February 20, 1947 the British Government announced its intention of transferring power in British India to "Indian hands" by June 1948. The task of transfer of power was assigned to Lord Mountbatten. He reached India in March 1947 with the mission to make last effort to save United India and in case of failure to preparer a partition plan. After his talks with the Indian leaders he was soon convinced that partition was inevitable. In the end of May, Mountbatten went to London for consolation and finalization of the plan.

On June 3, 1947 British Prime Minister Attlee made a statement in the House of Commons, which is commonly known as "3rd June Plan" or Mountbatten Plan". According to the Plan the Provincial Legislative Assemblies of the Punjab and Bengal were to meet in two parts representing the Muslim majority areas and the non-Muslim majority areas. Each part was to decide by simple majority whether the province was to be partitioned or not. The future of Sind was to be decided by its legislative Assembly and that of Baluchistan by the non official members of Quetta Municipal Committee and Shahi Jirga. Referendum was to be held in North Western Frontier Province and district Sylhet of Assam to ascertain the wished of the people. In case the Punjab and Bengal decided in favour of partition and Sylhet in favour of joining Pakistan separate Boundary Commissions were to be appointed for the demarcation of new boundaries. On June 9, 1947 the Muslim League Council gave full authority to Quaid-i-Azam "to accept the fundamental principles of the Plan," which he did. Punjab and Bengal voted in favour of partition and Sind, Baluchistan, North Western Frontier Province and Sylhet decided to join Pakistan. On July 17, 1947 the British parliament passed Indian Independence Act, which brought to an end the British rule in the subcontinent and provided for the creation of Dominations of Pakistan and India.

The Muslim stand was vindicated on Friday, August 14, 1947/ Ramadan 27, 1366H and a philosophical vision became a political reality. It will not be out of place to point out that the first Muslim state in the subcontinent was also established in the month of Ramadan. It was on the 10th day of Ramadan 93 A.H that Muhammad Bin Qasim defeated Raja Dahir and occupied Debal in Sind. The creation of Pakistan was not the

creation of another state. It was the creation of a state with a difference. It was the creation of a "Muslim State" which Iqbal considered necessary for "the enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam and implementation of the spirit of Muslim culture." It was the "homeland:" for the Muslims South Asia which Quaid-i-Azam demanded for "the development fullest" of their "spiritual cultural, economic, social and political life," in consonance with their own "ideals" and according to their "genius". It was the dreamland of the Muslim masses, where they wanted the essence of Tauhid—equality, solidarity and freedom implemented as a working idea. The slogan "Pakistan ka matlab kya? La ilaha ill Allah" was not an emotional cry; it was the loud expression of the collective unconscious of the Muslim Community of South Asia". (See, Saeedud Din Ahmad Dar, Ideology of Pakistan, NIHCR, 1999, pp. 21-25.)

## 4. CRIPPS PROPOSALS 1942

The deadlock in Indian politics continued for a year and a half. At last, when the Japanese, after overrunning Malaya, were rapidly advancing in Burma, the British made a conciliatory gesture. But the British Government refused to come to terms with the Congress, and the latter refused to cooperate with the former. The international situation began to deteriorate. In December 1941, Japan joined the war against the U.S.A. and Great Britain. The Japanese armies advanced swiftly all over the North-East Asian countries. The tide of their conquest rolled at a tremendous pace toward Burma and India. When Singapore fell in February 1942, the security of India was threatened. Rangoon fell on March 7. Colombo was bombarded. Some bombs fell on the eastern coast of India. Calcutta was threatened, and refugees began to leave that great city. But despite this, the attitude of Indian leaders did not change. It was not prepared to help the British against anybody. The impact of World War II forced Britain on 11 March 1942, and the prime minister of Great Britain, Sir Winston Churchill, announced the appointment of a mission. So, in March 1942, Sir Stafford Cripps, the leader of the House of Commons, came to India with a proposal on behalf of the British Government. Cripps repeated August's offer and promised Dominion Status and established a constitution-making body after the war to frame a new constitution, but held out no hope of any immediate change in the Government of India. These proposals were published on 30th March 1942 in a Newspaper.

i. The main purpose of this was to secure Indian cooperation and support for their effort in WWII
ii. To build up a consensus among Indian leaders, particularly Congress leaders
iii. To strengthen their rule over India
iv. For conciliation between the Britishers and the Indians

Both the Congress and the League rejected the proposals. The Congress believed that they were meant to break up the unity of India, while the Muslim League thought that, though Pakistan was conceded by implication, no firm commitment had been made. The differences between various parties could be resolved only after the withdrawal of British authority. So, on August 8, 1942, the All-India Congress Committee adopted a resolution in favour of starting a mass struggle on the widest possible scale. He also adopted a resolution called Quit India. Although

Gandhi announced the movement to remain peaceful, this movement took its shape of Hindu Muslim riots. Quaid-i-Azam expressed that it was an intrigue to oppose the Muslims. The Muslims at the meetings raised the slogan, “Divide and Go”. “India shall be divided”. Such conditions prevailed for many months. In response, all Congress leaders were arrested, and Congress was declared an illegal body. Meanwhile, the Muslim League gained more popularity. AIML approached the Muslim masses and convinced them that the only way for them to survive as a nation was to achieve their separate land. The people were now aware of the tactics of the INC. It was clear that Gandhi could not be able to secure control over India by ignoring the Muslims.

## 5. SIMLA CONFERENCE: VICTORY OF AIML

In May 1945, Lord Wavell, the Viceroy of India, visited London and discussed his course of action about the future of India with the British administration. The talks resulted in the formulation of a plan of action that was made public in June 1945. The plan is known as the Wavell Plan. The Plan suggested reconstitution of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, in which the Viceroy was supposed to select nominations by the political parties. All communities were planned to get their due share in the Council, and parity was reserved for Hindus and Muslims. While announcing the plan, the Secretary of State for Indian Affairs made it clear that the British Government desired to listen to the reaction of all major Indian communities. He said that it was only possible if the leadership of the leading Indian political parties agreed with the suggestions of the British Government. To discuss these proposals with the leadership of major Indian parties, Lord Wavell called for a conference at Simla on June 25, 1945. Leaders of both the Congress and the Muslim League participated in the conference, which was known as the Simla Conference. However, differences became obvious between the leadership of the two parties on the issue of representation of the Muslim community. The Muslim League claimed that it was the only representative party of the Muslims in India and thus all the Muslim representatives in the Viceroy’s Executive Council should be the nominees of the party. Congress, which had sent Maulana Azad as the leader of their delegation, tried to prove that their party represented all the communities living in India and thus should be allowed to nominate a Muslim representative as well. Congress also opposed the idea of parity between the Hindus and the Muslims. All this resulted in a stalemate. Finally, Wavell announced the failure of the conference on 14$^{th}$ July. The conference could not proceed further.

## COMPULSORY READING

Saeed, Ahmed and Kh. Mansur Sarwar. *Trek to Pakistan.* Lahore: Institute of Pakistan Historical Research, 2002. (pp. 45–52 & 111–115)

## SUGGESTED READINGS

Coupland, Reginald, The Constitutional Problem in India. London: Oxford University Press, 1944.

Flynn, Vince. Transfer of Power. London: Pocket, 2003.

Sarkar, Sumit. Modern India: 1885-1947. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989.

Sherwani, Latif Ahmed. ed. Pakistan in Making. Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1987.

Spear, T.G. Percival. The Oxford History of Modern India 1740-1975. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978.

## SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS

1. Examine the Lahore Resolution 1940 in the context of controversies it generated in the ensuing years.
2. Whether 'Lahore Resolution 1940' offered a viable communal solution for India? Comment.
3. Examine the Cripps Proposals. To what extent it strengthened the AIML?
4. Discuss the Mobilization Strategy of the AIML for the' Pakistan Scheme'. How did it affect the post-partition politics in Pakistan?
5. Discuss the Proceedings of the Simla Conference. What factors strengthened the position of the AIML?
6. What were the key points of the Lahore Resolution (1940), and why was it a turning point in Muslim politics?
7. How did the Indian National Congress and the British government react to the Lahore Resolution?
8. What were the main proposals of the Cripps Mission (1942), and why did the AIML reject them?
9. How did the rejection of the Cripps Proposals contribute to the Muslim League's strengthening of its demand for Pakistan?
10. What strategies did the Muslim League use to mobilize public support for Pakistan?
11. How did Jinnah's leadership influence the League's mass mobilization efforts?
12. What were the main objectives of the Simla Conference (1945)?
13. Why was the Simla Conference considered a political victory for the AIML?
14. How did the Simla Conference impact Congress's claim of representing all Indians?
15. How did the political successes of the AIML between 1940 and 1945 contribute to the final partition of India?
16. What role did the Muslim League's electoral victories (1945-46 elections) play in securing Pakistan?

**Unit–09**

# ALL INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE: THE SOLE SPOKESMAN OF THE MUSLIMS

*Written by:* **Dr. Fozia Umar**
*Reviewed by:* **Dr. Kausar Parveen**

# CONTENTS


| | | Page # |
|---|---|---|
| Introduction | | 119 |
| Objectives and Learning Outcomes | | 120 |
| 1. | AIML's Performance in the Elections 1937& 1946-47: A Comparative Analysis | 121 |
| 2. | Elections of 1937 | 121 |
| | 2.1 Muslim League's Manifesto | 121 |
| | 2.2 Election Results | 121 |
| | 2.3 Causes of the Failure of AIML | 122 |
| 3. | Elections of 1946-47 | 122 |
| | 3.1 Causes of the Muslim League Victory | 123 |
| 4. | Muslim League Performance Elections 1937 & 1946–47: Comparison | 126 |
| 5. | Cabinet Mission Plan: AIML Stance | 126 |
| | 5.1 Divergent Perceptions | 127 |
| 6. | Working of the Interim Government | 127 |
| | 6.1 Significance of Interim Government | 128 |
| 7. | Direct Action Day 16 August 1946 | 128 |
| 8. | The poor man's budget of united India | 128 |
| 9. | The New/Last Viceroy Lord Mountbatten | 128 |
| 10. | The Transfer of Power: 3rd June Plan and Indian Independence Act 3rd June Plan | 129 |
| 11. | Birth of Pakistan | 129 |
| Compulsory Readings | | 165 |
| Required Readings | | 165 |
| Self-Assessment Questions | | 166 |

# INTRODUCTION

The All India Muslim League (AIML) evolved from a moderate political organization into the sole representative of Indian Muslims and a powerful force that led to the creation of Pakistan. From its poor performance in the 1936-37 elections to its resounding success in the 1945-46 elections, the League solidified its position as the voice of the Muslim community.

This unit examines the key political events that contributed to the League's success, including the Cabinet Mission Plan (1946), the formation of the interim government, and the Direct Action Day (1946). These events exposed the widening rift between Hindus and Muslims, making partition inevitable. The unit also explores the economic policies of the interim government (such as the Poor Man's Budget), the June 3, 1947, Plan, and the transfer of power, leading to the birth of Pakistan on August 14, 1947.

By studying this unit, students will understand how the AIML overcame challenges, consolidated its power, and successfully led the movement for Pakistan.

## OBJECTIVES

After studying this unit, you will be able to:

1. Analyze the AIML's performance in the 1936-37 and 1945-46 elections. Evaluate the factors behind its initial failure and later success.
2. Evaluate the Cabinet Mission Plan (1946), its proposals, the reactions of Congress and the Muslim League, and why it ultimately failed.
3. Understand the workings of the interim government (1946-47) and examine how political tensions escalated under joint governance.
4. Examine the causes and consequences of Direct Action Day (1946) and analyze its impact on Hindu-Muslim relations and the demand for Pakistan.
5. Assess the significance of the Poor Man's Budget and understand its implications and how it influenced Muslim political sentiment.
6. Explore the June 3, 1947, Plan and the Transfer of Power.
7. Study the British decision to partition India and how power was formally transferred.
8. Understand the birth of Pakistan and trace the final steps leading to the creation of Pakistan on August 14, 1947

## LEARNING OUTCOMES

After studying this unit, you will be able to:

1. Explain the AIML's political transformation – Describe how the League emerged as the dominant Muslim political force after 1940.
2. Analyze the results of the 1936-37 and 1945-46 elections. Assess how the League's electoral performance shaped the independence movement.
3. Evaluate the Cabinet Mission Plan (1946). Discuss its proposals and the reasons for its failure.
4. Discuss the challenges of the interim government. Explain how conflicts between Congress and the League increased tensions.
5. Evaluate the impact of Direct Action Day. Analyze how this event escalated communal violence and strengthened the demand for Pakistan.
6. Understand the economic policies of the interim government. Examine the Poor Man's Budget and its impact on Muslim political consciousness.
7. Explain the June 3, 1947, Plan.

Trace the events leading to the creation of Pakistan. Analyze the final steps that resulted in the independence of Pakistan on August 14, 1947.

# 1. AIML'S PERFORMANCE IN THE ELECTIONS 1937 & 1946-47: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The performance of the Muslim League in the elections is discussed in detail as follows:

## 2. ELECTIONS OF 1937

February-March elections under the Government of India Act 1935

### 2.1 Muslim League's Manifesto

1. Protection of the religious rights of the Muslims
2. Repeal of all oppressive laws
3. Opposing all laws, which were antagonistic to the interests of India and which adversely affected the basic human rights.
4. Curtailing administrative expenditure and using the savings on constructive projects.
5. Curtailing expenditure on the Indian army, ensuring Indians' induction into the army, and using the savings on constructive projects.
6. Industrialization and improvement in the economic, social, and educational conditions in rural areas.
7. Compulsory primary education.
8. Protection of the Urdu language and its script.
9. Improvement in the general welfare of the Muslims.
10. Cultivating correct public opinion and reawakening of general political awareness.

### 2.2 Election Results

Absolute majority**:** Madras, U.P., C.P., Bihar, and Orissa, form govt. in Bombay

**Provincial Results**

| **Province** | **Total Seats** | **Muslim Seats** | **Congress** | **Muslim League** | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NWFP | 50 | 36 | 19 | | | |
| Punjab | 175 | 82 | 18 | 1 | | |
| Sindh | 60 | 34 | 07 | | | |
| Bengal | 250 | 119 | 50 | 40 | | |
| Assam | 108 | 34 | 35 | 09 | | |
| Bombay | 175 | 30 | 88 | 20 | | |
| Madras | 215 | 29 | 159 | 11 | | |
| U.P. | | 228 | | 66 | 134 | 27 |
| C.P. | | 112 | 14 | 71 | | |
| Bihar | | 152 | 40 | 98 | | |
| Orissa | 60 | 04 | 36 | | | |
| **Total** | **1585** | **492** | **715** | **108** | | |

*Source: Enlist India for Freedom by Edward Thompson*

## 2.3 Causes of the Failure of AIML

- Lack of Resources
- Ineffective Propaganda Machinery/ one newspaper **The Star of India**
- Success of Regional Muslim Parties, Unionist Party in Punjab, Krishak Proja Party in Bengal, Khudai Khidmatgars in NWFP, Sindh United Party in Sindh.
- AIML announced that it would **cooperate with the Congress** in the Legislative Assembly.

# 3. ELECTIONS OF 1946-47

- **Central Assembly Results**
  100% success ML won all 30 Muslim Seats & Congress won 57 out of 62% seats

**Provincial Election Results**

| Province | Total Seats | Muslim Seats | Congress | Muslim League |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **NWFP** | 50 | 36 | 30 | 17 |
| **Punjab** | 175 | 86 | 51 | 73 |
| **Sindh** | 60 | 34 | 18 | 27 |
| **Begal** | 250 | 119 | 86 | 113 |
| **Assam** | 108 | 34 | 58 | 31 |
| **Bombay** | 175 | 30 | 165 | 30 |
| **Madras** | 215 | 29 | 125 | 29 |
| **UP** | 228 | 66 | 152 | 54 |
| **CP Berar** | 112 | 14 | 92 | 13 |
| **Bihar** | 152 | 40 | 98 | 34 |
| **Orissa** | 60 | 04 | 47 | 04 |
| **Total** | **1585** | **492** | **923** | **425** |

*Source: The Indian Annual Register, 1946, Vol. 1, pp. 230-31.*

## 3.1 Causes of the Muslim League Victory

- Pakistan Demand
- Congress Raj 1937–39
- The Reorganization of the Muslim League after the elections of 1937, Parliamentary Boards, Committee of Action etc.
- Support of regional parties, Krishak Proja Party's Chief Minister Fazlul Huq, Unionist Party Chief Minister Sikandar Hayat (Skandar-Jinnah Pact 1937), Assam Chief Minister Muhammad Saadullah.
- Second World War and the resignation of Congress Ministries

## 4. MUSLIM LEAGUE PERFORMANCE ELECTIONS 1937 &1946-47: COMPARISON

| Province | Muslim Seats | Elections 1937 | Elections 1946-47 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **NWFP** | 36 | ---------- | 17 | |
| **Punjab** | 86 | 01 | 73 | |
| **Sindh** | 34 | ---------- | 27 | |
| **Bengal** | 119 | 40 | 113 | |
| **Assam** | 34 | 09 | 31 | |
| **Bombay** | 30 | 20 | 30 | |
| **Madras** | 29 | 11 | 29 | |
| **UP** | 66 | 27 | 54 | |
| **CP Berar** | 14 | ---------- | 13 | |
| **Bihar** | 40 | ---------- | 34 | |
| **Orissa** | 04 | ---------- | 04 | |
| **Total** | **492** | **108** | **425** | |

### 3. CABINET MISSION 1946

On February 19, the British Prime Minister announced that three members of the Cabinet would visit India to promote, in conjunction with the leaders of Indian opinion, the early realization of full self-government in India. Later, on March 15, they referred to complete independence as a possible goal of Indian constitutional development, if Indians so chose. The Cabinet Mission arrived at Delhi in March 1946, and held a series of conferences with the leaders of the Congress and the League. As no agreement was possible between them, the Mission stated on May 16, 1946, giving in broad outline their idea of the future government of India and laying down the procedure for framing a detailed constitution. The Cabinet mission recommended:

i. A federal type of government for the whole of India including the States.
ii. The Federal Government would deal with Foreign Affairs, Defense and Communication, and the other powers would be vested in the Provinces and States.
iii. British India was to be divided into three groups of Provinces.
   - Group A Madras, Bombay, the United Provinces, the Central Provinces, Bihar and Orissa.
   - Group B comprises the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan.
   - Group C comprising Bengal and Assam by a Constituent Assembly of 292 members elected on a communal basis by the Provincial Legislative Assemblies, and 93 representatives of States which joined the Union, while the representatives of the three groups of Provinces group.

iv. Each Province was given the right to opt out of the Federal Union after the first election of its Legislative Council under the new Constitution.
v. The Cabinet Mission further recommended the establishment of an interim National Government by the reconstitution of the Viceroy's Executive Council from among the leaders of the different parties.

On June 6, the Muslim League accepted the Cabinet Mission's proposals, retreating that the attainment of the goal of a complete sovereign Pakistan remained the unalterable objective of the Muslims in India. The Congress rejected the Viceroy's proposal for an interim Government but agreed to participate in the Constituent Assembly to frame the Constitution. On the other hand, the Working Committee of the Congress passed a resolution on June 26, 1946, by which it accepted the Scheme partially. The Congress accepted only that part of the Committee was report that the grouping of the provinces was not to be compulsory. However, the Congress rejected the interim Government scheme on the grounds that the clarification given to them on the subject was not acceptable. The resolution of the Working Committee of the Congress was ratified by the All-India Congress Committee. The Sikhs rejected the Scheme completely on the ground that the compulsory grouping of the provinces as contemplated by the Scheme was suicidal to their interest.

Before the members of the Cabinet Mission left India, they stated, along with Lord Wavell, in which they expressed their satisfaction that the work of making the constitution would proceed with the consent of the major parties in India. They regretted that an Interim Government consisting of the various parties could not be formed on account of certain difficulties. It was hoped that after the elections to the Constituent Assembly were over, negotiations would be started for the formation of an interim Government consisting of the representatives of the various parties.

Jinnah, who had accepted the Scheme in its entirety, was annoyed at the British Government's decision to postpone the formation of the interim Government. He accused Lord Wavell of having one. Back his promise. He was so very angry that the Muslim League under his leadership passed another resolution on July 29, 1946, by which it withdrew its former acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan. Jinnah was not content with this action. The Muslim League also passed the famous Direct-Action resolution by which both the Congress and the British Government were condemned for their breach of faith with the Muslims. It was declared that the time had come for the Muslim League to resort to direct action to achieve Pakistan. The resolution authorized the Working Committee of the league to prepare a programme of direct action at On August 16, 1946, it was fixed as the Direct Action Day. On that day, Hindu Muslim riots took place in Calcutta on an unprecedented scale. There was a lot of bloodshed. There was an enormous loss of life and

property. The British Government did nothing to stop this wholesale massacre. The Cabinet Mission left India on June 29.

The Muslim League demanded that the Viceroy should proceed with his scheme for an interim Government even though the Congress would not take part in it. This Viceroy refused to do so, for he had already declared that it was to be a government of all the parties who had accepted the Cabinet Missions plan. There were also sharp differences between the Muslim League and the Congress over the interpretation of the Cabinet Mission's plan. The tense atmosphere continued till February 20, 1947, when the British Government made an important announcement of policy. It declared its intention to quit India by June 1948, and appointed Lord Mountbatten Viceroy of India to arrange for the transfer of authority from British to Indian hands. This momentous proclamation evoked hearty enthusiasm all over India, save in the ranks of the Muslim League, which once more resorted to Direct Action. Riots broke out all over the Punjab and soon extended to the North-West Frontier Province, and lootings, arson, murder, and violence occurred on a large scale over a wide area. These successive communal outbreaks had a very unfortunate consequence. The Hindus and the Sikhs, who had hitherto been strongly in favour of a United India, now gradually came to realize its impracticability, and demanded the partition of Punjab and Bengal if the Muslims refused to join the Constituent Assembly.

The Cabinet Mission Scheme had both its merits:

i. Its greatest merit was that the Constituent Assembly was to be constituted on the democratic principle of population strength.
ii. The principle of being weightier was discarded altogether.
iii. The democratic method of decision-making of issues by a simple majority was adopted in the case of communal issues.
iv. Safeguards were provided for minorities.
v. The proposals also provided for an Indian Union of Provinces and States and rejected the idea of Pakistan completely.
vi. This was the last attempt made by the British statement to save the country from division and disaster. Some of the anomalies of the Schemes were also due to the desire of the members of the Cabinet mission to save Indian unity at any cost.
vii. The Scheme required that all the members of the Constituent Assembly were to be Indians. Neither the British Government nor the non-official Europeans in India were to be given any representation in constituent assemblies. The European members of the Provincial assemblies were to absent themselves from voting.
viii. It was as if there was to be no interference with the work of the Constituent Assembly either by the British Government or by its officials in India. Within the framework of the Scheme, the Construing Assembly was to be its own master.

However, there were also certain defects in the Cabinet Mission Scheme:

i. Although the rights of the Muslim minority were protected, it was done for other minorities, such as the Sikhs in the Punjab.

ii. The proposals of the Cabinet Mission concerning the grouping of the provinces were not clear. Both the Congress and the Muslim League interpreted the provisions differently.
iii. The Muslims regarded the compulsory grouping of the provinces as one of the cornerstones of the Cabinet Mission proposals and were not prepared to come to a compromise on that question.
iv. The Congress's stand was that the making of groups was optional for the provinces. The latter were free to join or not to join any group. Mahatma Gandhi asked the people of Assam not to join the group if they did not approve of it. They were asked not to care for the consequences. To solve this difficulty, it was suggested that the provinces might join the provision, but later freedom might be given to them to leave it if they so desired.
v. The Congress suggested that the matter might be referred to the Federal Court for decision. However, the British Government gave its verdict in favour of the compulsory grouping of the provinces. The Muslim League won, and the Congress lost its point.

Another defect of the Scheme was the order in which the Union and Sectional Assemblies were to meet and work and draft their constitutions. It looked ridiculous at first to form the constitutions of the groups and the provinces and then to frame the Constitution of the Union. It was like putting the cart before the horse. This practical difficulty would have been experienced if the whole scheme had been worked out in actual practice.

The Congress's stand was that the making of groups was optional for the provinces. The latter were free to join or not to join any group. Mahatma Gandhi asked the people of Assam not to join the group if they did not approve of it. They were asked not to care for the consequences. To solve this difficulty, it was suggested that the provinces might join the provision, but later freedom might be given to them to leave it if they so desired.
vi. The Congress suggested that the matter might be referred to the Federal Court for decision. However, the British Government gave its verdict in favour of the compulsory grouping of the provinces. The Muslim League won, and the Congress lost its point.
vii. Another defect of the Scheme was the order in which the Union and Sectional Assemblies were to meet and work and draft their constitutions. It looked ridiculous at first to form the constitutions of the groups and the provinces and then to frame the Constitution of the Union. It was like putting the cart before the horse. This practical difficulty would have been experienced if the whole scheme had been worked out in actual practice.
viii. It is desirable to trace the eyes that followed the publication of the statement of May 19, 1946. The AIML passed a resolution on June 6, 1946, by which it accepted the Scheme in its entirety.

## 5. CABINET MISSION PLAN: AIML STANCE

All of the British Government’s attempts to establish peace between the Congress and the Muslim League had failed. The results of the general elections held in 1945-

46 served to underline the urgency to find a solution to the political deadlock, which was the result of non-cooperation between the two major parties. To end this, the British government sent a special mission of cabinet ministers to India. The mission consisted of Lord Pethick-Lawrence, the Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade, and A. V. Alexander, the First Lord of the Admiralty. The purpose of the mission was:

1. Preparatory discussions with elected representatives of British India and the Indian states to secure agreement as to the method of framing the constitution.
2. Setting up of a constitutional body.
3. Setting up an Executive Council with the support of the main Indian parties.

The mission arrived on March 24, 1946. After extensive discussions with Congress and the Muslim League, the Cabinet Mission put forward its own proposals on 16th May 1946. The main points of the plan were:

1. There would be a union of India comprising both British India and the Indian States that would deal with foreign affairs, defense, and communications. The union would have an Executive and a Legislature.
2. All residuary powers would belong to the provinces.
3. All provinces would be divided into three sections. Provinces could opt out of any group after the first general elections.
4. There would also be an **interim government** having the support of the major political parties.

### 5.1 Divergent Perceptions

- Different interpretation of the Cabinet Mission Plan.
- The Muslim League demands to be considered the sole representative of the Muslims
- Equal representation in government

## 6. WORKING OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT

The Interim government was formed on 2 September 1946 & was reconstituted on 25 October 1946.

- **Nominated Hindu Ministers**

| | |
|---|---|
| 1. Jagjivan Ram, | **(**Labour) |
| 2. Jawagarlal Nehru, | (Foreign Affairs & Commonwealth Relations) |
| 3. Rajgopalacharia | (Education and Arts) |
| 4. Rajendra Prasad | (Food and Agriculture) |
| 5. Sardar Patel | (Home, Information & Broadcasting) |

- **Muslim Members with portfolios**

1. Ismail Ibrahim Chundrigar (Commerce)
2. Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar (Communications)
3. Jugindarnath Mandal (Law)
4. Liaquat Ali Khan (Finance)
5. Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan (Health)

- **Minorities**

1. Parsi Member C. H. Bhabha (Works, Mines & Power)
2. Christian Member Dr. Jan Methai (Industries & Supplies)
3. Sikh Member Defence**:** Sardar Baldeve Singh (Defence)

### 6.1 Significance of the Interim Government

- Practical proof of non-cooperation and divergent perceptions and interests of the Hindu and the Muslim communities
- Proof of the Inevitability of Pakistan

## 7. DIRECT ACTION DAY 16 AUGUST 1946

The Muslim League accepted the plan on June 6, 1946. Earlier, the Congress had accepted the plan on May 24, 1946, though it rejected the interim setup. The Viceroy should now have invited the Muslim League to form a Government as it had accepted the interim setup, but he did not do so. Meanwhile, Jawaharlal Nehru, addressing a press conference on 10th July, said that the Congress had agreed to join the constituent assembly, but said it would be free to make changes in the Cabinet Mission Plan. Under these circumstances, the Muslim League disassociated itself from the Cabinet Plan and resorted to "**Direct Action**" to achieve Pakistan. As a result, Viceroy Wavell invited the Congress to join the interim government, although it had practically rejected the plan. However, the Viceroy soon realized the futility of the scheme without the participation of the League. Therefore, on October 14, 1946, he extended an invitation to them as well. Jinnah nominated Liaquat Ali Khan, I. I. Chundrigar, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, Ghazanfar Ali Khan, and Jogandra Nath Mandal to the cabinet.

## 8. THE POOR MAN'S BUDGET OF UNITED INDIA

The Indian National Congress allocated the Finance Ministry to the League. This, in effect, placed the whole governmental setup under the Muslim League. As Minister of Finance, the budget Liaquat Ali Khan presented was called a "poor man's budget" as it adversely affected the Hindu capitalists. The deadlock between the Congress and the League further worsened in this setup.

## 9. THE NEW/LAST VICEROY LORD MOUNTBATTEN

On March 22, 1947, Lord Mountbatten arrived as the last Viceroy. It was

announced that power would be transferred from British to Indian hands by June 1948. Lord Mountbatten entered into a series of talks with the Congress and the Muslim League leaders. Quaid-i-Azam made it clear that the demand for Pakistan had the support of all the Muslims of India and that Muslims would not withdraw from it. With Hindu leaders as Patel agreeing to the Muslim demand for a separate homeland, Mountbatten now prepared for the partition of the Sub-continent and announced it on June 3, 1947.

## 10. THE TRANSFER OF POWER: 3RD JUNE PLAN AND INDIAN INDEPENDENCE ACT 3RD JUNE PLAN

The plan was made public on June 3, and is thus known as the June 3rd Plan. The following were the main clauses of this Plan:

1. The Provincial Legislative Assemblies of Punjab and Bengal were to meet in two groups, i.e., Muslim majority districts and non-Muslim majority districts. If either of the two decided in favor of the division of the province, then the Governor General would appoint a boundary commission to demarcate the boundaries of the province on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims.
2. The Legislative Assembly of Sindh (excluding its European Members) was to decide either to join the existing Constituent Assembly or the New Constituent Assembly.
3. To decide the future of the North West Frontier Province, a referendum was proposed. The Electoral College for the referendum was to be the same as the Electoral College for the provincial legislative assembly in 1946.
4. Baluchistan was also to be given the option to express its opinion on the issue.
5. If Bengal decided in favor of partition, a referendum was to be held in the Sylhet District of Assam to decide whether it would continue as a part of Assam or be merged with the new province of East Bengal.

## 11. BIRTH OF PAKISTAN

The British Parliament passed the Indian Independence Act on July 18, 1947. The Act created two dominions, the Indian Union and Pakistan. It also provided for the complete abolition of British control over Indian affairs from August 15, 1947. The Muslims of the Sub-continent had finally achieved their goal to have an independent state for themselves, after a long and persistent struggle under the guidance of Mr. Jinnah.

## COMPULSORY READINGS

Saeed, Ahmed and Kh. Mansur Sarwar. *Trek to Pakistan.* Lahore: Institute of Pakistan Historical Research, 2002.

Spear, T. G. Percival. *The Oxford History of Modern India 1740–1975*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

Coupland, Reginald, *The Constitutional Problem in India.* London: Oxford University Press, 1944.

Flynn, Vince. *Transfer of Power.* London: Pocket, 2003.

Sarkar, Sumit. *Modern India: 1885–1947.* Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989.

Sherwani, Latif Ahmed. ed. *Pakistan in Making.* Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1987.

Wasti, Syed Razi. *Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist Movement.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964.

## SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS

1. Compare the performance of AIML in the elections of 1937 and the elections of 1946-47. Point out the major causes of its victory in the last election.
2. Examine the working of the Interim Government. Why did this experiment fail?
3. Why did the Quaid-i-Azam accept the Cabinet Mission Plan despite AIML's clear stance on an independent state?
4. Examine the working of provincial Ministries after the elections of 1946-47.
5. Discuss the significance of the Muslim League Legislators Convention in 1946.
6. Examine the provisions of the 3rd June Plan and its implementation.
7. Bring out the significance of the Indian Independence Act for future governments of Pakistan and India.
8. Analyze different theories of Partition in the context of human sufferings.
9. What were the reasons for the AIML's poor performance in the 1936-37 elections?
10. How did the AIML successfully mobilize support for the 1945-46 elections, and what was its outcome?
11. What were the main proposals of the Cabinet Mission Plan (1946)?
12. Why did the Cabinet Mission Plan fail, and what were the reactions of the Congress and the Muslim League?
13. How did the interim government (1946-47) function, and what were its major challenges?
14. What was the purpose of Direct Action Day (August 16, 1946), and what were its consequences?
15. How did Direct Action Day impact Hindu-Muslim relations and the partition decision?
16. What was the Poor Man's Budget, and how did it influence Muslim political attitudes?
17. How was power transferred from British India to independent India and Pakistan?
18. What were the major challenges faced by Pakistan at the time of its creation?

# BIBLIOGRAPHY


Saeed, Ahmed and Kh. Mansur Sarwar. *Trek to Pakistan.* Lahore: Institute of Pakistan Historical Research, 2002.

Sayeed, Khalid B. *Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857–1948*. London: OUP, 1968.

Spear, T. G. Percival. *The Oxford History of Modern India 1740–1975*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978.

Coupland, Reginald, *The Constitutional Problem in Indi.* London: Oxford University Press, 1944.

Flynn, Vince. *Transfer of Power.* London: Pocket, 2003.

Mujahid, Sharif al. *Ideology of Pakistan.* Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 2001.

Philips, C.H and Mary Doreen Wainwright. *The Partition of India. : Policies and Perspectives, 1935–1947.* London: MIT, 1970.

Sarkar, Sumit. *Modern India: 1885–1947.* Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989.

Sherwani, Latif Ahmed. ed. *Pakistan in Making.* Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1987.

_____. ed. *Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan*, *1940–1947: A Selection of Documents Presenting the Case for Pakistan*. Karachi: National Pub. House, 1969.

Talbot, Ian. *Freedom's Cry: the Popular Dimension in the Pakistan Movement and Partition Experience in North-West India.* Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Wasti, Syed Razi. *Lord Minto and Indian Nationalist Movement.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964.

Zaman,Wahid-uz and M. Salim Akhtar. (ed.) *Islam in South Asia*. Islamabad: NIHCR, 1993.